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
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# ART IN EDUCATION AND LIFE

A Plea for the More Systematic Culture  
of the Sense of Beauty

BY

HENRY DAVIES, Ph. D.

Formerly Lecturer on Philosophy and  
Aesthetics in Yale University; Member  
of the American Philosophical Association, etc.

WITH INTRODUCTION BY

GEORGE TRUMBULL LADD

Emeritus Professor of Philosophy  
in Yale University

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
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**To**  
**My Father and Mother**



## INTRODUCTION

BY PROFESSOR LADD

The most ardent admirer of our American system of education would scarcely venture to claim that it affords any adequate place for æsthetical culture. It is true that a few of those actively interested in education have recognised this defect, and have made certain praiseworthy and more or less effectual efforts to remedy it. These efforts, when combined with a successful appeal to the civic pride of the locality, have here and there resulted in the architectural improvement, and even in the beautifying of the grounds and buildings devoted to the purposes of education. Instruction in the elements of the arts of drawing and music have been furnished in some of the primary and secondary schools; lectures on æsthetical subjects and schools of art have been founded in connection with some of the universities. And are not our millionaires becoming industrious collectors of the most expensive art-objects; while certain among them are securing the public approval by large gifts or bequests to our art museums? Multitudes of clubs, courses of lectures, and whole columns of "art criticism" in the public press, testify to a sort of interest in the æsthetical side of human life and develop-

ment. All this is in some measure encouraging and beneficial.

Yet I cannot think that the situation is completely satisfactory, whether as judged by the purity and intelligence of its motives or by the tendencies and characteristics of its results regarded as the beginning of a good endeavor. As respects these motives and tendencies, most of them lack, or seem to lack, a true appreciation of the relation in which the æsthetical side of human nature and development stands to all man's other interests and employments. For is it not true that our American public, and the major part of those who are fostering and conducting every branch and grade of our education, look upon the artistic impulses, interests and achievements, as something superfluous, something, so to say, which is over and above what is necessary to the solidity of the foundations and the superstructure, like a mansard roof to a building? With them such things are accomplishments, frills and trimmings, but not of the texture of the garment, not integral parts of education. They are pretty and entertaining accessories, if one has the time and inclination for them; but they are not necessities of full and true human living.

Such an attitude towards the æsthetical in education, whether secret or expressed, is a corollary from our national, exaggerated and even senseless overestimate of what we are pleased to call "the practical." Whatever else is to sink below the horizon of the aspirations and



ambitions of our youth, they must not lose sight of the practical. Their education must, by all means, whatever other deficiencies may be tolerated, not be deficient in the practical. Philosophy, ethics, and art, not being so obviously practical, are of comparatively little or no particular importance in the process of preparing the young for the life in which they must bear their part in our country and in the modern age. Such seems to be the prevailing opinion.

Now, any one who knows human nature comprehensively and generally, whether as manifested in the individual or in the history of the race, is obliged to protest against this view and the corresponding practice. For it is just these neglected subjects and interests which are most eminently practical, and most essentially related to the whole process of education as shaping conduct and as training for the attainment of the ideal. "Practical," forsooth! As though education in morals and manners were not practical; as though the appreciation or active production of beautiful objects were not an essential to the truest life and best practice of a human being — an essential which, alas! our modern worship of the so-called practical, of the huge factory, of the aggregate of machinery, is rendering well-nigh impossible for so many millions of our countrymen.

We need, then, to be constantly and sharply reminded that there are other things of value in human life and society, and other interests to be

fostered as having essential and inviolable rights in our system of education, than those on which the public eye is focussed at the present time. If we regard these interests and rights in an intelligent way, we see that the moment you pass beyond the most primary stage of education — namely, that limited by the three R's of the old-fashioned district school — æsthetical culture is as appropriate and indispensable as is scientific culture, for all the youth of the nation. If we wish to make truly educated men and women out of our boys and girls, we must take more into the account their æsthetical natures, and their susceptibility to, and need of, æsthetical training. Indeed, it is much more necessary that they should be trained to conduct themselves with propriety, to appreciate what is beautiful in nature and art, and to have respect for and joy in the artist's work, than that they should be trained in the dissection of frogs, or even in algebra, or the details of English grammar.

I am, therefore, glad to commend to the attention of the public this book, both because I am so heartily in sympathy with its effort to emphasize the essential character of education as involving feeling, judgment and the higher perceptions which relate to the beautiful in nature and art, and also because my long and intimate acquaintance with the author makes me know how competent he is, from his knowledge of theory and his skill in practice, to treat of this important subject.

GEORGE TRUMBULL LADD.

## AUTHOR'S PREFACE

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During the seven years I was a teacher of philosophy at Yale, I had a somewhat unusual opportunity of observing young men, whose education for life was in process of completion, and of forming some impressions of their equipment. While I hesitate to draw any positive conclusions from what I observed, not wishing to trust to the more or less casual recollections of the class room, I was struck by one thing, namely, that the educated young men who came to me, among their many fine qualities of body and mind, were singularly lacking in sensitiveness and delicacy of feeling in matters pertaining to art and beauty.

After I began to give separate courses in that subject, I made another even more striking discovery. I found that it was considered trivial, even by some students who had taken it up; my courses, which were among the list of electives, being classified, in the economy of the student mind, as of the "snap" variety generally regarded as easy; that is to say, requiring little work but gathering high marks in the examinations. I found that the idea had never crossed the minds of my students that one needs a *severe training* to understand and appreciate the beautiful. This I found to be a quite common idea even among some of the more serious-minded men of the uni-

versity, one of the more waggish of them openly confessing to me that he had never heard of the words "æsthetics" during his entire course, and that he had not the slightest idea what it meant! Imagine their surprise when they woke up and read the results of the examinations, when some of them had been plucked!

The inference I drew from these two discoveries was that there was something wanting in the earlier stages of the culture of these young gentlemen. This I found confirmed by my investigations of the public and secondary schools from which they came, which pay so little attention to the boy's taste; and there I believe the root of the trouble to lie. Be that as it may, I believe that it will be generally admitted that in matters of manners and taste our boys do not compare favorably with English, French and German boys, not to mention the youth of Japan. The conclusion seemed to me inevitable that had the earlier stages of my students' training provided adequate nourishment and stimulus for their sense of beauty, they would not so easily have adopted the view they did, when they came to my class-room to study æsthetics.

I determined, therefore, to make some practical use of my investigations of this situation, and call attention to what I must regard as a serious danger to the moral and, in the largest sense, the practical efficiency of our nation. The result is this book, which contains a review of some of the principal problems that arise when we address



ourselves to the task of imagining how the undoubted æsthetic gifts of the eighteen millions or so of young people, now under methodical discipline in our schools, colleges and universities, can and should be developed.

In the light of the circumstances of its origin I need hardly say that this work is in no sense a *system* of educational æsthetics. It is not intended to be anything so ambitious. It would be premature and presumptuous, at any rate for me, to attempt so great a task as the writing of one. As it is intended for the general public, or that portion of it that is interested in the discussion of education, as well as for those actively engaged in education, my aim has been to deal with the accepted rather than with the precious elements of a very practical situation. As the reader will find out for himself, if he perseveres, I have no royal roads to indicate, no new methods to recommend, no short-cuts to advise; nothing, in fact, but the same old beaten track of hard work and earnest thinking for all who would come to self-consciousness in matters of art and taste.

Believing as I do (I might rather say *knowing* as I do) from experience that the chief reason why this form of training is taboo to so many is chiefly because it is so dry and difficult — as dry and difficult as the learning of scales to the beginner in music — requiring that self-restraint, patience and resolute attention to detail which are so hard to command in these hurried days, I cannot expect that my audience will be large

or influential. But whatever risk there may be, my book goes forth on its career for what it is, "a plea for the more systematic culture of the sense of beauty," and I would fain hope that it may serve its purpose, which is simply to call attention to the actual and possible conditions that govern or ought to govern our practice in reference to the training of taste, as an important part of our education for life.

The reader who desires to plunge in *medias res* is advised to skip the second chapter, also chapter seven, until the rest of the book is read. The order of the chapters is the logical one and should, of course, be followed by those whose point of view corresponds thereto.


In closing these prefatory words I take this opportunity of expressing my thanks to my friend and former colleague, Professor George T. Ladd, for his words of introduction, in which he has diagnosed the situation with his usual penetration and wisdom. In common with many others whom he has trained for service in the cause of education, I owe him a debt which I cannot expect fully to repay. In this volume he may see some reward for his efforts, which, I trust, he will not think wholly unworthy.

H. D.

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
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**ART IN EDUCATION AND  
LIFE.**



# CHAPTER I

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## THE PROBLEM

(1)

“We come at last to set ourselves face to face with ourselves, expecting that in creatures made after the image of God we are to find comeliness and completion more exquisite than in the fowls of the air and the things that pass through the paths of the sea.”

*Ruskin.*

“It is undeniable that the American democracy has thus far failed to take proper account of the sense of beauty as a means of happiness and to provide for the training of that sense.”

*Ex-President Eliot.*

## CHAPTER I

### THE PROBLEM

#### I

What we are wont to call *practical* pursuits command the attention of the American people far in excess of those that are cultural. Learning, among us, has come to be regarded chiefly as a means of improving one's condition in this world; business and social success appear to be the most desirable aims even of educated people. Of education as the unselfish search for truth, beauty or goodness we think and hear comparatively little. In particular, the study of the beautiful in nature and art does not as yet enter seriously into the general problem of fitting the citizen for his duties in the modern world. "The great majority of schoolmasters," says Prof. McMurray, "stand squarely on this platform, knowledge and mental discipline."

Emphasis on the "practical" in American education.

In Europe, particularly in highly civilized states like Germany, France and Switzerland, considerable attention is still paid to the purely cultural values in general education. The education of Germans, Frenchmen and Swiss includes a fairly comprehensive survey of the æsthetic processes of culture and some study of art as a product of the national cultus, as an element of its efficiency,

economy and happiness. Compared with the schools of those countries, in this respect, the schools of ~~the United States~~ are far behind in both equipment and results.

Consequently the need of some readjustment of our educational values to include something besides "knowledge and mental discipline," something nobler than the desire "to better one's condition," has made itself felt. Here in America we are beginning to realize that our civilization lacks æsthetic quality simply because, in the education of our people, the values that spring from the emotions and the sense of beauty have been so generally ignored. To this tradition nearly all the deficiencies of American culture may be traced.

Origin of this  
tradition in (a)  
Puritanism.

The origin of this tradition must be sought in several directions. One of these points backward to the early history of our country, which was so profoundly influenced by the religious and political ideals of Puritanism. These ideals will explain much of our artistic immaturity. Yet we should be slow to attribute to Puritanism *alone* the lack of æsthetic interest in the American people; for was not Milton a Puritan? and were not the two central inspirations of the Puritan movement (I mean the love of liberty and belief in popular education) direct products of the humanism of the Renaissance? Obviously the explanation of so complex a problem cannot be so simple.

Still it remains true that the Puritan spirit, with its severe politico-religious morality, its æsthetic iconoclasm, accounts in large measure for the fact that for a hundred years, in spite of all efforts to transcend its limitations, America has produced no work of imagination of the first order; that indeed, as some critics claim, not a single work of art, ranking in the first class, a work, that is, at once original, unique and stamped with a distinctly American spirit, has ever been produced in this country.

Under the conditions that prevailed during the Puritan regime, in which a continent had to be subdued, it was *a priori* unlikely, to say the least, that life would take a decidedly artistic turn.

Another explanation of this deficiency is the corollary of the one just mentioned: we have had during the greater part of our history, no distinctive "school" of American art and consequently no marked national consciousness, no inbred disposition, for art. Our art has been, until recently, almost entirely fashioned on European models. Art-study has never met with the ready sympathy and practical support among us which has been freely and generously accorded to studies more utilitarian. In the century and a quarter or so of our separate existence we have not evolved a national system of art-training, because, as the phrase goes, the "art atmosphere" has been almost wholly lacking.

(b) The absence of the art atmosphere.

The plain truth of the situation is that as a nation preoccupied with the more practical or

utilitarian problems of industrial development, and burdened by these historical handicaps, we have had little time or inclination to form any settled convictions about this important branch of national education. It is not surprising that meanwhile we have been gathering a mass of erroneous opinions and false impressions, which, unfortunately, stand obstinately in the way, for the time being at least, of the more open mind to which the facts might appeal hopefully for a candid hearing.

Signs of an  
awakening.

But an increasing number of thoughtful people, feeling that something should be done on a large scale to rescue an important educational asset from obscurity, have been sharply reminding our educators and the general public of their duty to declare our age-long dependence on Europe at an end, by asserting our national individuality in matters of art, as we have already done in politics and economics. The laws of historical evolution would naturally suggest such an emancipation from the narrow economic and historical traditions of our past.

## II

Reasons for a  
readjustment  
of educational  
values.

The demand for a readjustment of educational values such as this volume proposes can be justified only as we come to see the spiritual necessity for it. This necessity, however, we may clearly perceive if it can be shown, first of all, that throughout man's development the æsthetic impulse has entered into, and largely shaped, his culture; and secondly, if it can be shown that



he is by nature as well as by inheritance endowed with the capacities to create and appreciate the beautiful. In this section, then, let us briefly review the main historical and psychological facts of the case.

The central fact of æsthetic evolution, historically viewed, is the *fusion* of man's æsthetic interest with other correlative interests, such as religion, industry, and even science.

In *religion*, for example, the sentiment of beauty found, from early times, a congenial soil, and the creative artist one of the noblest of his inspirations. Indeed, art and religion have, in many lands, shared a common ideal origin and enjoyed a remarkably similar development. In all stages of religion, from phallicism up to Christianity, we find the interweaving of æsthetic and religious aims, such as the appreciative use of form, color and decoration, along with the subtler elements of beauty that depend on contrast, novelty and dramatic intention. These are concomitants of all religious cults. Man, endowed as he is, with religious aspirations, has always combined with his idea of the supreme good that which was also expressive of the wealth of his emotions and his sense of beauty. Even in the religions of untutored savages there are evidences of lavish effort along these lines. The besmeared idol before which the heathen bows is to him a symbol of the best in himself, and it is invariably so carved and colored as to express his intensest

(a) Historical grounds.  
Fusion of Art and Religion.

æsthetic perceptions and feelings, as well as to elicit his deepest religious devotion.

Time and training, of course, bringing with them as they always do a more accurate sense of form and a more refined sense of beauty of line and color, work their changes in all this; but at no time do we find any discontinuity of the æsthetic and religious interests. The higher religions of the Greeks, equally with Christianity, show that art and religion are inseparably connected in the developing consciousness of man, and there is no new reason to believe that they can ever be long divorced. Clearly, then, the spiritual necessity that produces religion also produces art.

Art and Industry interrelated in evolution.

In the *industrial arts* we find a similar interweaving of motives and aims. Tool-using man has, therefore, never been satisfied to produce merely useful things. He will even adorn his tools! He will carve with subtle grace the weapons with which he slays his enemy or seizes his prey — the daggers, the arrows and bows, the spears, the axes, the clubs, the shields, and other implements, which he uses in hunting or in defense; weaving artistic motives about the useful, and thus expressing his pleasure in them. So, too, with the utensils he uses in cooking — his pots and kettles, — many of which are decorated with patterns, sometimes startlingly original but more often conventional, but always revealing a natural perception of beauty combined with use.

It is also easy to understand why such means of physical enjoyment as the pipe, the drinking cup, such articles as the robes and dresses used on ceremonial occasions, the drum and other instruments, and the dwelling that afforded shelter, should be treated by primitive man according to such art as he could command. Later refinements, due to the development of the industrial arts, only carry out this general tendency.

Man has, in short, always felt that beauty had some reference to use. Even in these days, in spite of the rapid increase of mechanical inventions, this cannot be denied; for, as far as the rigid requirements of the "law" of supply and demand allow, we still aim to convert our utilities into means of promoting the beautiful. Use cannot exhaust beauty; there is always a large margin left over for creative work, where the fine arts may aid in increasing even the marketable value of our industries; but even today use and beauty tend to æsthetic culture, as all vital manifestations of what is in man should.

It is in the history of *fine* art, however, that we get the true measure of the æsthetic factor and its function in human culture. It is not our purpose to enter here into a detailed account of their origin; (that will come out later); but only to point out briefly their emergence in history and experience. Suffice it to say here that what is called "fine" in art arose out of the gradual separation of beauty from use. This was probably hastened through the acuter and more sensitive

How the "fine" in art and industry evolved.

perceptions that leisure and enjoyment make possible. The pleasures of sense, particularly in the form of play, doubtless had their effect.

Arts of the eye.

The germ of those arts which appeal to the *eye*, (sculpture and painting) was probably the *dance*, in which the materials of expression are the mimic activities of the body, as in the satyrs and dancing fauns of the Greeks. Out of sculpture, which in primitive eras was often colored to give it greater verisimilitude, grew painting, by the process of specialisation spoken of. Architecture, probably the earliest of the fine arts, is obviously more closely related to the useful; but about it the other arts were, in turn, nourished, and grew finer as the sense of the interrelation of beauty and use was refined.

Arts of the ear.

The arts that appeal to the *ear*, music, poetry, drama, oratory, and literature, illustrate the same tendency, the same spiritual necessity. However it is explained, the history of culture makes us acquainted with no fruitful era of human activity that did not, along with its religion and industry, produce its music, its mythical epos, its great drama, its hymnology, its creative poets, both lyric and tragical, in a word, its literature. Reflective thinking — thinking, i. e., which is not necessarily subordinated to use and wont — together with writing, were contributing causes of these developments, which have been among the most powerful moulders of civilization as well as the sources of the most ingenious and refined

pleasures known by the mind. Later on we shall consult them farther for light on our problem.

Thus the fine arts, along with religion and the useful arts, bear their unique testimony to the presence of the æsthetic factor in human history, showing us that man, as soon as he begins to think and to enjoy the free play of his faculties, spontaneously created an art which, because it is beautiful and good, is self-satisfying.

The continuity of the æsthetic consciousness can also be traced, less clearly perhaps but none the less certainly, in the domain of *philosophy and scientific discovery*. At no time has science lacked the power to excite the æsthetic emotions. For example, a doctor, collecting virus from a child that he has vaccinated, will exclaim, as he rolls up the child's sleeve, "What a beautiful scab!" or while examining a cataract, "It is a perfectly beautiful cataract!" These cases show that there is a certain æsthetic pleasure in the study and cure of disease when it develops and culminates according to its law. When we look to the other sciences, particularly to astronomy, who could withhold assent to Swinburne's words,

The Aesthetic  
factor in  
Science.

"'tis the eternal law

"That first in beauty shall be first in might,"

or to Clough's more rigid statement, that the universe is

"Built by that only law, that Use be suggester of Beauty?"

Wordsworth, in the preface to his *Lyrical Ballads*, has gone so far as to hint that the poetry of the

future might draw its great inspirations from science, and yet be beautiful!

In this brief summary we have reviewed a historical fact or two of the highest significance. What do they mean? At the least appraisement they disclose in man a constant tendency, gradually increasing, to think, feel and act in terms of beauty, to endow the creations of his hand and brain with the character of imagination and power, of ideal perfection and emotional interest. And in so doing, it has been proved that man is, by a spiritual necessity, æsthetic for the same reason that he is intelligent and moral, namely, because he *must* be; because it is his nature.

(b) Psychological grounds.

The more precise determination of the *nature* of that creative impulse, of which beauty and art are the expression, belongs properly to psychology and philosophy. A complete description and explanation of this impulse will be found in the works of writers on this subject from Plato onward. In this place we shall only mention a few admitted points, and indicate their bearing on the problem we are considering.

Beauty a form of perception.

First, it is admitted that the sense of beauty is a constitutive element of human nature and involves, in a peculiar way, the activities of ideal perception, imagination, emotion and judgment. It is to be carefully distinguished from mere agreeable feeling, and from those pleasurable neural reactions that follow the normal activity of the physical organism. "That is beautiful," says Lotze, "whose impression accords with the

permanent structure of our spiritual nature and is shared by all alike."

Second, it is admitted that æsthetic perception is *intensive* rather than *consecutive*, i. e., includes values not given in the succession of sense-presentations. In other words, the subjective conditions, in accordance with which the perception of beauty arises are actively creative of *ideals*. Thus beauty, or rather the perception of beauty, does not usually arise as a result of the mind's apprehension of the static qualities of objects, but rather of a sense of their emotional and teleological meanings, of their fitness, in form and content, to express choice ideas or selective values. That will be beautiful, therefore, in any object or arrangement of objects, which harmonises with our ideal perceptions and embodies a choice idea or quality that conforms to the universal law of unity in diversity, the most perfect form of intellectual perception.

Aesthetic perception intensive and teleological.

Third, it is admitted that the mediating activity of this form of perception and experience is the imagination, by means of which the materials of beauty are combined in ideal objects and the creative functions of the mind are brought into activity. The activities on which the imagination depends are, as Schiller first pointed out, of the nature of play, in which exertion has no end beyond itself, finding complete satisfaction in the pleasure which itself produces. Closely allied is *fancy*, which, however, differs from imagination in being a livelier and more unrestrained form

The Imagination and Fancy enter into it.

of mental activity, from which the ideal constructions of the intellect and the means of expressing them proceed more spontaneously. From these two activities we not only derive much of the pleasure afforded by beauty in nature, but also the chief inspirations to create other beauty in the various forms of the fine arts.

Aesthetic perception depends on the growth of mental life in general.

Fourth, it is admitted that the development of æsthetic perception follows the laws governing the general improvement of the mind; but the chief agency for this purpose is, of course, the culture of the sentiments in the choice ideas represented by the fine arts. It follows that as human beings are trained to understand these ideas, they acquire a more vigorous interest in them and more actual power to appreciate and judge of their value. Taste is improved as mankind grows more intelligent and sensitive to art. Good taste, at any rate, is always a result of *training*; for all agree that the sense of beauty is not an innate faculty, telling us infallibly what is beautiful or ugly. In other words, the progressive refinement of the mind in its proper artistic *milieu* is one of the indispensable conditions of the right use of the judgment in matters of taste, and pleasure in beauty and art grows only as the individual takes his proper bearings in them.

This orientation in art is admittedly a complex affair involving many experimental efforts and some degree of mastery of technique and practice. But this is not a peculiarity of æsthetical development. Moral development is similarly



conditioned. Indeed, we may lay it down as the main feature of mental development, whose chief function is to find, after many experiments, and with the aid of emotion and will, the most economical and self-satisfying mode of perceiving the meaning of life, and one that meets the needs of the whole individuality. Aesthetic perception, instead of being an exception to this law of mental procedure, is really its most radical and striking instance. To say, therefore, that human beings grow in their ability to appreciate the beautiful according as they grow in other directions of mental life is only to state a truism.

Fifth, it is admitted that the training of the æsthetic capabilities is also an important factor in the education of man for practical efficiency and happiness.

Art in education and life.

As regards the function of this factor in human efficiency it is enough here to refer the reader to the history of mankind, which furnishes abundant and convincing evidence of the truth, that the uses of life cease to please to satisfy or to uplift where men grow incapable of rising above merely mechanical conceptions to grasp the higher significance and worth of the ideal. If the productive eras have hitherto been, as Goethe says, the eras of creative art and faith, surely the practical efficiency of humanity still requires for its perfection the æsthetic outlook.

As regards the relation of art to human happiness, that, too, follows from the essential mission of beauty and art, which is to annul the material-

Art a contribution to happiness.

ism, the vulgar sensualism and the low-keyed aims of competitive society, by revealing an order of knowledge and feeling in which perfection and blessedness, harmony and social sympathy have their place. That mission beauty and art have always fulfilled, and thus, from the particular point of view of human happiness and enjoyment, they possess a preciousness and advantage not equalled either by science or religion.

This brief resume' of some of the salient features and functions of the æsthetic sentiment must suffice for the present. The space assigned to it in current systems of education is small — a situation due in large measure to the failure of our system builders to take full knowledge of it and to perceive its individual and social implications. But in spite of all that is said by the advocates of "practical" education, one thing is becoming increasingly clear, namely, that any system of education that ignores this factor will fail to accomplish its comprehensive purpose. The more they push their investigations the more will educators be obliged to assign a controlling position to the quality of beauty, which, when duly appreciated and trained, leads, in all directions of the mind's operations, to clearness, harmony and power.

From these two sources, then, i. e., history and psychology, we gather a strong warrant for our contention that the æsthetical factor in education is one the neglect of which is likely to prove disastrous to contemporary culture and to the

future of human nature. If the sense of beauty be, as these facts of history and introspection seem to indicate, no chance by-product of evolution, but an integral part of it, the training of that sense cannot be sidetracked in favor of so-called "practical" education without violating the truth of both.

### III

Further warrant is also furnished by a science closely related to psychology, namely, *pedagogy*. Art and Pedagogy.

The spiritual necessity for art and beauty in human culture, having once been established in history and psychology, forces upon us such questions as these: What is the true place of the æsthetic element of human nature in education? What relation does this element sustain to other mental elements in the processes and methods of mental training, and how does its presence promote the efficiency of the individual? In endeavoring to answer these questions we shall consider two points: (1) what the comprehensive aim of education is; and (2) the true function of the æsthetic factor in this aim.

Now there is a conflict of aims in modern education, about which students are by no means as yet agreed. Scientific and humanistic, practical and cultural interests are seriously at war. This conflict is largely the product of historical tendencies which have descended to us from the past, but into which we need not enquire here. Perhaps the best service that could be rendered, under the circumstances, would be to point the

Conflict of aims  
in modern  
education.

way to a clearer perception of the *unity* underlying them, and from that standpoint to resolve the antagonism, or supposed antagonism, among them. This course will be followed in the following sketch.

Central aims  
of education.

What, then, let us ask, have the great thinkers, Plato, Comenius, Kant, Rousseau, Mill, Spencer and the rest, declared to be the central aims of education? Summarizing many definitions, the following may be accepted as a statement of the substance of belief:

(a) The subject of the educational aim.

All authorities agree that the *subject* of the educational process should be nothing less than the whole personality of each individual, physical, intellectual, moral, social, æsthetic and religious; that the development of the total worth of the many-sided nature of man must always be the strongest motive of the teacher's vocation.

When Plato, for example, declares that the purpose of education is "to give to the body and the soul all the beauty and all the perfection of which they are capable," it is obvious that such an aim could be attained only as the *whole* of human nature was brought under the process of training.

Again, when Mill says that education "includes whatever we do for ourselves and whatever is done for us by others for the express purpose of bringing us nearer to the *perfection of our nature*" (italics mine), it is sufficiently evident that by "the perfection of our nature" he means our *total* human nature.



So when Spencer defines the central aim of education to be "preparation for complete living," it is natural to suppose that "complete living" here involves the completion of the total personality, and that means, in the last analysis, the training of all the mental functions.

Even where there is a radical difference of opinion as to the best means of realising the central aim of culture, some insisting, like Spencer, that science, others, like Hamilton, that classical learning, is best adapted to this purpose; there is remarkable unanimity on the main point, the *subject* of the educational process; all are agreed that the whole man, physical, intellectual and social, etc., has an indisputable right to education and training as a means of developing his nature, so that he may become both efficient and happy, or, as Hegel says, "realise himself."

In defining more concretely the *content* of this aim it is agreed that *moral* perfection, by reason of its overwhelming importance to the race and to civilisation, must be accorded a supreme place in all educational processes. In other words, character, or, as Mill says, "a completely fashioned will," should be the choice result of human training. This, however, hardly needs argument or illustration, so fully is it admitted by all, even "heathen," systems of education.

(b) The moral aim.

In more recent thought a third element has received a somewhat belated recognition. The tendency now is to emphasise the *social* purpose

(c) The social aim.

of this training. As voiced by McMurray we find on all sides that "the demand for the perfection of the individual is yielding, to a considerable extent, to the requirements of socialising, or subordinating the individual to the needs of society." This demand is really the product of a deeper insight into human nature. It is the recognition of the fact that "the individual is social." His birth into a social order; his moralisation under the authority of the family; the occult and yet positive influence over him of the political and industrial forces of the state give point to the social conceptions underlying this newer view.

Man, therefore, must be trained so to adjust himself to his environment as to meet the duties that await him in it in an efficient manner. Education that fails to equip the individual for social service is closely watched and, we think, rightly. For good or ill—we think for good—the abstract and highly speculative instruction of the older type of schools has given place to instruction of a more concrete and serviceable kind, and is distinctly out of favor in our time.

Instead of this resulting in a limitation of human nature the best interests of personality are being served by it. It is, of course, liable to be overdone; it *has* been overdone in some cases; but no thoughtful student of modern life, especially in America, can doubt that this effort to adjust the individual to his immediate environment, through the study of the social order, in

which he is a factor, is one of the most notable modern contributions to the philosophy of education. After all, it is *in* society, not in isolation from it, that the individual realises himself; and any scheme of culture that implies contempt for the world, or counsels habits of separation from it, must, to the modern mind, smack more of feeble-mindedness than of strength. Human beings, even for sentimental reasons, can no longer be educated for the duties of life in that way. Education has turned towards the concrete. In this we rejoice, because in this direction we may expect to find a larger field of opportunity for the exploitation of neglected elements of power, including the æsthetic, in which we are here directly interested.

These three points, then, may be accepted as fairly representative of the substance of our belief with regard to the central aims of education. In the light of this creed we may confidently expect that the conflict of educational aims, already referred to, may be gradually resolved. It is surely no extravagance to say, meanwhile, that all studies that prove, or have proved, profitable in promoting these aims deserve a place in the culture of human nature. A new synthesis of values is the inevitable result of such a clearer analysis of educational forces.

We turn now to our second question: What is the place of the æsthetic factor in the general aim of education?

The place  
of art in  
Education.

The aesthetic point of view needs to be emphasized.

A momentary digression must be made here to emphasise the particular point of the statements that follow. It is often claimed, by those who are unfriendly or indifferent toward the fine arts as educational forces, that the people do not need to be educated to understand them, and that we can acquaint them with their purpose and mission without any special reference to their *aesthetic* quality. Now, it is precisely this position we question. Indeed, the whole burden of these pages is that it is only as the æsthetic factor, i. e., the quality of *beauty* in art is studied and understood, that art-study has any value for culture. Our purpose, in short, is to raise the questions: *What are the æsthetical as distinguished from the intellectual and moral elements of education? What is its function in the discipline of the school and the studies pursued therein? Does it not lie in the perception of the beautiful; in the specific training, therefore, of the creative imagination, the emotions, the judgment; in a word, — in the development of the taste of the pupil?* We think it does.

We shall later in this discussion endeavor to describe in some detail how the quality of beauty becomes explicit in the work of training human beings for life. Meanwhile, it is essential that the reader should note what we are here dealing with. The whole effort of this book is devoted to the question of *the formation of taste*, as this is, or may be, brought about by the ordinary agencies of education. But all that we have to say in the



earlier parts of our study of this problem, leads inevitably to the criticism of the actual conditions, presented by our nation, which, according to our view, disclose a deficiency amounting to a defect. This, we insist, is, in large part, due to the subordination of the "intensive" elements of our culture to its more material and practical aims. Without in the least deprecating this subordination on grounds of general policy, we nevertheless claim that we are thus exposing ourselves to the danger of defeating the higher aim of education; whose function it is to refine human nature, to stimulate the creative imagination, to avoid one-sidedness in the acquisition and use of knowledge, and, in general, by the development of good taste, to impart to the life of all the people a much needed element of power and beauty.

This being understood, we may proceed to answer the question: What is the place of the æsthetic element in the general aims of education? We merely summarise the answer here, reserving further discussion for later chapters.

We have seen that it is the general aim of education "to give to the body and the soul all the beauty and all the perfection of which they are capable." In this aim the æsthetic sentiment must be accorded a place, first, because it is an inalienable element of our perceptions and feelings. It belongs to us as our moral sentiments belong to us. Educators, indeed, could be under no obligation to recognise it in their provision for the individual's preparation for life, unless

Personality and  
art-training.

it actually were a constituent element of mental processes. Let us be frank and further acknowledge that it would be foolish waste of time to endeavor to develop taste in human beings in the absence of the sentiments upon which taste rests. But this is fortunately not the case. Human beings are as capable today of good taste, if properly trained, as they were in the days of Greece and Rome, or in that great flowering of the æsthetic impulse which appeared in Italy in the thirteenth century. It is not human nature that is misleading us in these matters, but the rigid conventionality of our middle class culture.

If, then, the whole personality be the proper subject of education, we cannot question the right of the sense of beauty to receive as much attention as other sentiments, to which, in the unity of self-consciousness, it is indissolubly related. The place of this element, in the first of the great aims of education, is fixed by these facts.

Art and  
morals.

What, now, is the relation of the æsthetic factor to the second of the great aims of education, character-making? The answer is, It stands in the very heart of it. For since the æsthetic and moral sentiments, beauty and goodness, live side by side in the mind, sharing similar impulsive tendencies and seeking substantially the same ends, it is exceedingly doubtful, to say the least, if the moral ideal can be successfully vitalised without the quickening of the æsthetic. A moment's thought will show that the approval we accord to noble conduct is not essentially

different from the approval we accord to the beauty and power of a nobly conceived and well executed work of art. Conduct is a fine art, perhaps the finest of all the fine arts. At the least appraisal, therefore, the æsthetic factor must be regarded as a chief contributory agency in the moral development of man. So Kant said, "When we see a man interested in the beauty of nature, we have reason to believe that there is in him at least the basis for a good moral character." Reverse this statement, and what do we get? This: Bad moral behavior is presumptive evidence of the absence of a true interest in beauty. How true this is!

The æsthetic factor also has its place, a very important place, in the third of the general aims of education, the socialisation of human nature.

Art and social sympathy.

The two French thinkers, Guyau and Tarde, have shown that art owes its great power of appeal to the fact that it is so largely the product of what they call "the laws of social sympathy and imitation." This was also the cardinal principle of the æsthetic criticism of Taine, and embodies the important truth that art and society are mutually conditioning elements of life, the highest expression of social efficiency.

Without endorsing this view in its entirety (it seems to underestimate the irregular force of genius) we may infer from it the important educational principle that art is one of the best means of taking one's bearings in the social life of the race; and further, by reason of its powerful

appeal to the social nature, particularly to the universal sympathies, of which it is the highest and most valuable concrete expression, it is essentially an educator of the social feelings in their widest extent.

Accordingly, the place of the æsthetic factor in the aims of education is somewhere near the social heart of it, where the pulse beats strongest and the flow of imagination, emotion and judgment is swiftest. This proves to be so, as we can see wherever it is seriously studied. As a medium for the transmission of the social emotions of particular historic eras, art stands before all others. In a masterpiece of art we see the creative essence of human life embodied in some striking phase of universal aspiration or experience; it is a social document; and though it is there primarily to please, to reveal and to inspire, it also transmits to our observant intelligence, feelings and judgment, aspiration and experience like its own. In this lies its immense importance as a civilising and educational agency.

Summarising these bare statements, we may say that the place of the æsthetic factor in the general aims of education is a place of peculiar power. Its function is not that of lording it over the other factors, intellectual and moral, but co-operating with them, suffusing them with a subtle value, and promoting the welfare and the efficiency of the individual under the conditions of social life. The beautiful, in other words, and

the appreciation of the beautiful, whether in nature or art, are interests which no conception of education, laying any claim to completeness, can place on a lower plane than other culture-interests; for it is the subtle essence of all culture.

#### IV

The particular points raised in the foregoing sections have been, as the reader will doubtless observe, merely mentioned. In later pages we shall deal with them more in detail as our survey of the function of the æsthetic factor in education and life brings them to our notice. Meanwhile, this bare mention of them has, we hope, led the reader to perceive the problem with which we have to deal in these pages.

The problem  
stated.

In its most general terms it is this: Is the rising generation of Americans receiving that training of their potential æsthetic capabilities, which the facts of history and of human nature and the larger claims of our national life demand? We have contended, in the earlier sections of this chapter, that the American type of civilisation still lacks æsthetic quality when compared with Europe; that this is the case because the feeling of the beautiful is inadequately ministered to in our schools, colleges and universities, which are placing an undue emphasis on "practical" education, because, in our admirable energy and zeal for education, work that stimulates the imagination, the emotions and the judgment of

taste is not exercising its wonted power in the life of our people.

The thesis.


The contention of those who, like the present writer, advocate a more serious and thorough study of the æsthetic quality of school work (not for its own sake, but in order that the general aims of education may be promoted) is — that we are adding little or nothing to the people's appreciation of the beautiful. Our argument runs somewhat as follows: If, in education, we are obliged, by the very notion of its nature and aims, to consider the needs of the whole man, the failure adequately to recognize the æsthetic factor contradicts the idea of education so far set forth; and this failure cannot but result in dwarfing the social efficiency and happiness of the individual; and therefore, if it is to be developed in our social life, a freer and more discerning policy is called for from those who are concerned with the control and direction of American education. As ex-President Eliot says:

"It is undeniable that the American democracy has thus far failed to take proper account of the sense of beauty as a means of happiness and to provide for the training of that sense."

Not alone for the sake of the happiness of our heterogeneous population but also for the sake of our industrial and economic efficiency the quality of beauty should be cultivated.

Stated positively, our problem is imposed upon us by education itself; for not only does the idea of education create the demand for æsthetical training but social evolution leads us directly to it. To ignore this is to fly in the teeth of obvious facts.

In the following pages the attempt is made to vindicate this fundamental thesis.





## CHAPTER II

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### THE NATURE AND CONDITIONS OF TASTE

(31)

"False taste may be known by its fastidiousness, by its demands of pomp, splendor, and unusual combination; by its enjoyment only of particular styles and modes of things, and by its pride also, for it is ever meddling, mending, accumulating and self-exulting, its eye is always upon itself, and it tests all things around it by the way *they fit it*. But true taste is forever growing, learning, reading, worshipping, laying its hand upon its mouth, because it is astonished, casting its shoes from off its feet because it finds all ground holy, lamenting over itself, and testing itself by the way *it fits things*."

*John Ruskin.*

## CHAPTER II

### THE NATURE AND CONDITIONS OF TASTE.

In this chapter the word *taste* is used for the Taste defined. power of judging the beautiful and deriving pleasure from it. Its function in our mental life is to appreciate, (to set a *pretium*, or price) on objects. He who derives particular pleasure from music, for example, may be said to have a taste for music, though he may not attain a high degree of proficiency in it.

So, when we speak of "good" and "bad" taste all we mean is the individual's power of judging, or "sampling," beautiful things. Good taste always goes along with the power of accurate and discriminating judgment. Bad taste always betrays some defect of judgment, due to lack of training. At the bottom of the whole process is *the power of valuation*.

In this chapter we propose to consider some of the more prominent features of this power.

The task is not simple by any means; for the reason that we are daily using our powers of judgment in many other directions, (practical, moral, religious, etc.) than the beautiful; indeed, the vast majority of us do not use them in the domain of beauty to any great extent. And when we do so, our judgment is influenced by a multitude of opinions, convictions and prej-

udices brought over from these other interests of life. The consideration of the subject of taste, therefore, cannot be profoundly viewed except in its relation to the whole field of life within which we have employed our powers of judgment. This complicates it, and calls for special care and much patient thought if we are to penetrate to its real meaning.

We shall limit our enquiry, however, to four points: (1) the *field* of æsthetic judgment; (2) the *process* of judgment; (3) the *criterion* of judgment; and (4) the *social reinforcement* of judgment.

### I.

The Field of  
Valuation.

Our first task is to ascertain the scope and sources of man's interest in beauty; the probable manner in which this field of interest was acquired; what factors have contributed to differentiate it from other fields of human interest; the influence of this differentiation upon our ideas of art and upon the evolution of the fine arts themselves; and, finally, the classification of the arts as one field of interest and as elements of taste-culture in the race and in the individual.

Beauty of  
Nature.

The first field of æsthetic interest is, of course, furnished by the objects of the external world, the beauty of *nature* — the fountain and origin of all beauty; and if in "nature" we include man, then art itself is included in this field, because art can have no other purpose than "to hold, as 't were, the mirror up to nature." Shakespeare says:

"Nature is made better by no mean  
But nature makes that mean: so, over that art  
Which you say adds to nature, is an art  
That nature makes. There is an art  
Which doth mend nature — change it rather, but  
The art itself is nature."

The beauty of nature is thus the "tuning fork" by means of which we pitch the key of our appreciations and test their values. As Emerson says:

"In nature, all is useful, all is beautiful. It is therefore beautiful because it is alive; it is therefore useful because it is symmetrical and fair."

This primal beauty possesses two advantages, *It is living.* which must ever give it a superior claim. First, it is *living*; it has motion; it is ever changing, yet ever revealing a beauty which art can imitate, but not equal.

"But who can paint  
Like Nature! Can imagination boast,  
Amid its gay colors, hues like hers?"

The more taste is refined, by culture and training, the more clearly and inevitably does it perceive that there is a discrepancy between this living beauty and its best human imitations; and that only as art is inspired by it, only as it becomes a more sincere devotee of this "Vicar of the almighty Lord," to use Chaucer's simile, does it become more worthy of study and praise,

It is  
universal.

The second advantage which nature possesses over art is its *permanence* and *universality*. By this we mean not only that the beauty of nature enjoys a greater independence, a more obvious out-there-ness than the adventitious creations of fine art, but, being living, it reveals objective values with clearer verity. Even when we are in no mood to perceive and enjoy it, we know it is *there*, and this is what we mean by objective beauty; it is not affected by the doubtful fortunes that attend the progress of art.

As living, progressive, changing and improving, nature reveals an immanent Spirit of beauty. All revelations of beauty are organic elements of this Spirit, which is part and parcel of her very existence. Hence she appeals to this Spirit in man; and the feeling of this living fact is the deep cause of the pleasure we derive from the contemplation of the beauty of nature, and explains as nothing else does or can why natural beauty is the most widely appreciated and enjoyed of all the fields of æsthetic culture, and why her disclosures are a "common school" of taste. Her teachings are never unstable or unfruitful as are those of many of the arts.

While, therefore, the races of mankind may have different local standards of taste in their arts, relative to their culture and civilisation, this is not the case, at least not to the same extent, with the beauty of nature. A sunset probably affects the soul of a Hottentot in much the same way as that of a swift-thinking French-

man; to every soul, not abnormal or diseased, it makes its unique appeal. Primitive ritual, specially in the forms of nature-worship, shows this as clearly as the most perfect art. It will also be admitted that the more the mind is trained to perceive this beauty, by *other* means than nature, by pictures, poems, music, etc., the more susceptible does it become to the thousand unsuspected forms of beauty revealed in the external world. These advantages combine to make nature the first and most important objective field of æsthetic culture and taste, in which the valuation-process is carried on.

The second objective field of taste is the *fine arts*, architecture, sculpture, painting and the rest. These arts, in turn, possess one great advantage over nature; for if natural beauty furnishes the living material of our first impressions of beauty, the fine arts furnish the most perfect *collection* of beautiful objects. But here the advantage ceases. For they are neither so instinct with life, nor so permanent and real, as the beauty of nature. For example, architecture has been picturesquely defined as "frozen music." Now, while there is, in nature, the marvellous beauty of frost, as in the crystals, there is no "frozen" beauty.

Advantages of  
the Fine Arts  
over Nature.

As we trace the evolution of the arts, we notice that the vital or creative factor increases, the highest arts, like music, poetry and drama, revealing a spiritual fluency that approaches living

nature; but they never attain to the absolute point of life. Illusion is still the largest part of art; human creation is, in one sense, always petrification. But in nature beauty is always in motion, and changes; it is never at a full stop. At the same time, nature nowhere furnishes a collection of objects which, taken together, are so beautiful and educational as those of fine art.

In selection.

This depends on two things. In the first place, the arts abstract their content and concentrate the revelation of beauty in more tangible and available forms; they *select* their material, comparing beautiful things only with beautiful, rejecting what does not suit their æsthetic aims, what does not contribute to create the immediate impression of beauty and truth. In nature, beauty is not so widely distributed that it does not co-exist with much ugliness and barrenness. Thus the wild and luxurious beauty of a jungle bears with it also the association of disorder, and the sinister suggestion of the abode of still wilder and hideous animals, far from beautiful in form or disposition. Not so art.

It is true that the beauty of fine art is relative. Hence, the modern man of taste rejects many of the crude forms supposed to be exquisite to the taste of the primitive man, as indicating impure or imperfectly trained perceptions of what is beautiful; for all refinement of taste arises from *the improvement of perception*. Ask a North American Indian, for example, his idea of a beautiful woman, and he will indicate to you



the following outline: a broad, flat face, with small eyes, high cheek bones, and three or four black lines across each cheek, a low forehead, a large broad chin, a clumsy hook nose, a tawny hide and a sloppy disposition of the body. Travellers tell us that Africans regard Europeans as deformed. This is quite natural. To their untrained perceptions the best examples of womankind are positively ugly. Their noses seem pinched, their cheeks shrunken, their hair lank and flimsy, their bodies long and emaciated, their skins bleached, and their complexion suggests the disgusting idea of dead flesh sodden in water till all the blood and juices are extracted. A Greek goddess would be to them a monstrosity. This is because their limited culture does not permit them to perceive beauty outside their tribe. It is in this sense that beauty is relative. But it is the supreme merit of fine art that it has, in the slow procession of the centuries, created a *standard* of beauty, which transcends nature in the perfection of its forms. This is because it abstracts its objects from the surrounding ugliness, so that they may become precious and suggestive of the *ideal*.

A second advantage possessed by the fine arts over nature lies in their more obvious *interpretative* power. Nature does not interpret. Man is the only organism in nature that has sought to give nature utterance, and to express his sense of its meaning. Nature creates living beauty, but she does not judge or value it. Now the

Their power  
of Interpretation.

artist cannot create living beauty, but he can interpret it. Of this fact the fine arts are the objective expression and all artistic invention derives its significance from this interpretative aim. Thus the stone, wood and other inert elements which an architect uses in building become, in the mysterious alembic of his soul, the means of representing *ideas*, precious on account of their power to kindle our perceptions and to stir our imagination and emotions. Nature does not do this; for though her forms of beauty and the ever dying and ever living movement of her creative purpose, *provoke* thought, they do not tell us what she thinks. It is art's true mission to *interpret* the thought, to chain it to its form, and to reveal it as an open secret known and read by all men.

As knowledge grows vaster, and general culture refines our perceptions and feelings, this service, of course, becomes more subtle and moving. The progress of the arts, therefore, is a continuous commentary on man's growing views of life, always increasing in power and beauty. Matthew Arnold said that poetry is "the interpretation of life," and the same may be said of all the sister arts. Together they form the most precious fruit of human creative effort, the most indispensable tools to be used by us for the development of spiritual perception, and of intellectual and moral power; for it is the fine arts that reveal more clearly than anything else *the meaning of life*. In the absence of these arts, life is sordid and mean. With them, none need go

through life a slave to ignorance or selfishness, or blind as to its meaning.

It is, of course, impossible now to recall or envisage the exact situations in which these two fields of valuation took on formative power as elements of taste; but we may roughly sketch the process as follows: Early stages of taste.

Primitive man, urged by the imperious necessities of life, was compelled to find the most economical, pleasant and satisfying adaptations with his natural environment, his first task being that of controlling his organs and subduing the earth. Now this process in itself required, or rather implied, a certain kind of art, inasmuch as it involved incessant observation, practice and skill; and for this, we know, he disclosed a remarkable cunning from the first, also a dim sense of values. His sense of values was, of course, all of the earth earthy, the values of the "natural man"; for his view of life was little else than the reflex of his pleasure in life, which doubtless had a strong sensual element at first.

But his perceptions and impulses, we may surmise, were gradually but continually modified, chastened and refined, in a crude way, by his discovering new (and that meant, safer and easier) modes of reacting within his wild and unfriendly environment, being impelled thereto by the force of habit, by the need of watching his prey, of guarding himself against the attack of enemies, real or fancied, and by the need of

resting within the shelter of his home. We may well imagine that this primitive *curriculum vitae* was not only the stern mother of all his inventions, but the chief incentive to improve his lot, to increase, and still further perfect, the means of livelihood, economise his energies by controlling them, mechanise his actions, reduce the friction of social intercourse, and thus liberate power by directing it; in short, he must will to live, to learn by doing and strive to be happy and enjoy life by getting on the best possible terms with himself and others; or become extinct.

The tremendous tension of this endeavor, in his primitive surroundings, left him only brief spells of rest; but in these rest periods, when he could give rein to his more playful creative impulses, the tension was relaxed; and with this came a certain glow of vigor, increasing with the release of his powers. At these times he doubtless caught a glimpse of his higher nature and felt the inspiration to exercise himself in directions not immediately rewarding, but involving deeper insight and more profound pleasure in activities of a more playful nature, involving social sympathy and imitation. Confronted, as he was, by the majesty and beauty of the natural world, by the glory of the sun, moon and stars, the mystery of the sunset and the wind, and by his own emotions while contemplating them, his taste was unconsciously and yet profoundly influenced long before he created an art. Indeed, primitive man has left behind him permanent memorials of this

culture of the sense of beauty in his rituals, which are the best evidence of the serious intentions which governed his behavior in his periods of keen perception and enjoyment, and are among the most valuable indications we possess of the beginnings of art in the proper sense of the term.

In this process, which is a long story, several *social* factors may be considered as favorable to the discrimination in question. One of these has already been alluded to, namely, the liberation of attention from material needs, or, in a word, *leisure*. Now, human art was the product of man's leisure in the sense that it flourished best when the perceptions were freed from their more enforced mechanical operations; that is, as the creative impulses, which are never wholly absorbed in material pursuits, or in work immediately productive or useful, acquired a larger opportunity to nourish themselves upon the beauties of nature, or in imagining and reflecting how the love of life might be more worthily expressed. Leisure afforded, at least, relief from enforced toil and the occasion for meditation. And as these periods of leisure were lengthened, the chasm between art and utility was naturally widened, inspired to new social adaptations, and powerfully influenced the direction in which the creative tendency spoken of expended its force. But the creative tendency itself was not thereby essentially changed. Art only became a specially

Factors in  
this process:  
Leisure.

precious form in which its function worked itself out in life.

Wealth.

The organisation of *wealth*, in the form of property, houses, goods, money, and other facilities of exchanging material values, was another invention decisive in this process. For if leisure afforded time to meditate, and to indulge the creative impulse, if only in the form of play, of dance, or of song, wealth furnished the incentive for the invention of works precious on account of their religious or decorative purpose, as distinguished from works of mere utility. Besides this, as wealth and leisure tend to go together; as they became more firmly established among man's social adaptations, merely useful or economically productive activities likewise tended to fall back into the region of the reflex and automatic, leaving room for those that spring from the imagination and emotions; for activities that are free, disinterested and precious as revelations of personality.

Whether we have regard to the blossoming and flowering of the creative impulse in the early art of India, China and Japan, or in the time of Solomon, of Praxiteles, of the Italian Renaissance, of Shakespeare, or of the early Victorian era, each epoch, in which it has attained to pre-eminent expression, is associated with the accumulation in some form or other of *wealth*; and, however we may estimate the future in this respect, life never wholly recedes from these red-letter days; they stand out, and something

permanent for the popular taste results from them; for we feel more deeply, perceive more keenly and with greater ease, and, on the whole, the economy and harmony of experience and existence are promoted, as a consequence. What is "fine" thus receives recognition equally with what is useful or mechanical.

But the greatest influence favoring this differentiation in man's inventions is, of course, the example of *great creative personalities*. If we understood better than we do the mysterious physiological conditions which account for its emergence, (we know next to nothing about them at present) we should probably see in genius only an instance of the truth which we have been considering: the genius would then be explained as the exquisite fruit of the economising and harmonising tendency of nature, a product of the differentiating process of life itself, brought under higher control.

The genius.

Charles Lamb, in his essay on *The Sanity of Genius*, tells us that the hall-mark of genius is not aberration from this normal central tendency of creative nature, but only a more complete and perfect embodiment of it. The genius therefore must be understood not as a departure from nature, but rather as a more finished work of nature, wherein the mental adaptations have an initial perfection not shared by most others; and impulse and intuition are keyed to higher functions, the perceptions economised and harmonised with greater perfection, work with

greater ease and harmony, and "the spark of life" burns more fiercely, as a consequence. His creative function accordingly is to invent for others to imitate, to lead while others admire and follow.

The great man has been *the* differentiating force in art and social evolution. He it is who has advanced the average perceptions of humanity to keener insight, warmed the flickering feelings, fired the ambitions, and kindled them to nobler aims. He is the indispensable factor. Eliminate Plato, Dante, Bach, Shakespeare and a few others, and how little aesthetic progress the world would have made! Great personalities are the pioneers who lead the world to higher adaptations, point the way to fuller freedom and greater social efficiency. Such men have been the chief differentiating forces in all lines of human effort, in invention, strategy, statesmanship, religion, as well as in art. The number of them who have thus profoundly influenced social evolution is relatively small; while in art they are fewer, indeed, than in almost any other line; but no intelligent person will deny that these have been absolutely determinative in the progress of fine art, and in enlarging the field of artistic valuation. So it was in the case of the primitive man.

In these three social agencies, then, in leisure, wealth and the example of great creative personalities, we have some of the chief social and personal means whereby the direction of the general tendency of creative effort was diverted from



purely useful occupations, affording a limited sphere for automatic or mechanical activity, to those of a more highly specialised character in the forms of feeling and *fine art*. But in saying this, we have not altered by one iota the central meaning of that tendency, which, as we have contended, is *one* in all the activities of perception and reason. It is only the *perfecting* of this tendency which we see revealed in the more highly differentiated activity which fine art reveals.

For all human action rests, as we have said, upon a kind of instinctive art or cunning (*können*, to know), a knowing *how* to do things. To hunt for food, to fish, to play, to make love, to whittle a piece of wood, to design a cathedral, to invent a machine, to sing a song or write an epic, are only different forms of the same impulse, *the effort to do things artfully, to express, to represent and to achieve ends*, which is the essence of life in whatever direction it works. Art, in this sense, is as broad as life, and therefore cannot be confined to the domain of beauty.

All doing  
involves art.

Now in the actual working of this creative instinct; in all forms of art, of cunning and of knowing *how* to do things, the two standards of value hinted at have been prominent, growing as they do out of the actual conditions and imperious necessities of human life and labor. One of these we call the *mechanical*, the other the *personal*. The former is the standard of all

Two standard  
of value in  
taste.

man's hand to hand dealings with nature, upon which he impresses his intelligent methods of economising energy, of orderly arrangement, and use. His primary attitude towards the material world is thus an intensely practical one; all his doing is a learning how to control matter and its energy to serve his practical needs.

But the kind of "art" that governs this learning does not exhaust his creative activities. Over and above this is an art, controlled by emotion, the region of personal valuation, which invites to the expression of feeling and the joy of doing for joy's sake. This we call the personal region of values.

These two judgments of value, it is true, cannot be widely separated in life or in the field of man's creative endeavor. As a matter of fact, our most ardent emotions in time become mechanised and drop back into the region of our reflex or accepted adaptations. As Bergson says, the creative process of evolution is, on the one hand, a falling back on these past accumulations of ordered experience, so far as they prove durable and adapted for meeting immediate needs; but it is ever transcending them, intuitively, in the search for new and more perfect and more personal satisfactions. Life and work consist, in the main, of the effort to find the true equation between these two values, mechanism and personality, between what is useful in art and what is disinterested and free. At every stage and section of it, mechanical and personal standards are

at work. Every epoch of civilisation, every invention, every art, every individual achievement of humanity, and the unfolding of every individual mind, illustrates this truth.

If this be so, it follows that the discrimination of a *field* of values, specifically æsthetic, came about naturally as a result of the differentiation of life. Such a field, in which human activity acquires a cunning beyond the mere mechanical necessities of his situation, would seem to be the almost inevitable result of man's progressive adaptation to his environment; the fruit, in short, of the liberation of his creative powers of hand and brain from immediate wants, which his increasing control of the mechanical order of the world and society rendered possible. If so, *differentiation in an æsthetic direction is only a special instance of the general tendency of life to differentiate*. In this sense, art may with some show of truth be said to be *biological* in origin. Without, however, pressing analogies borrowed from the field of physical science, we may lawfully insist that *life* is the force at work in every stage of human progress, and for this reason, differentiation and classification in man's æsthetic interests may be regarded as nothing but the unfolding of his own nature, which, after all, *is* his life.

These considerations may now serve us in explaining the differentiation of the fine arts from one another. Two things may be mentioned as probably determinative of this process.

Further  
division of  
the field of  
taste.

The materials  
of expression.

One of these relates to the *material medium* through which man learned to express his specifically personal sense of values, his joy and pleasure in freedom and beauty. It is probable that man began to create beauty in material substances, wood, stone and metals, which were nearest at hand, more easily susceptible of treatment by his tools, as well as more intimately associated with his needs. Human antiquities seem to indicate this. But, as leisure and wealth afforded opportunity for freer and more personal and more flexible expression, other resources were in turn added to them and refined by being linked with his sense of enjoyment; and as this happened new avenues of expression were opened, and the scope of imaginative invention enlarged and intensified. Thus, by a natural process of differentiation, an element of distinction arose among the products of his creative genius; some of his arts, by reason of the nature of the medium employed, were, or seemed, more personal than others, because farther removed from the material foundation of his life.

Influence of  
the growth of  
ideas.

The same is true of the *ideas* he sought to express. The number and intrinsic value of these grew as his perception and intuition were better organized, and as he was, emotionally, better disciplined to appreciate their delicate shadings and imaginative significance. At first, they were simple enough, like his needs. He was easily satisfied. But the creative tendency of life naturally led, specially when he was at liberty to

enjoy leisure, and the example of strong personalities became effective in his social life, to the development of a taste for the more refined aspects of the fancies and thoughts that came to him. This, of course, could happen only as he himself became a better organised and more highly disciplined individual — a comparatively late product of his evolution; since, even now, with all the elaborate appurtenances of education and civilisation, the distinction of the ideal and the practical, is often supposed to be absolute, whereas, in reality they are both the product of one vital creative process at work in life; and we still have to *fight* for the ideal, indeed, for all ideas that do not promise “practical” fruit, not perceiving that the more practical we become the more need there is of more delicate and minute modes of thinking to save us from thralldom to the machine. (These general principles of differentiation within the valuation-field deserve special attention, because they show that the highly abstract claim, made by many philosophers and artists, that the several fine arts represent fields which have been absolutely discrete, unique and separate from all other fields of mental activity from the first, cannot be maintained. As a matter of fact, this claim is itself a late product of reflection, due to the mental differentiation spoken of.)

The same principle should assist us in arriving at some workable scheme of *classification* among the arts and their values. Many schemes have

Further  
division  
through class-  
ification.

been proposed and elaborated, some good; but it seems best to connect this matter more intimately than has been the custom with the living creative process of differentiation itself, with its tendency towards mechanism and personal freedom. Here, as heretofore, *life* and the actual conditions of labor are far more likely to be creatively at work than abstract ideas. With the double clue afforded by our analysis, then, we can understand why the first general grouping of the arts to be achieved was that into the *useful* and the *fine*, or, to use our own terms, the mechanical arts and the personal or disinterested arts.

Arts of use  
not necessarily  
unæsthetic.

Now, an art of use is not necessarily excluded from the æsthetic field on the ground that its standard of valuation is mechanical. Indeed, it may, and often does, appeal to our æsthetic sense on that very ground. A machine, for example, may conceivably be so designed and constructed as to do a certain kind of work, and may serve its purpose so finely, so perfectly and rhythmically, that our normal perceptions could not detect a single flaw in it. Under these circumstances, it could not fail to excite our admiration and appeal to our sense of æsthetic values, specially the more elementary of these, such as the orderly, the rhythmical and the harmonious.

Indeed, it is altogether probable that the modern age of machinery will, in its higher aspects, be judged by the taste of future generations as embodying, not unworthily, the very tendency of which the fine arts of the past were in part the

product. The machine has, at any rate, economised energy and harmonised the various fields of human activity; it has liberated power while harnessing it, and thus fulfilled an æsthetic need in promoting greater ease of adaptation. The absence of "great" art in our time, therefore, may in future ages be explained, in part, by the fact that the æsthetic tendency became temporarily absorbed in the creation of a new "machinery of civilisation," in short, submerged in the relatively elementary, but not less worthy, aim of perfecting the useful arts. It would be erroneous, therefore, to deny that there was anything "fine" in these arts, or to claim that the division of the arts into the useful and the fine is an absolute one.

The point where the differentiation takes place is clearly seen, however, as soon as we perceive the *application*, or service, of which each art is susceptible. Thus the useful arts are, in all cases, *applied* arts; their aim is the satisfaction of material needs or the doing of mechanical work. The fine arts, on the other hand, while employing mechanical agencies furnished by the useful arts for the accomplishment of their aims, serve a personal and disinterested purpose, perfecting their work to a point beyond need, even beyond nature; for they seek ideal values, precious on account of their relation to our sentiments and emotions, and subordinate the mechanical agencies of expression to the higher aims of the spirit; they are the attempted expression of the full rationality of the human mind, to which they

aproximate the more beautiful and perfect the revelation is made.

Architecture.

The fine arts may now be differentiated and grouped according to this twofold principle. The first is *architecture*. In this art the material or mechanical element is the more prominent, because this art employs, mainly, substances which are already of use to man in the useful arts. The personal element is relatively small. The art of building is nine-tenths an art of use.

Still it cannot be denied that a certain emotional appeal, an elevating æsthetic pleasure, a certain tone of emotion is excited in us by the impression of strength and permanence which a building conveys when it is well built. The push of the sky-scraper against the force of gravity, for instance, the conquest of structural and mechanical difficulties, the union of joint and frame, the revealed victory of mind over matter, create their own values and are decidedly appealing. But these values are all of the intelligence and will; for a mechanically well-built structure is not *ipso facto* a beautiful one. Beauty is conferred upon it only by investing it with design and ornament, with "style," as it is called, or by conveying the consciousness of some large spiritual or social purpose to which it is put. When all these factors combine to produce a whole organically developed out of its integral parts, we judge it to be of higher value as an index of the artist's



sense of beauty and good taste. In this sense architecture is also a personal art.

We do not agree, therefore, with Mr. J. A. Symonds when he says, "Architecture teaches nothing, tells no story, offers no allurements to the senses, imitates nothing." As a matter of fact, buildings are among the most precious records of human nature. The best of them epitomise the taste of the epoch in which they appeared; they are an age's spirit caught in stone and jewels; exquisite revelations of the social feelings; monuments of man's devotion to the beautiful and the good, and are to be valued, on that account, as among the most perfect blossomings of the creative genius of man.

We see this at once when we contemplate a building like the Baptistery of the Cathedral of Florence, or the cathedrals of Rome, Venice and York. So great, indeed, is the social mission of this art, in relation to the formation of taste, that among modern nations, even the school-house, the dwelling, the post-office, the railway station and other buildings of administration, as well as churches, must be designed and erected with reference to beauty as well as use, and thus made suggestive of the nobility of the spiritual life they represent. It is, in short, the purpose of this art "to sway materials and matter," to make them subservient to the revelation of mind; for though it depends on an excess of the material or mechanical elements, it is, from the spiritual point of

view, the most unselfish, the most social and therefore the most useful of the fine arts.

**Sculpture.**

*Sculpture* stands nearest to architecture, so far as its material and mechanical medium is concerned; but it differs in its *theme*, in its *scope*, and in its *aim*. While its range of representation, the area of its field of work, is smaller, it is more subtle and romantic; it is also closer to life; its spiritual and personal significance is, therefore, more obvious. Its models are mostly the living organisms of nature, particularly human beings; in fact, humanity and its emotions may be said to be its central theme. These the sculptor seeks to represent with a degree of fidelity to essential truth and with a refinement and technical perfection, chronologically and artistically in advance of anything needed by architecture, as such. Accordingly, he subordinates the marble more completely to the play of fancy and creative imagination, seizes the significant outward physical attribute or pose of an emotion, and conveys the truth in a more delicate way. The sculptor, indeed, is more the product of leisure and wealth and his art calls for a more precious use of genius. It is also more strictly personal, and demands a higher and keener taste to appreciate it and to admire the varieties of feeling and beauty revealed in it. These two arts, however, sculpture and architecture, often unite their services, and many of the greatest sculptors have been equally great as architects.

*Painting* ranks next. This art was probably differentiated from sculpture, since some of the earliest sculptures known are *painted* to represent the hues of the skin, hair and eyes. But this fine art was long delayed in becoming an independent art, because it had to dance attendance on the science of chemistry; for without the secret of mixing the oils and pigments, which constitute the chief medium in which it works, little advance could be made. This is painting's debt to the mechanical and useful arts. But when the medium was perfected, its rapid development was assured. Painting.

It has already overtaken sculpture in the range of its representations, and stimulates perception and imagination to a livelier and keener activity; while by the representations of spatial *depth* it achieves what neither architecture nor sculpture could, with such ease, on material surfaces. By *shading*, too, and by the manipulation of *light*, rounded surfaces, like the cheek of a child, have enormously extended the field of artistic invention. The decorative element, also, has been successfully utilised to heighten the significance of incident and emotion, to quicken social interest. But greatest of all, this art has excelled in the delineation of character and temperament, of expression and attitude of soul, as revealed in the pose of the body and face. Painting thus became, in the proper sense, a romantic art, an art of personality and incident, none the less vital because entirely addressed to the eye. Besides

this, the whole realm of sea, sky and land has been searched for beauty, and brought into the service of poetic feeling and beauty; painting, in these respects, far surpassing either of the arts already mentioned.

Arts that appeal to the ear: Music and Poetry.

*Music and literature* seem to stand apart from the other arts in that they are chiefly addressed to the *ear*. But let us beware of any arbitrary division of the arts into those of the *eye* and those of the *ear*. We can see, if we think a moment, that no actual discreteness exists. Thus music, though appealing chiefly to the ear, depends entirely upon the printed page, upon the eye and hand, for the mechanical rendering of its creations. So with the art of literature, specially the drama: no organ of perception is so severely taxed as the eye in witnessing a play or in reading a poem. In fact, these arts are only apparently discrete. As with the more formal arts, it is the mechanical *medium*-used, (sound and language), which differentiates them from each other and from the other arts. The proper relation in which to regard them, therefore, is not separately, but side by side, or as supplementary to the other arts. No sound or language is needed by architecture, sculpture, or painting, to make them appealing, but what would the finest building in the world be worth to us without the living voice or the composer's work? and what would sculpture and painting amount to in the absence of those emotions which either have, or may, become articu-

late to the ear as well as to the eye, as in poetry or drama? Painting and sculpture may thus be regarded as dramatic and poetical arts.

*Music* is the most mathematically and mechanically exact of the fine arts, and strange to say, it has grown more and more romantic as its instrumental resources have become mechanically more perfect, as in the modern orchestra, which is by far the finest instrument of æsthetic expression created; while, in fluency and copiousness of expression, as well as in its catholic appeal, it excels all the other arts, not excepting literature. As the youngest of the arts to attain technical efficiency, it seems to have a practically unlimited future. Mr. William Wallace, in his interesting work *The Threshold of Music*, goes so far as to say that through this art a new form of reason, perhaps even an altered system of ethics, may spring, upon which a wider interpretation of existence may be based. Whatever we may think of this, all serious nations, all nations that still have any feeling for the disinterested values of life, have prized this art above all others; and in some nations, like Russia, it may well be *the one avenue left open*, through which the stifled ambitions of the people, yearning for freedom, become vocal. Russian music, therefore, breathes the spirit of revolution.

The art of *literature* may, in a certain sense, be regarded as the parent of all the arts; because, without the mechanism of speech there could be

no far-reaching exchange of ideas. The perfecting of this mechanism and the invention of the mechanical process of printing were the two steps upon the consummation of which its æsthetic development depended. This, of course, followed, *pari passu*, with the development of culture, and the refinement of the perceptions and emotions thereby. Music had much to do with this, specially rhythm and melody; but differentiation has now proceeded far enough to make the "music" of literary speech independent of any aids from the sister arts.

As a fine art, literature is the weakest and most restricted in the mechanical means of expression (twenty-four letters) but the widest in the range of its ideas. No art approaches it in the variety and perfection with which it reproduces the choicest creations of the imagination. Music has greater catholicity of appeal, but literature excels music in its power of clearly visualising thought to perception and emotion. This may be partly due to the fact that it is the older art, but also because humanity has not yet so generally learned to *think* in music. Most people are still tone-deaf and blind, and experience much difficulty in perceiving *ideas* through music's attenuated medium. Unmusical people, probably, would not have the same trouble in perceiving and feeling the beauty of poetry and of the other literary arts. While, therefore, literature excels all the arts in the clearness with which it expresses its ideal content; in variety of form, and directness of effect


on the emotions, it is inferior to music, but superior to architecture, sculpture and painting.

In the arts of literature we include drama, fiction and the essay, as well as poetry; for these, too, are media through which the creative artist may express the beautiful and the true, and minister to culture and good taste.

The only doubt is in regard to the *essay*; but when the object of a writer is not merely to convey information, as in books of science or the newspaper, but also to endow thought with beauty of expression and emotional appeal, we must admit that the essay is entitled to be called literature. Perhaps this has not often enough been perceived or sufficiently emphasised, and the art of prose writing has been allowed to suffer accordingly. I suppose, however, that no man of taste would doubt that Plato's *Dialogues*, though entirely written in prose form, and Carlyle's *French Revolution*, though written with a distinct emotional bias, are literature; or that an essay like Lamb's *Dream Children*, or Morley's *Voltaire*, or some of Robertson's or Newman's *Sermons*, should be included in the list of works which are precious as literature, as well as for their ethical and spiritual power. We may, at least in part, accept the dictum: "Poetry is entirely, prose only in part, the utterance of emotion." If we admit this, then the range of literature, as a fine art, is much wider than is commonly thought,

This completes the list of the principal fine arts. There are, we are aware, a large number of *minor* arts, offshoots of these main branches of the one tree of art; but it is not necessary, for our present purpose, which is mainly pedagogical and practical, to follow them out. Enough, we hope, has been said to show that a natural process of differentiation has been at work among them, giving each a value, while adding to the richness of the whole field of æsthetic enjoyment.

Our classification may be diagrammed as follows:



## II

So far, we have been dealing with the chief objective conditions amid which taste is developed, beginning with the beauty of nature. We have seen that, even in its earliest manifestations,



life tends to differentiate the sphere of the *useful* from that of the *personal*, and that this division of the field of interest runs through the entire objective history of art and the arts.

Now, the primary function of education with reference to taste, is to furnish the proper stimuli to the organs of æsthetic valuation, to adjust them to this objective field of values and to train the individual to use his senses and judgments upon their noblest specimens. Taste grows more sure of itself only as the individual is thus gradually familiarised with this field and the objects contained within it. Without such a field, filled with objects of living or imitative beauty, taste can only degenerate or cease to function altogether. It is the business of education to forestall this catastrophe, by keeping the mind and its field in constant touch.

The further development of taste may now be described from the point of view of *process*. The judgment of taste grows by passing through three cumulative stages of interest, which may be designated as *contemplation*, *comprehension* and *appreciation*.

The Process  
of Valuation.

*Contemplation*, as the derivation of the word suggests, implies a specially meditative attitude of attention to what is present or before our eyes. In the field of beauty, this attitude is required by the fact that its "atmosphere" is one of peculiar emotional power and spiritual exaltation. When, therefore, we contemplate a work of

First stage of  
interest; con-  
templation.

beauty, whether in nature or art, and seek to absorb its values, our powers of feeling must be adjusted to take in its high character, purpose and meaning.

The process is complex. Let us illustrate it by taking a few examples. Suppose we are giving a pupil in our schools his first look at a great and noble building (Rouen Cathedral or Westminster Abbey), or a piece of statuary, (St. Gauden's *Shaw Monument*), or a painting, (Sargent's *The Prophets*), all of which, we may suppose, will stimulate his organs of perception. What takes place? He contemplates them. He "takes them in," first of all, one by one and then as a whole. He focuses his attention. He does not analyse. He is wholly receptive. In a half dreamy, shy, wondering way, he senses their meaning and absorbs their spirit. Just as the lens of a photographic camera is adjusted to the point of clear vision, so his senses strive to focus upon its object. Now, this focusing of the perceptions is the first stage of that "whole moment" in which he seeks to value and judge the object before his eyes, or the sounds and rhythms he hears.

Or let him take up music. In listening to music, the listener first shifts the focus of his attention from the presentations of sense, turning his mind from the objects of his immediate environment in their discreteness and continuity, to the broader, more subjective, more intense field of reflective thought and emotion, so that he can the better sense the tonal values of the art.

Music, in particular, demands this subjective adjustment of attention; for there is, in this art, no visible object presented to the eye as there is in sculpture or painting. The contemplative attitude, therefore, must needs be more inward and emotional if the intimate message of this art is to be absorbed. For example, Beethoven's *C Minor Symphony* makes its proper impression only on condition that we yield ourselves up to it in this entire *abandon* of contemplative attention, at any rate in the first stages of valuation. We must listen with our feelings, not merely with our ears.

This does not mean, of course, that, in contemplating a fine work of art, the mind is passive and contributes nothing to the relation. On the contrary, we are never so profoundly moved. The mind is intensely active in receiving æsthetic impressions, but active from its deeper centers. We "let go" the particular and distracting elements of perception, with its sense of strain and egoistic striving, and fall back, as it were, upon intuition and feeling, and, actively perceiving some significant or precious idea of value, absorb it through our sense-organs by a process of emotional assimilation. In this act, we are not wholly passive, but active, though in a largely subconscious manner; for beauty is ever hidden, and must be sought for.

It is clear from this why contemplative attention of the æsthetic variety is also well described as *disinterested*. For in this state we are not

seeking useful knowledge; our object is not profit in the material sense; but the pure pleasure and uplift of those values which are derived from the revelation of beauty; her values are values of sentiment, not of possession, in which the self is lost in its object, and our sympathies and social emotions are exercised and enlightened. It is this fact that makes the attitude of contemplation so important educationally, as we shall see.

Self-adjust-  
ment is  
æsthetic per-  
ception.

The complete analysis of this complex fact cannot be set forth here; but we may briefly indicate and consider some of the more obvious factors entering into it. First, then, there is the already-mentioned rapid, almost spontaneous, adjustment of the sense-organs in "taking in" the object. How rapid this is, and what almost infinite practice in the economising and harmonising of the sense-perceptions through long ages of effort it implies, few of us can now realise who enjoy the process without conscious effort. It seems to be largely a matter of the instantaneous adjustment of the physiological mechanism of sensation, the obedient activity of intuition and feeling, the *motive* being the intelligent search of values and the expectation of their ordered revelation.

This act of self-adjustment, in contemplating any object of beauty, it is true, is not peculiar to the æsthetic field. As a matter of fact, it is involved in almost all our intellectual and moral experiences, whenever we are endeavoring to take in a moving situation. Still, æsthetic contemplation is undeniably characterised by a

*peculiar ease and harmony of motor adjustment*, by a pleasurable economy of perception and feeling, not equally obvious in other fields of attention and interest.

This is, of course, partly due to the stimulating quality of the object as beautiful. The eye, in contemplating the lines and curves of any beautiful object or combination of objects, is appreciably relieved of the tension which ordinary attention entails, and agreeably stimulated and affected. And what is true of the eye is equally true of the whole sensory side of æsthetic impression and assimilation.

Nor can we consider the subtler sources of stimulation in a work of beauty, which are revealed only to our deeper understanding of it, to be wholly outside the range of this attribute of contemplation. These are undoubtedly part of the "whole moment"; though they may not be distinctly revealed at this stage of valuation. But in so far as æsthetic contemplation is viewed as only a particularly thoughtful and emotional attitude of ordinary attention, i. e., attention with an agreeable sensuous twang, accompanied by ease of movement, it bears upon the total content of the mind, and calls for the coöperant activity of the intellectual and moral judgment, as well as of the sensory mechanism. Our present point is that, in the first stage of this "whole moment," the sensory and intuitive factors are in a state of economical and harmonious adjustment resulting in ease of movement.

Visualising  
the æsthetic  
content.

Another stage of this self-adjustment to the object which may be regarded as, in part, a result of the one just mentioned, is the stage of *clear visualisation*. Here, again, we may find the reason partly in the object. For in fine art meaning is conveyed at high pressure, demanding on our part a correspondingly high degree of intense perception, if its meaning is to be clearly perceived. In the arts of architecture, sculpture and painting this is provided for in the *form* which each object takes to represent ideas. But here the element that requires recreation in our minds is not merely the external features of the object, absorbed by the senses, but the precious content of thought and feeling conveyed by them. Assuming that the artist has succeeded in conveying ideas of value by the mechanical means at his disposal, *our part* in contemplating his work is to focus attention on them; for we never properly value what we do not intelligently assimilate through "the mind's eye." This is much more necessary, and, we may add, more difficult, in the arts of music and poetry, than in architecture or painting, because in them we are dealing with a subtler and more fluid medium of expression, and a more complex apparatus of conveying ideas, communicated by an extremely subtle sort of mental shorthand, whereby the skillful artist touches into intenser life ideas and feelings which our average perceptions would judge prosaic, or miss altogether.

To really live, this spiritual part of a work of art must be recreated in the soul and become incarnate in our own flesh and blood, before it can be said to live for *us*, as well as for the artist.

It is in connection with this process that we begin to perceive a *third* factor at work, I mean the subtle play of the power of *suggestion*. This has been largely ignored by psychologists and writers on æsthetics, yet it is surely one of the vital factors of "the whole moment" which we are describing, and a brief reference may be made to it here. Take poetry. As a means of suggesting choice ideas to the mind poetry is the best equipped of the fine arts. The poet's fancy and imagination have the power of so heightening the utterance of reason that they become commanding to attention. When Shakespeare, for example, speaks of Macbeth's dagger as "unmanly breeched in gore", we have a force of suggestion almost brutal. Now, all the arts have not this power of suggestion to the same degree as poetry, but all possess it, because this is their nature.

Suggestibility  
a factor.

Of course, in contemplating a work of art much of this power also depends upon the suggestibility of the observer. The values embodied in Titian's great picture, the *Assumption*, *e. g.*, would be lost on a backwoodsman almost as surely as on a blind man. No one can assimilate the rational part of art who has not submitted to a course of discipline for that specific purpose. The high degree

of suggestion possessed by fine art is dependent, in large measure, upon our susceptibility to it, gained by this means.

In this stage of ideal contemplation, as Sully says,

"I am not only ascribing life and feeling to the object, but I am projecting myself in fancy to it, feeling for the moment that *I am* the object."

This is the acme of suggestion and suggestibility. Now the consummation of this state will, as we have said, depend upon the degree to which our taste is developed, — according to which it will be easier or more clumsy and hesitating; for our habits of association, our culture, our temperament, our experience and training in the arts, undoubtedly exert a modifying influence over the suggestiveness of the object and our suggestibility while contemplating it. The boor will not be so easily moved, therefore, as the man of culture. For, while it is indisputable that everyone is suggestible to some degree, training regulates and develops the sensibilities and increases the readiness with which intuition perceives and emotion responds to the presence and power of beauty in the field of nature or art.

We should carefully note, however, that in the moment of contemplation itself we are not conscious of the complexity of the situation; the mind automatically adjusts itself and strives instinctively to apperceive and appreciate its object.



When we are viewing the majesty of the Alps, for example, we do not dissect our mental processes; we are seeking the unique divine quality of the whole revelation, which we take in in a moment as an indivisible unity. In listening to music the attitude is the same. In the economical and harmonious blending of the mental elements in the "whole moment" of contemplation, the spirit of beauty, or some unknown spiritual precipitate, enters, unifies and reconciles the discords of sense, blending the diversity of impression into a clear and perfect whole, and confers a peace, like the peace of God, which passeth understanding. The more masterly the revelation of beauty, the more obvious is this experience of peaceful satisfaction in it.

The second stage of interest is the stage of *comprehension*. In this stage there is added to the contemplative attitude just described a more critical use of the judgment.

Second stage  
of interest:  
Comprehension

It is said, "second impressions are always the best." It is precisely with our second and third, in short, with our repeated impressions, with which we have to deal in this second attitude, where we are seeking to strengthen and confirm, by further study, our primary impressions and to understand them.

In so doing, the contemplative attitude, already described, is not suspended or essentially changed. We cannot shake off the emotional bias summoned up by the presence of beauty. Judgment,

2 therefore, must be exercised in this feeling-full atmosphere, or it will certainly prove misleading and unproductive; for the cold, critical light of the intellect is not less destructive of the values of art, than the crudity of the practical man's standard, who would estimate all values in pounds avoirdupois. In the domain of aesthetic perception and feeling, therefore, the formal attitude of culture and knowledge kills rather than stimulates the sense of values. The deeper interest in beauty, which supervenes as soon as we begin to use our judgment upon it critically, is not, therefore, such an attitude as destroys "the finer breath and spirit of knowledge", but one in which we seek a more comprehensive understanding of the secret of beauty, and the sources of the enjoyment it affords, and in which we validate our reasons for the uniform satisfaction we derive from contemplating it. It is only as we learn to use our judgment in this warm and sympathetic way that taste can be developed from a naïve to a more intelligent and comprehending state. In a certain sense, we must become artists to comprehend art; or, to express it paradoxically, we must already *be* artists to become lovers of art.

This admitted, the rest is simple enough. For just as we develop the ethical or the logical judgment by exercising it on questions of conduct and truth, i. e., by differentiating their values as good or bad, true or false; so the aesthetic judgment is developed by exercising it on the values of beauty. This is not a matter which can be left

to "unconscious cerebration", or to any chance mental influence; it is a matter of training according to definite laws; for taste is either right or wrong in its judgments. Bad taste surely implies a lack, a blameworthy lack, of respect for the beautiful; good taste implies at least the earnest endeavor to conform judgment to acknowledged standards of worth; and therefore to have a right judgment in things concerning art, we must at least loyally and comprehensively use our judgment upon them. Only on these terms can we acquire the ability to evaluate works of beauty and art, and derive the greatest amount of pleasure from their unique qualities.

We come now to the *principles*, in the light of which the judgment functions in this process. These are, in the main, three: First, the principle of *truth*. In the literary arts, poetry, fiction, historical interpretation, etc., this is more obvious, perhaps, than it is in the formal arts; yet we can perceive its necessity even in these; indeed, in all revelations of the beautiful.

Truth as a  
principle of  
valuation.

Thus in architecture, a structure which is not "true", we do not, and we cannot judge beautiful. It must first be true to the elementary mechanical principles which control the use made of the materials that compose the inert foundation of it. It must not defy the laws of gravitation like the leaning tower of Pisa, for example. A building is more "true" the more thoroughly its mechanical features have been studied. Ar-

tistically this is the case; for the strongest and most serviceable building will always be one that combines aesthetic with mechanical truth in its structural features. It is also likely to be more permanent. Some of the cathedrals of Europe give an impressive sense of their value on this ground alone; for at least they must be mechanically true or well-built to have stood so long, some of them over eight hundred years.

In prose literature, it is easier to sense truth, as we have already remarked, because in this species of art we demand a closer approximation to the actual facts of personal experience, as in a historical narrative; but in poetry and music it is more difficult, because truth, in these arts, is more typical than actual. Still, in these arts, as the reader will perceive, art is still bound by the law of truth, for the value of a poem must always lie in its essential agreement with the general reason of mankind, which it cannot violate and still retain a permanent place among our accepted artistic possessions.

A musical composition seems less exposed to this test; but this is due rather to the fact that we are less accustomed to sense truth in music's attenuated medium than in some of the other arts. For this reason an unmusical person does not appreciate music as readily as one who, by listening to or practicing the art, has acquired facility in thinking musically. But as musical culture penetrates the domain of a man's thought and emotion, its truth also insinuates itself into

his mind, and thus it becomes obvious to him that music is not inappropriately described as "the deepest harmony of reason", and he will appreciate Carlye's saying, "Think deeply and you will think musically", also Browning's bold assertion, "'Tis we musicians *know*." For a musician's concern is not primarily with the exact truth of things. But neither can he indulge in an aimless meandering of emotions, or potter around, dilletante fashion, and expect the public to accept and admire his work. The final justification of his art is in reason. It is therefor always subject to moral censorship. And this is true of all art in different measures.

The same is true of taste. Mr. Santayana truly says:

"Mere taste is apt to be bad taste, since it regards nothing but a chance feeling. Every man who pursues an art may be presumed to have some sensibility; the question is whether he has breeding, too, and whether what he stops at is not, in the end, vulgar and offensive. Chance feeling needs to fortify itself with reasons and to find its level in the great world."

Our judgments of art and beauty, in other words, have no right to live unless they are rationally and morally sound; they must, to be valid, harmonizze with the truth of reason, just as our religious and moral judgments must, for only as art is seen to be "the outshining of truth" can it be, even in its most detached forms, good for taste. Better taste must, therefore, always wait upon more knowledge.

Form.

The second principle of the critical use of the judgment is the principle of *form*. Under this head we are concerned with two things, the artist's selection and arrangement of his subject-matter, and the expression or style of its treatment. The former is a purely technical question; the latter is more a question of personality. A remark or two on each will be all that is necessary for our present purposes.

The artist is to a large extent limited by the technique and medium of his art in the selection and arrangement of his subject-matter; not everything in nature or life being suitable: A musician and a sculptor have a different *metier*. Each must, therefore, select what harmonises with the aims of his art, and with the technical rules which govern the *form* which the subject takes. Thus a historian, having a great mass of material to deal with, will naturally write in the long or narrative form; but a poet, though dealing with the same subject-matter, will select only what can be treated either dramatically or in epic or lyric form; because a poem calls for a more exquisite sense of rhythm, a higher kind of workmanship, a subtler principle of selection than a narrative, and because, in the formal use they make of language, each occupies a different standpoint and employs a different way of expressing the truth.

Mr. Basil Worsfold puts the situation thus:

"As applied to the arts in general it (form) enjoins and requires that the artist should in each case both

select such attributes of reality as can be best reproduced by the means at the disposal of his art, and also confine himself to the employment of these means in reproducing its aspects."

What judgment, in the exercise of its critical functions, has to determine is whether the form chosen is *adequate* to express the selected truth. In nature this is always the case, but the artist's task is the more difficult one of arresting the life of nature at an instant, to select one suggestion from a multitude, to bend and shape it, so that an equivalent is offered for what cannot really be reproduced.

"It is the artist's duty, while making himself the secretary of nature's shyest thoughts and the interpreter of her secluded mysteries, to perpetuate these fugitive perfections in work which cannot pass away."

When the portrayal *is* adequate, fitting as hand and glove, as soul and body, the judgment is bound to conclude that the artist has thereby conferred value upon his work, and in most cases we do thus conclude.

*Expression* is another and more individual matter. This is largely a subjective question, relating to the attitude which the artist himself takes toward the subject he portrays. It is the personal equation of his art. It concerns not only the limits of his art, which make some subjects unfit for representation in his medium, but also his taste in selecting and his power to interpret his themes. He must, in any case, reveal some-

thing that is personal, since he is dealing with thought and feeling. He can never rival nature in her own sphere. Who could portray all the agonies of the *Crucifixion*? What man of taste would care to see them depicted? But the artist can and must penetrate to the essential truth and give *that* ideal expression; he can and must interpret reality according to the *best* of his insight into it and in the light of his nobler feelings.

In the plastic arts, as we have seen, definite limits are placed on the expressive tendencies of the artist; but even in them, we notice that a Michael Angelo or a Rodin will contrive to reveal a wealth of spiritual and romantic truth, which lifts the marble out of the category of the inert and approaches life. In their work we touch a high level of expressive power; we are confronted by a faculty or sense of form brought into the service of ideas and feelings of value, through which the personalities of these artists stand immediately revealed. Part, at least, of the expressive power of their works is derived from our feeling that in them they have unconsciously revealed their own higher natures, their culture and training, their moral insight, their moods, their social *métier*, and their special standpoints as classicists or romanticists. This is quite apart from the beauty of their productions or the perfection of their technique. For a work of art may be valuable on personal grounds, as an index of the character of the artist, as well as on grounds of technique and beauty. His whole at-



titute towards life and art and towards his fellow human beings stands revealed in it. But the highest art we possess is that in which the artist has placed definite restraints upon his lower nature in order that that which is most characteristic of his and of humanity's best attributes may be brought forward.

The adage "Style is the man" must therefore be taken with limitations. Not everything in "the man" is worthy of expression. He must first be his own critic; must sift out the highest from that which encumbers it, and give that the right of way. The artists to whom all his ideas seem good, or good enough, for expression, justly exposes himself to the judgment of a lack of good taste and true inspiration, and his work will suffer in consequence. Much in modern art comes under this criticism. The cubist and futurist are symptoms of a spiritual exhaustion amounting almost to a disease. Their works express nothing, teach nothing, and lead nowhere, and are certainly not among those precious things

"Which seem too beauteous to endure  
In this mixed world."

Lastly, we appeal to the principle of *perfection*, the most catholic of the rational principles of art, and the ultimate criterion of æsthetic judgment. Perfection.

An artist who works with this ideal of reason in full view confers a value on his work, other things being equal, which it must otherwise lack. Let the subject matter be true to life, actual or

typical; let the form be adequate to convey the truth; we have still the task of judging, its total worth, as an ideal, upon our hands. No one knows this better than the artist. When he imagines a perfect object, such as a perfectly beautiful figure, male or female, the creation of that object necessarily reveals an *ideal* man or woman. In fine art this principle implies the close study and selective use of the material given in perceptive intuition; but this material is worked over, refined, combined and changed, in the light of the ideal of perfection, into something entirely different *in value* from anything actually perceived. Cicero says that Xeuxis took five of the most beautiful women of Crotona as models from which to make up his ideal of perfect womanly beauty.

The true artist, in other words, is never satisfied to merely reproduce his own impressions, or even his liveliest fancies; he will *use* them; but they will be recreated, purged of their dross, and reproduced in a form adequate to the revelation of his idea of the perfection of beauty. In so doing, he will be loyal to nature and truth; for that also is a law of art; he will also obey the imperious technical laws of form; yet the highest worth of his work will be derived from the *ideal* which he impresses on the finished product.

The claims of  
Impressionism,  
Realism and  
Idealism.

It is this principle, thus generally stated, which underlies the long controversy between the three leading 'isms of art—impressionism, realism (or naturalism), and idealism. In the somewhat tedious dispute between the representatives of

these theories the fact has often been obscured that they are only three different ways of interpreting the final purpose of art, its universal value, its perfection. It is unnecessary for us to enter into their merits in detail. We satisfy ourselves with the single remark that each contains an essential element of the whole truth; though when taken by itself each is an exaggeration.

For in the "whole moment" of aesthetic contemplation we ourselves may, in turn, be impressionists, realists and idealists. Thus, the isolation and exaggeration of the fleeting *sensuous* element of beauty makes us impressionists; the isolation and exaggeration of *material* or *natural truth* makes us realists; and the isolation and exaggeration of the element of *imagination* makes us idealists. As we have already seen, when analysing the nature of aesthetic contemplation, all three of these factors unite to constitute clear perception and afford aesthetic pleasure; and now we can see that they are needed when we address ourselves to the more difficult task of understanding the object contemplated.

If we ask, as we must, which of these three points of view represents the *highest*, the *final* purpose, of art, the answer is, the last—*idealism*. This, however, does not and cannot mean that the other two are not essential to a perfect embodiment of beauty, but only that the standpoint of impressionism or realism is not the most universal; whereas idealism strikes into the very heart of it. The art, therefore, that finds its final

Idealism represents the highest value.

cause in that which is perfect will be ideal or universal, and will always be judged as the art that possesses the highest significance and beauty.

If so, no art can be satisfying if it merely reproduces nature and life,—the art that is merely a scientifically accurate representation of facts or of nature's laws. That can be better done by those whose aim is not the creation of works described as "fine". A true artist will recreate nature in the light of his own conceptions of perfect beauty, and impart to his work a personal and imaginative quality which, while it does not contradict the truth of nature, transcends or perfects nature. The result will reveal reality in its ideal perfection, as surpassing anything "given". Art that fails of this effort fails as art, and we take no lasting pleasure in it. We may admire its skill, its cleverness, its "originality", but if our taste is at all developed, if we possess trained artistic and moral perceptions, we shall demand of the art we approve not only truth in this natural sense, but truth in the ideal sense as well, truth in its universal revelations. Mr. Worsfold sums up the case against realism so aptly that we venture to quote his words in this connection:

"It is said that art has outgrown the stage of fairy-tale, adult art should present things as they really are. But this argument admits of a very definite answer. The kind of truth which is here required is not the kind of truth which a work of art can yield. . . . A work of art cannot be made to present the facts of life in the sense in which these facts are presented in history, biography, or in a scientific or philosophic treatise: if the

attempt is made, such a work ceases *ipso facto* to be "creative," and it loses forthwith the characteristic beauty of a work of art."

In short, it is the highest function and mission of art to *idealise* life, not merely to reproduce it.

But idealism also has its inherent limitations. For the idealist cannot say to the impressionist or the realist "I have no need of thee". Fancy cannot run riot, or be allowed to disturb the serene heights where universal truth and beauty enjoy undisputed sway. Philosophy is the foe of both impressionism and realism, which are extremes leading us to take too rosy or too grey a view of life; but it is equally the foe of a lawless idealism, as seen in much of the so-called "new" art of our day.

Art that attains to perfection will not lack both a fine sense of the sensuous element of beauty; it will rather emphasise it; nor will it lack an obvious sincerity or human truth; for these, too, are essential elements of beauty. But where beauty of form and idea are combined with perfection, and the universal ideals of reason inform the whole creative purpose of the artist, art attains a preciousness and value which the judgment is bound, by its own procedure, to recognise and approve. Such work belongs to the universal order of things, and is truly objective, and is not merely the impression of the artist's mind, or of his intellectual ideas.

To this class belong the works of the Greeks, and those of the masters who have touched the highest peaks of vision. These works are, as Mr. Dowden calls them, the "tuning-forks", whereby we pitch the key of our individual enjoyments and appreciations of the beautiful, and in the light of which we must, for many a long day to come, judge all other work.

Enough has now been said to indicate, in outline, the nature of those interests which emerge when we apply ourselves to the study of the deeper sources of value in the fine arts. After the first warm contact with beauty, we naturally proceed to *comprehend* its material, formal and ideal foundations. In this, the second stage of interest, the student is always concerned, if he be well taught, with the quality of beauty and the means of its revelation which, he will find, fit into all the dispositions and ends of the most vigorous and vital of his own judgments. There is never any real contradiction between truth and beauty in the noblest examples of their embodiments. To understand this is the result of study, and of the refinement of feeling and perception which study alone can impart. That is why we have called this stage of taste the stage of comprehension. This, too, is why the education of taste is a matter of such great importance and difficulty. As Ruskin puts it, our problem is not to make art fit our tastes, but to fit both art and taste to the spirit of beauty in its ideal perfection.

We now come to the third stage of this process, *appreciation*, by which we mean the final approval our judgments accord to the beautiful, as good, bad, wrong, right, and so forth. Now the two stages of interest already considered, in so far as they involve the use of judgments of taste, may also be said to be stages of appreciation. But it would be a misuse of terms to say that in either of the first two stages we ever attain to the point where our judgments are entitled to respect. The approval we accord in these earlier stages, because it is based on defective processes or untrained judgment, must be largely emotional, and therefore fugitive or capricious. There is, however, a higher stage of interest in "the whole moment" of aesthetic perception, where emotion and judgment, our own or that of competent critics, coalesce with the principles of reason and harmonise with our intellectual and moral sentiments and with the judgment of the cultivated portion of society. This is the stage of appreciation, of the fullest self-consciousness in matters of taste.

Third stage  
of interest:  
Appreciation.

Psychologically, appreciation is not an original or underived faculty, since it is largely determined by previously accepted principles and by moral and social emotions, at work in other directions of the mind's activity; while aesthetically, our judgments of approval or disapproval are powerfully influenced and promoted by feelings derived from these correlated areas, as well as by pleasure and pain, and, in the adult, more commonly by sentiment. But in either case, judg-

ment is not really appreciative until it is reinforced by the approval of our entire nature. The point to be observed here is that in the "whole moment" of aesthetic perception, it is not emotion alone that determines taste, but a complex of causes which raises emotion to a higher stage of insight. Really, it is life as a process of self-interpretation that determines our final judgments of any special embodiment of the beautiful, if indeed any of our judgments are ever final.

The development of this power depends, first, on education and training in the best art, since without extensive familiarity with and study of it, our appreciations do not rise higher than the stage of personal impression and feeling. Professor Winchester truly says:

"We may school ourselves to like what we know is highest, and be sure that, if this liking becomes sincere, it will outlast our temporary and unriper preferences."

This is because the highest already has its *pretium*, or price, set upon it by those who are competent to value it, with which our own judgments coalesce. We thus become conscious of the grounds of their approval and our own. But this involves a severe course of training. For this reason a person of small culture and taste cannot appreciate the same things as one who has taken the trouble to develop his tastes; the pleasure each one takes in the beauty of art, though a constant element of the whole state, depends entirely on the degree of one's aesthetic development, on how much or



little one knows about the art he assumes to judge. The sense-enjoyments of art are purely individual experiences and fleeting. They are not less valuable on that account, of course; but if the individual student is to advance to the stage of appreciation, where he exercises his judgment upon the full worth of what he enjoys, he must needs study art for other reasons than pleasure. That is why he needs education and training.

But appreciation is not merely a question of the education of the judgment, a becoming conscious of the reasons for our tastes; it also implies the elimination of caprice from these judgments and the development of the *habit* of being pleased with the best in fine art.

Choosing the best.

Goethe truly says, "Whatever is great educates us, as soon as we *feel* that it is great." But the greatness and nobility of art can be perceived and felt only as we become familiar with it. Appreciation is the necessary result of such familiarity. Now the *habit* of feeling whatever is great is not easily or quickly acquired. It depends upon a thousand influences that assist or retard the sluggish senses, and never more so than now, when art is so empty and unstable. If, however, we have had the good fortune to be brought early in life and continuously thereafter into contact with great art, the habit of pleasure in it is formed unconsciously and taste is liable to be appreciative in its judgments. In the absence of these conditions we have to rely on later education and training, and for the most part this is the only

hope of developing an appreciation of what is noblest in it.

The point is that our judgments in matters of art, like our judgment in matters of ethics, cannot be reliable if they rest upon the unsubstantial and capricious tides of feeling. A great work of art, in any of the mediums employed by the creative mind, claims the right to be admired and appreciated quite independently of your or my *feeling*, or any precious prejudices we may hold. Appreciation of it would indeed be a very simple matter—so simple as to be quite negligible and indifferent—if all we had to consider was whether we liked or disliked it. A painting like Sargent's *The Prophets*, for example, does not ask the public if it likes it, but whether its taste is developed to the point where it can habitually appreciate it, and so agree with the judgment already passed upon it by person of good taste. And the standard of good taste is, first, the acknowledged works, in which elements of greatness have long been recognised, not the caprice of mere feeling.

The study of standard literature has an enormous value in this connection, specially upon the young, whose sentiments and feelings are not yet fully formed. Mr. McDougall writes:

“Even if the author of acknowledged eminence is not intrinsically superior to one less generally recognised, he will exert a greater moulding influence upon the abstract sentiments of his readers, simply because their knowledge that so many others admire, or have admired, this author, increases by mass-suggestion and sympathy their admi-

ration for him and so increases also their receptivity toward him and all his opinions and expressions."

Here we have one reason why the daily and weekly press is inferior to literature in forming taste, because in it we do not come into habitual contact with great personalities in their creative influence. The same remark, of course, applies to all the arts. The taste for whatever is great in them becomes a habit only by our absorbing whatever we can of the noble characteristics in their works which have already been admired.

This stage of appreciation, the highest in the "whole moment" of aesthetic enjoyment, is attained only by long and incessant practice. But here as elsewhere "Practice makes perfect." And for this to become more than a proverb, our perceptions must be trained to recognise and rejoice in whatever is perfect, until it does become a habit. Taste can become fixed, and our appreciation of beauty become a permanent source of culture and happiness, in no other way, hard as it may appear.

One remark further. In the "whole moment" of aesthetic enjoyment, the "escort" of emotions excited by the different kinds of great art enriches the quality of the response we make to its lesser excellencies. These excellencies appeal to a great range of human feeling, as we shall see in the next section. Thus a work of art may charm or amuse or please merely, and that may well be *all* it was designed to do. Other art, conceived

- and executed with more serious intent, would appeal to another and nobler set of emotions. But each of our responses, though on different levels of feeling, ranging all the way from the comical to the tragical, contributes to the appreciation of any work of beauty. But (and this is the important point) *only as we accustom ourselves to react to the highest and noblest forms of beauty, embodying perfection, can our minds be purified and liberated from the defective and degrading, even on the lower planes where feeling ranges.*

It is true, of course, that this perfection of beauty is attained nowhere but in nature. This is the reason why we always feel a sense of limitation even in the highest art, even the masterpieces we already possess not being final, if by that we mean that they are the last word on the subjects with which they deal. All art is mixed with this sense of limitation; its revelation of beauty only *approximates* perfection, and is ever in a process of becoming.

This perhaps is the most important insight afforded by the study and appreciation of such art as we have. We are therefore led to expect new and fuller revelations of beauty and truth, perhaps altogether new modes of expression. This is because, spread over them, like a garment, is the spirit of infinite Beauty and Perfection. Only in the light of this universal spirit do we perceive the depths of artistic endeavor and find the true ground, the ultimate reason, of our own emotions

in the presence of art that aspires to give it utterance.

To bring this discussion back to our thesis, we may once again remark that individual taste can be sure of itself only as these subjective attitudes are brought under the control of the will, and the individual adjusts his attention to appropriate the values represented in each stage. These stages stand for three degrees of interest in the beautiful, not three discrete standpoints from which it may be viewed. As the individual's taste grows it passes from the one to the other; but all belong to "the whole moment" of aesthetic enjoyment, and all grow together in the unity of the mind. This growth depends on education. It is not the business of the learner to produce perfect work, but it is essential, for his taste, that he zealously exercise his faculties upon it. No wiser or more encouraging words have been uttered about this long process than those of Goethe:

"All supremely excellent works of art make us at first uncomfortably sensible of our limited powers; for we feel that we are not sufficiently developed to appreciate their merits. It is only when in process of time the culture of our feelings and intellect has enabled us to regard them as actual *possessions* that we love and esteem them."

This is the promise held out to all who strive to acquire the power to value the works of creative genius. Good taste cannot be formed in any other way.

## III.

The Criteria  
of Valuation.

We are now in a position to consider the third of our topics, the *criteria* of valuation, or the various kinds of beauty, viewed as elements of a universal ideal of value.

We have already seen that *perfection* is the artistic aim, and governs all our higher judgments of the work of man, beauty being, in all cases, this ideal revealed in some particular object or combination of objects. Now it is essential to the revelation of beauty that it appear *in* the actual or real. Abstract perfection excites no aesthetic emotion, but only perfection revealed in some concrete object, like a *Madonna* by Raphael. Thus the mathematical statement of the law of gravitation is not a particular moving spectacle; but as revealed in the solar and stellar system it awakens our wonder and admiration, and fills us with awe. A cathedral in like manner can be judged beautiful only as it embodies, as perfectly as possible, all the noble aims of the soul in its aspiration towards the Fountain of all life. A cottage would look ridiculous if used for this purpose. So a picture or statue of a human being is beautiful only if idealised. Put wings on it, and it is less perfect, because less concrete, and therefore less true; for beauty is always some splendor of truth, some union of the ideal and the real. But the universal criterion of judgment is always the *perfection* of the revelation.

All the orders and kinds of beauty are variations of this fundamental principle of taste. Some we always judge higher, more refined and delicate than others. Thus the beauty of the human form is more perfect than that of the animal. Some human forms are likewise more beautiful or perfect than others. Compare, for example, Raphael's conception of the *Madonna* with that of Murillo and Reubens. All of them transcend any actual models furnished by nature—are more perfect than they; yet each, in its own way, approaches perfection and helps to form a rich and satisfying idea of perfect womanhood and motherhood. In all such cases, where we employ our judgment of the beautiful, we appeal to the ideal of perfection in some concrete object.

Many attempts have been made to classify the different orders of beauty, which the judgment considers essential to the revelation of this ideal; but it has not always been perceived that such classifications must, in the nature of the case, be nothing else than the analysis of the ideal of perfection into its living elements, and that the student must allow large margins for their overlapping and combination in both nature and fine art, as well as for their mixture with the more mechanical elements of formal representation. In the lists that follow we shall endeavor to keep these facts in mind.

The orderly,  
symmetrical  
and  
rhythmical.

Perhaps the simplest kind of beauty is the *orderly*, the *symmetrical* and the *rhythmical* — the beauty which all objects must possess in order to suggest the perfect balance of their parts. It is the kind of beauty that approximates nearest to mathematical perfection. Illustrations abound in architecture, and in the human body, where one side is balanced by the other. Nor is it absent from a highly emotional art like music, the most mathematically exact of the arts. Rhythm in music is, in a way, a mode of motion; and the sweetness or harshness of a tone, whether taken alone or in combination with related tones — its quality as exciting or tender — is measurable in wave-lengths, known to be mathematically orderly, symmetrical and harmonious. The same is true of the rhythm of poetry to a lesser degree.

But, for our *taste*, objects are not beautiful because they may be explained mathematically; their beauty, as such, is altogether independent of mathematics, our admiration and pleasure in appreciating them depending primarily upon their stimulating effect on our sense-perceptions and emotions rather than upon the ingenious intellectual process of description or explanation. The Parthenon is not judged a perfect or beautiful building merely because its mathematical proportions are exact within a few fractions; but because it appeals to our aesthetic sense as orderly, harmonious and symmetrical, indeed, as a consummate work of art of its kind.



There is a large number of such objects, whose power depends on this quality, from which we derive a consistent pleasure on that ground alone.

Next, we may mention the *graceful* and the *pretty*. These elements of beauty express the perfection of *motion*, rather than the perfection of form; though both form and motion may be, and often are, combined in fine art. Hogarth's so-called "line of beauty" is beautiful, because at every point it deviates from the straight line and thus suggests motion and harmony simultaneously. Probably all graceful motions could, if measured, be resolved into the single element of order, and be determined with mathematical exactness; but they would not be beautiful on that account, but because they conform to an ideal in the mind, because they move us to responsive admiration and pleasure on their own merits, and because this movement is vital and sensuously agreeable.

Criteria of  
beauty of  
Motion.

*Power* and *strength*, when regulated by the will, are also judged beautiful; for unregulated power does not excite in us aesthetic pleasure, but something akin to fear and consternation. A disordered mind is not beautiful, because it is inseparable from a certain suggestion of weakness; but when reason is revealed in the works of a commanding genius, it is always impressive, even in directions not specifically aesthetic. A well-made mechanical contrivance, like the piston-rod of a locomotive, conveys, by its regulated

Criteria of  
beauty of  
Thought.

motion, a quasi-aesthetic sense of *power*, but so also does a well-reasoned argument, or a well-planned and executed military campaign. In the fine arts, this element enters into all the higher revelations of beauty, suggesting to the mind the presence of beauty, of creative thought, and conveying a relieving sense of strength overcoming difficulties; and the greater the ease with which this sense of motion and power is conveyed the more obviously does the judgment of taste infer beauty and enjoy the revelation.

Next in the scale of values we reach what, for want of a better term, we may describe as the *spiritual*, or the *mystical*. Here the ideal is disclosed as a revelation of the higher nature of the soul, specially its religious nature. Wordsworth's interpretation of nature reveals this quality; but it is obvious in all the best art. The Sistine Chapel is full of it. Certain aspects of external nature, too, have an undoubted power to appeal to the mystical in us. It is because of this power, and because we all respond to it in a measure, that we believe that the universe is the work of creative mind, of free spirit, and not of blind force. "Mind does not delight in matter, but in mind." The beauty of the human body, specially of the face, is also of this order. In its physical symmetry, grace of motion, suggestive of control by the mind, there is also conveyed the suggestion of higher values, the expression of a virtue and loveliness which are from within. Thus Dr. Doune says of a beautiful face:

"The pure and eloquent blood  
Spoke in her cheek and so distinctly wrought,  
That we might almost say her body thought."

Of a face *without* this spiritual expression, Tennyson's description of Maud may be taken as an example:

"Faulty faultless, icily perfect, splendidly null."

The highest kind of beauty, however, is that which corresponds to the conception of the *infinite*. This includes the *grand*, the *sublime*, the *vast*. The ocean, for example, reveals vastness and power; the starry heavens, the depths of space, the orderly motion of the planets, also suggest spiritual grandeur and reveal a will infinitely beyond human imagination or utterance. In architecture we get the impression of the *immense* in the pyramids, the Sphinx, the pylons and huge rock tombs of Egypt. In sculpture the *Laocoon* reveals sublime effort struggling against fate, exciting in us awe and pity. In painting, there is a work of Turner depicting a dragon's body issuing from a cave, but concealing, while suggesting, the immensity of the parts within, which is terrible. Milton's conception of *Satan* suggests this element of will, of the infinite. So does all the deeper music of Beethoven, and much of Brahms. It is not too much to say of such creative achievements that they are sublime, not only in form, but in matter and expression as well. It is, however, in nature that one gets the

Criteria of  
the beauty of  
Will.

— sense of the infinity of beauty best, as all our poets have perceived.

These are among the chief kinds of beauty: the orderly, the symmetrical and the rhythmical; the graceful, the pretty, the handsome, and the charming; the powerful and strong, the beauty of masculinity, the regulated power of the will conquering difficulty; the spiritual, the mystical, or the beautiful as moral and holy; and the beautiful as suggesting the infinite, the immense, the grand and the sublime.

The ugly.

Ugliness on the contrary is revealed whenever there is any radical deviation from these categories. Nature and human life are full of examples; indeed, most objects, "in a state of crude nature," and taken by themselves, are imperfect, neither ugly nor beautiful. Some are incurably ugly. Thus the hippopotamus cannot be judged, by a person of taste, as conforming to any canon of beauty. It has neither symmetry of form, grace of motion, spontaneous regulation of its immense strength by reason, spiritual expressiveness, nor sublimity. Why such creatures exist we do not now enquire; that is a question for the theologian. From the point of view of art and beauty the most that can be said of them is that they act as foils, like the gargoyles of Notre Dame cathedral, serving to emphasise, by contrast, the loveliness and higher satisfaction of the surroundings. They are like the deep shadows in a picture, or the discords in music,

which only serve to emphasise the central beauty. So, even ugliness may have its artistic purpose.

Only on the condition that taste is educated and refined by culture can one come to *prefer* the beautiful to the ugly; otherwise any deviation from beauty, any deformity, in fact, any vice, awkwardness or stupidity, revealed in nature or life, may mean more to us than the orderly, the graceful, the strong, the spiritual or the sublime.

An undeveloped taste, actuated by a desire to exploit its own vagaries, is quite likely to tend toward a vulgar or a cynical and pessimistic view of life, where the eye sees only the deformed, and derives infinite satanic glee in parading it. The cubists, futurists, *et hoc genus omne*, seem to have fallen victims to this vice.

On the other hand, experience shows that the study of the works of great creative minds not only develops our taste for beauty, and its varieties, but introduces sharpness and clearness into our perceptions, and quickens and broadens the normal intellectual life; and the effect of this study is the highest possible; for it is also eminently good for the moral nature. To quote Goethe again:

"It develops spiritual life out of the collective powers, it resumes into itself everything noble or worthy of reverence and love, and raises man above himself by revealing the soul."

This is the direct warrant for training and development of the taste through education,

Plato on  
Ideal Beauty,  
or Perfection.

Plato taught this in the *Symposium* and in others of his dialogues, not as a theory, but as a principle of practical judgment. All the various kinds of beauty, the orderly, the graceful, etc., have reference to an ideal which, he says,

"exists for ever, being neither produced nor destroyed, and susceptible neither of growth nor decay. It is not beautiful from this point of view and ugly from that, or beautiful at one time or place or in one relation, and ugly at another, nor beautiful to some persons and ugly to others. Nor is it the outward appearance of face or hands or anything in which the body participates; nor is it any form of speech or vision; but it is beauty in itself and by itself, simple, uniform and everlasting. And all other beautiful things are beautiful by participation in this absolute beauty. And the true procedure is to use the beauties of earth as steps by which the learner mounts to that higher beauty, going from one beautiful form to two, from two to all beautiful forms, and from beautiful forms to beautiful customs, and from beautiful customs to beautiful ideas, and thence to the idea of that which is beautiful in itself, and so at last he knows what beauty is."

It is this large vision that emancipates the student of art from the tyranny of dogmas, of one-sided judgments and logical formulas. To see art in the light of this ideal of perfect beauty, and not as exhibiting a personal proclivity or caprice or some precious taste, but as the steady comprehension of the whole; to live in the true, the good and the beautiful, as Goethe advised — this is the only way to appreciate it, and to leave ample room in the soul for all its variety

and charm. And only as the individual is led to believe in this universal norm of beauty and to exercise his senses on its most perfect revelations in the several arts, can he come, at last, to the full appreciation of the beauties of art and to agree with the judgments of those best qualified to estimate them. Without this discipline such works as Phideas's *Zeus*, Giotto's *Campianle*, Beethoven's *Symphonies*, Shakespeare's *Dramas*, all the art, indeed, that awakens wonder and kindles delight, is likely to be and remain a dead letter.

It is not meant by this that any of these works has *actually* attained the absolute perfection of beauty or is beyond fault of any kind. Only a *life*, indeed, can embody the ideal of perfection completely; and art is illusion. Our meaning is rather that that art is most serviceable for the development of taste which has already been judged the most perfect; that art which, because it is typical, is prophetic of more and higher beauty yet to be revealed; and therefore it is, that as the perceptions and emotions are brought systematically into contact with these works taste is developed and judgment rendered sure of its verdicts.

No art has yet attained absolute perfection.

#### IV.

Our last topic is the *social reinforcement of valuation*. By this we mean the influence that institutions exert over taste. These comprise a great variety of social organizations, educational, religious, political, which have the op-

Agencies of æsthetic valuation.

portunity in various ways of promoting culture and taste among different human groups by fostering the aesthetic side of life and thus reinforcing the taste of the people.

The school.

And first among these we place the *school*. In spite of the fact that, in the present day, the aesthetic function of the school is relatively ignored, we insist that now, as in the early days of education, the school should train humanity to perceive and enjoy beauty, as well as to think truly and act nobly. This, indeed, as the reader has already perceived, is to be the burden of these pages; and both history and psychology, not to say common sense, lend the irresistible weight of their evidence to the ideal in this respect. Education and instruction, when understood comprehensively and with a view to complete human development, forbid us to accept the current compromise which sacrifices feeling to interests more immediately rewarding in a practical way. In the next chapters we shall try to show how fatal this attitude is when its consequences are traced out in the life of the nation.

Meanwhile, let us observe the advantageous position which the school occupies among other social institutions for serving humanity in this matter. This lies in its popular opportunity, its admitted importance, and its aims and agencies. Obligation attaches to school work in a way and to an extent that is denied to any other form of social operation, not excepting the church. Its true sphere, indeed, is to represent the total



worth of life. It should defend the ideal in man. This, to be sure, it does to a certain extent; but so long as its aims and methods are compromised (for current school practice rests on compromise) it cannot do its whole duty; and, in matters of fundamental importance, involving the life of reason, compromise is fatal to efficiency.

It would be easy to show that the tremendous strain of living in our modern economic civilization *creates* the demand that we train the people to take pleasure in things not connected with the question of bread and butter. It is art that holds the key to this demand. Education without beauty is bound to make us a nation of materialists, rich, indeed, in purse, but poor in conscience and heart. It is the *school* that should show us this.

The institutions devoted to the study of the fine arts must next be mentioned. Excluding the theatre, which we consider later, we have our schools of painting and music, whose work is valuable because it is specific and more definite than that of the public school, college or university. To their promotion are drawn teachers of acknowledged talent, learning and skill. Moreover, the correlation of these institutions with other art agencies is happily growing closer every year. The museum, for example, is now taking its place and performing a valuable service in the development of public taste along general lines, which cannot be overestimated. If our museums, even the best of them, are inferior

Schools of Art:  
The Museum.

to those of Europe, they are improving both in the extent of their objects and in the intelligence displayed in their arrangement, and they are rapidly being enriched by the gifts of generous collectors. Thus their aesthetic and educational value is being increased manifold. *If* the school will but plow the fallow ground and sow the seed of good taste, the special schools and the institutions correlated therewith will furnish "atmosphere" and encouragement for its growth to a promising degree of perfection.

Music, in particular, is faring well. Here, too, *if* the school prepare the way, the oratorio societies, the choral unions, the people's orchestras, the symphony societies and kindred organizations may still do valiant service for the reinforcement of public taste. If this work is at present almost entirely in the hands of foreigners, or the descendants of foreigners, its influence is not less appreciable, but probably more educational on that account, because they are more artistic than we are.

Moral  
agencies.

Next, we may glance at the political and moral agencies, through which we have a right to hope that æsthetic aims will receive accurate valuation. Under the head of moral agencies may be mentioned the various social clubs, the chambers of commerce, the numerous organizations whose aim is general social betterment; the societies devoted to antiquarian research and the preservation of historical relics;

the lyceums and lecture agencies, and even our municipal councils and political parties! There is not one of these agencies that does not exert an influence over public taste, either by upholding high ideals, or by degrading them by self-seeking, pride and commercialism. Their power is almost incalculable. If that influence is not, at present, as we believe will be admitted, profoundly aesthetic, may this not be because their membership is often recruited from the ranks of those whose taste has not been awakened by culture, or because they serve a nation lacking "the fine humanities"?

The *church*, while it is the chief agency for the development of the religious life, should also be one of the most powerful means of aesthetic reinforcement among the people. Art and religion have always doted upon one another like sisters; and the philosophy that attempts to separate them strikes a blow at life itself. Opinions may differ widely as to the place which beauty should occupy in worship. The Quaker meeting-house, with its bare conveniences, its absence of sacramental grace, its severe formality, its abstract simplicity, does not necessarily imply a lack of the highest kind of beauty, called the "perfect beauty" or "the beauty of holiness." There are many gorgeous cathedrals in which there may be less sincerity of worship, less real devotion to spiritual ideals! Indeed, it is a nice question, which Ruskin has discussed, whether there is

The Church.

not an inevitable tendency in all human beings, specially under the influence of the aesthetic impulse, to become idolatrous in the presence of religious symbols, whose beauty raises them to a high degree of suggestiveness — the tendency to become absorbed and identified in the object. There is, of course, a middle ground, where the symbol is used only as a mnemonic peg, valuable to remind us of precious truths, just as we value an heirloom which has descended to us from a past loaded with generations of hallowed associations. St. Paul says, "An idol is nothing," and St. John, warning the early church of this danger, counselled its members to "guard themselves from idols", referring no doubt to these forms of spiritual and material idolatry.

The true view of the relation of beauty to religion emerges as soon as we perceive and provide against this danger. Freedom and democracy are, before all things, necessary to the vitality of faith. This granted and adequately safeguarded, we may properly, and with great advantage, press into the service of religion the whole wealth of fine art without endangering the religious interest. Both art and religion would prompt and profit from this course. For if *love* be the root of genuine religion, it would sacrifice its richest possessions to express its meaning. In worship, thus inspired, the best that art could create may be used and still be thought unworthy.

And who can estimate the influence, in reinforcing public taste, which a form of worship,

expressed in the language of fine art, in its speech, its music, its environment, would exert? True religion, of course, like true art, arises from within; but no intelligent person will deny the complete appropriateness of a union of beauty of form with beauty of holiness, and, as a matter of experience, there are few who can resist their power when they are fitly matched.

We may, it is true, never *compel* men to enter the church even when beautified by art, because compulsory religion, however beautiful it is made to appear, will never win the devotion of the *heart*, though it may for a time win the allegiance of the *will* through fear or for the sake of advantage. But a free and democratic religion, combined with a beauty which springs organically out of the life of the people, and expressing the everlasting truth of God and the soul, in which all the fulness and blessedness of love are freely bestowed and enjoyed, will always be a source of social strength. Beauty, when thus serving the interests of religion, may yet become one of the chief means of restoring religious faith to doubting and distracted souls. Beauty will draw men together when a barren dogma, however cleverly exploited, will fail to raise the slightest interest. Let ritual worship be beautiful, but free and democratic; let the spirit of sacrifice and service, which belongs to the essence of true religion, be understood in a democratic way, and religion will once again command the service of genius in creating beautiful forms for its ex-

pression. Whatever increases the popular sense of a glory of life, higher than nature, higher than *human* nature, is of use to religion, and the church is recalcitrant to duty when she does not avail herself of it. In this service an informed public taste has its place.

Summary.

But it is time to bring our long discussion of this subject to a close and to summarise our results.

The role of  
the School in  
this work.

We may be pardoned, perhaps, if, in conclusion, we once more emphasize the role of the school in relation to all these interesting questions, as this is to be a large part of the discussions that follow. This is a predominant one, from whatever point of view it be regarded, because it is the school that has the control of the awakening years, when these values of life are first consciously aroused. If that part be efficiently performed; if, in our methods and aims, the aesthetic elements of human nature are first understood, then provided for and trained; if the fine arts are laid under contribution for this purpose, as history and science are now used for the development of intelligence and reason; the results can only be the raising of the efficiency, happiness and taste of the individual. Wider issues bearing on the economic life, and perhaps—who knows?—upon the evolution of a higher stage of civilization, are hinted at in this school task. Perhaps we may yet learn from art that no na-

tion was ever made great by its wealth or its territory, but only by the enrichment of its spiritual life and by the nobility and beauty of its handiwork. The school may yet teach us that, in the promotion of these higher aims of civilisation, good taste is a factor of more importance than abundance of raw materials and cheap labor, as being that quality which confers *value* on all material, as well as on the *uses* to which it is put in the work of man.

All will endorse the opinion that the healthful, vigorous growth and development of art will depend mainly upon the popular cultivation of good taste. We cannot expect our artists to pursue high and noble aims unless the *standard* of taste is proportionately elevated among the people by means of training, and their judgments of what is beautiful and perfect are developed by intelligent contact and sympathy with all that is best and noblest in the art-traditions of the race. The task of initiating the people into these mysteries devolves chiefly upon the educator. It is the most important spiritual task before the school. For, after all, what is the use of education if it does not deliver us from the thralldom of the mechanical, and initiate us into the free, if it does not point the way to happiness and contentment of life? Professor Ward, of Cambridge University, has well defined the problem:

"The problem is 'to train up the child in the way' he should grow. Grow he will in any case; what we want is, so to control the circumstances that call forth his activity that he shall grow as straight as possible, as much as possible, in as many directions as possible, *but as harmonously as possible.*"



## CHAPTER III

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### THE AESTHETIC RESOURCES OF THE SCHOOLS

(111)

1.

"It is in raising us from the first state of reverie to the second of useful insight that scientific pursuits are to be chiefly praised. But in restraining us at this second stage, and checking the impulses toward higher contemplation, they are to be feared and blamed."

*Ruskin.*

## CHAPTER III

### THE AESTHETIC RESOURCES OF THE SCHOOLS

The foregoing chapter has brought us face to face with a problem, with which judgment has to deal as well as it can. The situation is substantially this: Modern political and industrial life in America, with its emphasis on the practical and vocational, with its opportunities for men seeking careers of fortune, has diverted the attention of our educators for the time being from culture and its relation to social efficiency; with the result that our people, more than any others, have developed an extraordinary predilection for mere material welfare, and but small ability to know or enjoy the best things and their uses; the disinterested pursuit of truth, beauty and goodness being a comparatively rare product of our educational endeavors, even in their higher forms.

The present situation.

This situation is regarded by many, strangely enough, as a healthy one; indeed, as an inevitable outcome of our social evolution; by others, among whom the present writer enrolls himself, as an arrest of evolution, a temporary immersion in matter, a preparatory phase of social revival, looking towards a new synthesis of educational values, in which the creative, moral, æsthetic and religious factors will, perhaps not without a

purging conflict, again assert their influence and authority. For modern democracy can no more afford to ignore the traditional contexts of intellectual and artistic experience in developing its own individuality, than older countries; rather must the newer freedom among us, owing to its very immaturity, strive to meet these demands and endeavor to preserve its historic unity and continuity with the past, while fulfilling its own peculiar mission. Our problem in this country is to recover for our national life those values which, in our one-sided devotion to making money, we are in danger of losing altogether.

This will involve, as we claim, a revision of our educational aims, a restoration to our social practice of the higher life and its ideals. Only thus, it would seem, can we be prepared for life under all the exacting conditions of modern democracy, in both its material and its idealistic phases.

In the present chapter we propose to leave aside the abstract questions of æsthetics involved in this problem (which will be more fully discussed in our last chapter) and advance a step into the concrete, namely, to the portals of the school, and ask ourselves what are the first steps to be taken towards its solution?

Now, let us assume in discussing this question that some actual provision is made for beauty in the nation's training, that in the erection of our school buildings, e. g., and in the work prosecuted in them, we have taken thought for the æsthetic

The question of equipment is involved in the question of creative ideals and their application.

needs of those who enter them. It would be an unpardonable impertinence, an obvious violation of the truth, not to do so. But this acknowledgment, which is generously accorded, is only one-half the question we ask. If we turn to the other half, and ask whether this provision is what it should be, we at once perceive the essence of our difficulty.

Now, the question whether a school building is endowed with a style calculated to impress the æsehtetic perceptions of those who frequent its precincts; the question whether, in the studies pursued within it, these perceptions, with their emotional accompaniments, are adequately appealed to, depends upon the more ultimate question whether we recognize the fact that *every form of self-activity of the growing mind naturally and inevitably implicates these perceptions and emotions*. The real problem is, whether we are working out our educational salvation in the light of this creative impulse, not merely whether we have made the material equipment of our buildings adequate, and drawn it into the service of creative ideals. When we put the question in this way, the most ardent admirer of our American schools would hardly venture to claim that our equipment for æsthetic culture is, or ever has been, what it should be.

In considering the first steps to be taken in the direction indicated, we shall deal with three points: (1) school environments; (2) school

studies; and (3) school ideals, from the point of view of their elementary appeal to the sense of beauty.

## I

Essentials of  
ideal school  
buildings.

That school buildings should be artistically constructed and arranged is the first proposition to be considered.

Let us briefly summarise the points of a good school building, using for this purpose Dr. Search's work, *The Ideal School*, a work written *con amore* by a man who, in educational matters, is a seer.

### (a) *Its Site.*

This should be high and dry, having perfect natural drainage for its own water supply, but receiving none from higher ground. The subsoil should also be natural, not artificial, containing no organic matter. The building should face the southeast, as this arrangement carries the sun-bath to every room and, with the changes of the day, provides the degrees of light and shade needed during school hours.

### (b) *The Materials of the Building.*

The walls should be of brick, impervious to moisture or absorption of organic refuse. Every part of the wood-work should be of hard wood, and the floors, in particular, should be close in grain, with no cracks, and thoroughly sanitary, and easily cleaned by treatment with beeswax and turpentine. It is important as well as artistic,

though not always practicable, that all sharp angles in corners and on the edges of walls, etc., should be avoided by using concave surfaces. These buildings should be of one story only, with no basements of any kind, the superstructure resting on solid arches of masonry, and every room should be ventilated, warmed and kept perfectly dry.

(c) *Style.*

Architecturally they should be graceful, attractive and simple in style. Much will depend in this matter, of course, on the site and surroundings. Beauty must often be sacrificed to a variety of tyrannous local conditions, specially in cities; but ideally school buildings should command a view of the natural world and harmonise with such beauty in the environment as can be utilised for permanent artistic purposes. Gracefulness and simplicity should be principally aimed at, as being most in accord with the purpose for which such buildings are erected. A school building, located amid beautiful surroundings, and suggestive, structurally, of the finer elements of the human environment, would inevitably exert a positive though largely unconscious influence over the senses and perceptions of those who habitually enter it for study.

(d) *Interiors.*

These should carry out the suggestions of the exterior, and therefore should be graceful and

harmonious in line, color and arrangement. The walls should be entirely without reflection and bear a soft shade of light green. This last requirement, however, would depend somewhat on other circumstances. Green, beside being the most widely distributed color in nature, is the "hygienic" color; but it is sometimes difficult or even impossible to flood the room with sufficient light on a green foundation. In such cases a dull yellow or buff color is preferable to green. One thing is certain: they should *never* be treated in white, though this is the shade generally adopted at present. The reason of this is clear. It is on account of its injurious influence on the organs of vision. Experience shows that eye-strain is a fairly uniform concomitant of education conducted in school rooms whose walls are treated in white, and is, on physiological as well as æsthetic grounds, to be condemned. The rim of blackboards that usually forms the circuit of the room only emphasises the ghastly funereal appearance of such an arrangement of tones.

(e) *Furniture.*

The furniture and fixtures of an ideal school-room should be of adequate size and comfort, as well as appropriate to the special purposes to which each room may be put. No two rooms would necessarily require the same equipment. Nor should a too rigid adherence to one style of arrangement be enforced. Each room should, of course, be furnished with distinct reference to



the cultivation of taste, according to the age and standard of the pupils, and so far as its original limitations allow.

Special effort should be made, as we have said, to correlate all interiors with outside nature, either by the introduction of flowers or by means of views through the windows, so that tired eyes and flagging attention may readily secure relief by dwelling on the beauty of nature. For the same reason and for their purely cultural influence, pictures of the masters, statuary, a choice but not too copious library of the masterpieces, both ancient and modern, together with the instruments of musical and dramatic study, should form part of every well appointed school room, according to age and capacity.

(f) *The Art Room.*

A separate room should be provided for the special study of the fine arts and should receive special care. It should be a kind of laboratory of art, and would, therefore, require more space and a greater profusion of art objects than the ordinary class-room. It should have a stage. Everything about it should be simple and harmonious; floor, walls, ceiling and furniture should be so harmonised as to relieve the senses and invite the creative activity of the imagination and feelings. The walls should be warmly tinted. The equipment should be so displayed that the objects could be easily seen or taken into the hands for purposes of study if need be. There

should be no formal arrangement of desks or benches; the art-room in short should never suggest the severity of those rooms where routine work is conducted; indeed, its true function would be to serve as a *relief* from the strain of the more formal studies. The best plaster casts should be visible at any angle and handy for study, and studio-chairs, adapted either for drawing exercises or for seating the class, should be available in any part. As the only form of manual training permissible in an art-room is drawing, all mechanical apparatus should be relegated to the manual-training department. A pupil on entering this room should forget, for the time, the mechanism of school work, and unconsciously absorb that which belongs to his sense of artistic values.

This covers the main features of a school building adapted to give place and free play to the quality of beauty. Much greater demands are often heard from those who make a fad of this matter, but it is hardly necessary at present to consider these. The irreducible minimum is all we can legitimately claim; but this, it will be found, would, if recognized and duly considered, lead to a reform of much of our school architecture and equipment, and go far towards improving the taste of those who go to school; while, from the point of view of social efficiency, it will be found that the school building that is designed and executed with reference to good taste is

always the best adapted to fulfill its practical purpose among the people.

That there are some school buildings in this country constructed in accordance with these requirements is to our credit; but the vast majority, as we know, do not measure up to them. Most of them, perhaps eighty-five per cent, are located in the rural districts and are, for the most part, erected without reference to any beauty of design or fitness as places of æsthetic culture. Many of them are situated at cross-roads, out of eye—or ear—range of readily available scenic beauty—an unpardonable error of selection and judgment—and they are not infrequently as unsanitary as they are unsightly. Such buildings hardly meet the elementary requirements of shelter; they fail simply on economic grounds; for, after all is said and done, the most economical building will always prove, in the long run, to be that which satisfies the demands of beauty. Moreover, it costs less to construct our schools artistically and to equip them for their work liberally than it does to be always tinkering with improperly designed and poorly constructed ones. The best is the cheapest, if we have the foresight and taste to know what the “best” is; and the best is none too good for the child, as all enlightened teachers and taxpayers have always felt, cost what it may.

So much for the school plant from the æsthetic point of view.

Influence of  
environment  
in education.

The further discussion of this subject carries us into the heart of the question of the influence of environment in developing the mind, and the relative importance of environment and personality in the teaching process. It is, indeed, a nice question to determine which is the greater influence in the school, personality or environment, but it is beyond question that school surroundings have a very important educational value and that the more richly they are endowed with the quality of beauty the higher will be that influence; for while the personality of the teacher may, and often does, compensate for the lack of an adequately equipped school plant, it can never wholly do so. If we must choose between them, we must, of course, give the preference to personality; but, on the other hand, the lack of sufficient force in the personality of the teacher, which is unfortunately a frequent contingency of education, may, for the high purposes of culture, often be atoned for by attractive and inspiring surroundings.

It is only too true, of course, that poor teachers will growl out the instruction in any school, be it richly dight with beauty, or barren. Such teachers, lacking the imagination to perceive or the ability to avail themselves of the subtle implications of beauty and order in a structurally ideal school, would inevitably fail to make their pupils perceive and appreciate them. But when both these forces, environment and personality, are at work; when with an appropriate environment

there is combined the personal influence of the teacher awake to the æsthetic possibilities of the environment, we have the ideal conditions for carrying the pupil through the first steps of æsthetic education. The analogy of experience follows in the æsthetic as in the intellectual and moral phases of education. A teacher of sympathy and insight and of high moral character exerts a force, creative in kind, and greater, other things being equal, than that of a teacher lacking these endowments.

In the absence of these ideal conditions, we contend that the static quality of the environment — the fact that it is always out there, a visible, tangible thing — gives it a special significance; and when it is adorned with grace and beauty of style it makes a steadier appeal to the æsthetic feelings than the personality of a teacher, in whom the sense of beauty is only feebly developed. Of the two, under these circumstances, the force of environment is greater than the force of personality, specially upon the younger scholars; one is always to be depended upon, while the other is variable.

It is certain that in our practice we have underestimated the power of beauty in the school environment. Else we should not have designed and erected so large a number of our school buildings after the pattern of barracks, where the sole occupation is a sort of semi-military discipline. We have thus unconsciously violated one of the first laws of successful teaching. As Horace

Mann says, "the process of education should always be accompanied with feelings of pleasure." Keats, in *Endymion*, sings the familiar truth:

"A thing of beauty is a joy forever:  
Its loveliness increases; it will never  
Pass into nothingness; but still will keep  
A bower quiet for us, and a sleep  
Full of sweet dreams, and health, and  
quiet breathing."

Why should not the temple of instruction be so instinct with the beautiful that the senses of the scholars always rejoice in it? However we may answer this challenge of common-sense and art, it will be admitted that there is a largely educative influence in school environments; and that in their æsthetic equipment, they should be adequate and satisfying if they are to fulfil their purpose. And that is all we wish and contend for at this stage of the discussion.

## II

How the æsthetic sentiment enters into school study.

Let us now proceed to the next proposition. One question is: is there an æsthetic element in the first formal steps of school work, the appreciation and development of which predisposes the scholars to perceive and always to rejoice in it? Our answer is: *All processes of school study implicate it more or less obviously.* Let us see if this is borne out by the behavior of human nature under school conditions.

Take, first, the *play-impulse*, through which the child is initiated into school work. The recognition of this impulse as an element of the æsthetic psychosis is a comparatively recent discovery, though the Greeks recognized and used it in their theory of "music" and "gymnastic." This theory was the product of the Greek theory of life and culture, the æsthetic bias of which was pronounced from the first. But it was not until Goethe, Schiller and Froebel seized upon it at its psychological basis, that it came into its own as a means and method of education. Since then it has played an ever increasing role in all schemes of elementary culture, and its influence may now be said to extend to its every phase and, in fact, to be coterminous with life itself. (a) Play.

Now, the child's play activities function to its educational advantage in three ways, namely, biologically, socially, and, in a special degree, æsthetically. Of the first Professor Horne says:

"The main education of early life comes to the child through play. It is nature's schooling and should be supplemented, not interfered with, by man's schooling. \* \* \* In the school it affords the necessary reaction from work and preserves the individuality of the pupil. Its educational effects in the way of unintended preparation for later living is incalculable."

Of this primary function of play we need say no more here except to point out the fact that it still remains the conception held by the majority of our people, to whom play appeals merely as a

respite from work, and too often quickly degenerates into amusement.

But play has a far wider function to perform than that of affording an outlet for stored-up physical energies. It is also a medium for the manifestation and development of the social sympathies. It is, indeed, the most important means by which the child secures a warm and living hold on its human environment. It is so largely educational because, as Professor McDougall says, it prepares the child "for social life, for co-operation, for submission and for leadership, for the postponement of individual to collective ends." Of this aspect of the play function, too, we need say no more in this place. Poor, indeed, in sympathy is the social life of the child where it is not given free and abundant room for development.

Is there, however, anything æsthetic in child's play? We find this to be even *more* pronounced than its biological and social features. Why, let us ask, does the child, in its play life, always dance, sing, act, and dramatise its social experience? Is it not because the whole effort of the child is guided by the quasi-æsthetic purpose to adapt the body and its movements to express its instinctive pleasure in rhythm, harmony and beauty of action? Its pleasure in this effort is partly biological, partly social, mainly æsthetic, and always intense.

It is nothing against the child's instinct in this matter that its first attempts at play are often crude failures. Education alters this. Gradually,



specially if assisted by sympathetic adult example, it comes to adopt an order of movement, expressive not only of its joy in sheer physical exertion and its sense of social sympathy, but also and specially an individual tendency to mimic, to play a part. Every child finds this sort of thing useful as self-preservation as well as satisfying to its æsthetic feelings; so that in the course of time it comes to perceive, as Professor Kirkpatrick says, that "Anything suggesting want of equilibrium and strength fails to appear beautiful."

Between the play-impulse and the art-impulse Play and art. there is thus a relation of the closest intimacy. In the child we are always dealing with the player, whose life consists in seeming; make-believe is its whole vocation; to shine and to please. These, too, are the most persistent elements of those idealising activities, by means of which art attains its ends; they are the means by which art becomes, as Groos says, "the highest and most valuable form of adult play." It is of the highest significance for education, therefore, that the roots of the æsthetic sentiment should be thus early disclosed, and that a *positive preference* should be encouraged for what is rhythmical, musical, dramatic, and for that reason self-satisfying.

It is beyond question that if these instinctive play-activities were taken at their true epochal value, and a timely cultural use made of them, they might form the foundation of a cultivated

taste throughout life. But we have largely missed their æsthetic significance, and often speak slightly of them, calling them "mere child's play!" The poets have shown far deeper insight in these matters than many of our psychologists and philosophers. They have dwelt upon the gladness, the self-sufficingness, and the unexpectedness of the child's behavior in its play life. They have perceived that in play the child enjoys a life wholly apart and free, and acts from impulses of which the adult often has only the barest reminiscence. Wordsworth gives us a charming picture of this in the lines:

"Even so, this happy creature of herself  
Is all-sufficient; solitude to her  
Is blithe society — who fills the air  
With gladness and involuntary songs.  
Light are her sallies as the tripping fawn's  
Forth-startled from the fern where she lay couched;  
Unthought of, unexpected, as the stir  
Of the soft breeze ruffling the meadow-flowers;  
Or from before it chasing wantonly  
The many-colored images impest  
Upon the bosom of a placid lake."

This is the true world of the child — a world peopled with fancies, a world touched by pure pleasure and instinctive taste.

Play in the  
kindergarten.

It is in the kindergarten that formal use is first made of the play-impulse of the child, and is first turned to educational uses. A good summary of these is given by Professor Horne, who writes:

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"Froebel and the Kindergartners are the true educational interpreters of play as one of the child's highest modes of self-expression. 'We should not consider play as a frivolous thing,' says Froebel; 'on the contrary, it is a thing of profound significance. \* \* \* By means of play the child expands in joy as the flower expands when it proceeds from the bud; for joy is the soul of all the actions of that age.' In fact, in the Kindergarten, play is converted into systematic teaching, skilfully suggesting as it does aims of action and objects of study. The Kindergarten is supervised play; in it the community sense is developed; children of the same age playing and working together here develop unselfishness and their social natures in a way impossible in the home with children of different ages and the youngest the object of central interest. With its basic principle of self-development through self-activity, the Kindergarten is particularly serviceable to that type of child which is naturally timid, undemonstrative and inactive."

While educational opinion has varied, and still varies, as to the real value of the kindergarten, some authorities denying it any, there is a growing sense among students of the importance of the æsthetic factor in the child's formal occupations. This appears in various schools started here and in Europe, where larger opportunity is offered for its operation. This is seen with special clearness in the vogue recently acquired by the methods of Mme. Montessori, which have been introduced into this country by Miss Anna E. George, in her "House of Childhood" at Tarrytown. These methods, though not ostensibly æsthetic, (and capable only of limited application in this country) are based on the elementary laws

The Montessori methods.

of æsthetic perception; for, in them reliance is placed on the expressive or creative activities of the child, the whole aim being to discipline and develop them through liberty, self-activity, the power of selective attention and the feeling of the fitness of means to end.

These potencies of human behavior have not, it is true, been utilised in education to the extent they should be, considering their strength; but the best kindergartners, I mean the instinctive rather than the theoretical kind, know their true force, and, whenever they are awake to their æsthetical implications, employ them liberally in the occupations and games of the school. How keen is the joy of creating in every child, in whatever direction he seeks to express himself! This joy is, to be sure, largely sensory, and depends on the objective stimulation of sense-organs, but it is simply lack of insight that denies to the child an inexhaustible fund of subjective pleasure whose sole object is in itself, and whose incitement to expression is its inchoate sense of the beautiful. It is a fatal blunder to ignore these rudimentary æsthetic activities, a blunder none the less serious because its fruits are visible throughout life.

From these remarks it is clear that in the organized play of the kindergarten we have the first school of the æsthetic nature, and first perceive its function in human education. *It is to impart to the routine activities of education and to its practical results an element of pleasure,*

*this pleasure arising from the free play of the creative and expressive functions of the mind.* In accordance with their varied capacities, all children are makers or doers; they learn by doing, and never learn effectively in any other way. The highest pleasure they know is the pleasure of acting a part, in which they find a channel of self-expression and creation, and this because they are themselves in the making. Our brief analysis shows that in the core of this form of human behavior the æsthetic element is implicated.

Further use may be made of the æsthetic functions in what is commonly called *physical culture*. (b) Physical culture.

The chief value of physical culture lies in its bearing on *health*. The eugenic movement which has gained so much momentum and has, by no means, reached its height, is serving the good purpose of emphasising the importance of a sound physical inheritance for race culture. We are learning that as the evolution of plant life can be controlled for improvement by intelligent human interference, so race evolution can be controlled. Manifold have been the beauties added to nature by this means. and there seems bright promise of still greater ones for humanity in the near future, of which the school will surely take advantage.

But meanwhile conditions are far from ideal. The positive physical defects of school children

are assuming the proportions of a serious hygienic problem. The report for the current year (1913) states that in the city of New York alone almost three-fourths of those examined needed the attention of doctors and of dentists. According to the reports of children examined in 1912 there are over 426,000 in the public schools with defective teeth, and over 9,000 pupils were recently taken out of the city schools in nine months as a result of the detection of different diseases and isolated as unfit to associate with normal children. Of those that remained no less than 10,438 were treated for *favus*. It was also found that chronic *diphtheria*, *trachoma*, *adenoids*, *measles* and incipient *tuberculosis* were quite common. In the city of Boston, the report of the medical commission of 1911, appointed to investigate the physical condition of the pupils, showed that of 42,750 children examined only 35 per cent were found to be physically normal, the defectives numbering 27,795, or 65 per cent. Dr. N. C. Schaeffer, State Superintendent of Public Instruction for Pennsylvania, declares that 1,000,000 children now in school in the United States will die of consumption before they are 18 years old. Dr. S. A. Cotter, addressing the schools of Chicago, recently, said that one out of every ten of the scholars will never grow up. They will die before attaining maturity. Two out of ten will become moral wrecks. This is all very wasteful, but under present conditions it is a law of statistics.

This physical abnormality among children in schools is due to many causes besides the lack of proper training of their bodies — to bad heredity, to malnutrition, to unhealthy environments, to lack of hygienic self-management; and the primary remedies for these disorders are certainly in the first instance in the hands of the school doctors. This, however, should not blind us to the fact that physical education, in which the æsthetic factor is allowed to play its wonted role, is one of those things the neglect of which is ever likely to prove disastrous to health in education.

It has been experimentally demonstrated that the harmonious exercise of the organs is not only an important factor in the graceful carriage of the body and in all gymnastic exercises, but, when trained into the bodily movements, is also positively conducive to health. A recent French investigator says:

“There is an order of limb movement that leads toward right thinking; and not in one lesson but in all lessons, movement, hidden or external, free or controlled, of the muscular system, plays an important part.”

We can, for instance, trace the lowering of the mental and moral vitality in large numbers of children to the degradation of the muscular sense. Luys refers to one of his patients who lost every vestige of morality with the blunting of the touch-sense in his body.

On the other hand, what can be done to recover the moral sense by harmonious rhythmical phy-

sical culture, guided by teachers with an eye to true ideals, can be seen in the numerous cases reported by Ker, Seguin, Esquinol and Schuyter, who have shown that the education of the body, by means of rhythmical movements, is a factor in the symmetrical education of the growing mind. The relation of this important branch of education to the character and welfare of the people is obvious enough, and its social aspects will be considered in a later chapter.

#### Gymnastics.

That the æsthetic factor in contemporary physical education is neglected is an observation any one might make. Take gymnastics. We do not, as a rule, consider them æsthetically. Yet as soon as it is pointed out, we can see that physical exercise to be truly educational, especially for growing children, should be regulated, rhythmical and graceful, as well as spirited and vigorous, and should be *adapted to the correction of individual faults* in the body and their control by the mind. Physical culture is not, as we so commonly think, an end in itself; the true purpose of this art is to develop the body in the economical and harmonious management of all its resources, so that it may suggest peace and strength combined, and thus conduce to health.

#### Dancing.

Attention has recently very properly been given to *dancing* as a means of utilising the æsthetic factor in this form of culture. The advocates of this idea have pointed out the prominent place which the dance has always occupied in the culture of the races of mankind; they have also



shown that primitive peoples invariably combined with their dances much that was poetic, dramatic and musical, and that most of these exercises were significant of an idea or feeling, to which they sought to give expression in the movements portrayed.

Dancing has had a great history. Among the Egyptians and Greeks we know that the art was carried to a high degree of beauty by competition. But into this history we cannot enter here. Survivals of these æsthetic characters and intentions may, however, still be seen in some of the national dances of the Tyrolese and Scottish peasantry. These, too, are rapidly disappearing.

Our social practice has, on the whole, departed in large measure from these hints of nature and art, so much so, indeed, that we can hardly describe the current modes as artistic, when compared with the Greek modes. Our sole aim seems to be enjoyment; we dance for the sake of the sensuous rapture and the barbaric fun it affords, not for the satisfaction of an æsthetic impulse. Perhaps that is why our national recreations are often vulgar and brutal, and our dances often morally degrading. Nor is it the best commentary on the physical education of our young people that so many of those who have come under its influence for a number of years should be completely incapable of performing some of the most elementary physical movements, like walking across a room in the presence of a com-

pany of people, without suggesting something grotesque rather than graceful.

All these physical defects have, as we shall see later on, their mental counterparts or incitements, such as slovenly speech, noisy vocalisation and careless, crude thought, so intimate is the relation between the movements of the body and the mental activities. Is this not because we have largely ignored the æsthetic factor in human nature, the culture of which would go far to redeem behavior from these obvious defects, both physical and mental? We think this is highly probable.

(c) First steps  
in sense-  
knowledge.

We have now to consider the first steps in the formal training of the sense organs of *seeing* and *hearing*, and to enquire if, and to what extent, there be any appeal to the sense of beauty in this training. The primary studies that come into view in this group are naturally those which appeal to the eye, such as drawing and writing, and those which appeal to the ear, such as singing and music.

Now, writing is really a species of drawing. Therefore, learning to draw should, chronologically and psychologically, precede learning to write. The history of language teaches this lesson. For all letters were originally pictures of objects, — “pictographs,” as Haddon truly describes them — as we may still see in the language of China, for example, in the heiroglyphics of the

ancient monuments and in our primitive American Indian "writing."

In the Montessori schools the basic sense of touch is combined with vision, and utilised in teaching the child the outline form of the alphabet. Thus the child learns to synthesise its first impressions, and, as it were, comes to have "eyes in its finger tips," to visualise the tactual sense of the proportions and values of the lines, to draw them in the mind, so to speak. In this way a mental image of the letters is gradually built up out of the crude elements of sensation; then words, and lastly, sentences. Thus the child learns, by the sense of sight and touch, to draw *and* write almost simultaneously.

The difficulty that most children have with writing, specially in the secondary grades, grows largely out of lack of previous training in drawing. Take, for example, the formation of such difficult letters as capitals R, W, S or M. The picture of the pupil struggling to *draw* these letters, without proper control of the manual acts involved, that is, without a sense of the proportion and harmony of the lines, is grotesque enough. The process is really complicated, and few adults, even, attain to the mastery of it.

That the writing of school children is so often and so justly criticised is due in large measure to the failure to adequately provide for the æsthetic factor in the earlier stages of the process of training. Reform must begin at the basic muscular senses. There is, first of all, as we have seen, an

Criticism  
of current  
methods.

*order* of bodily movement appropriate to this as to other forms of thinking. The neglect of this truth may explain in part the fact that 90 per cent of all cases of spinal curvature in schools, and 58 per cent of all cases of myopia, occur in the chief writing grades of our public schools. (The right eye, as is well known, is worked harder than the left in writing; and the body, unless the proper postures are taken, tends to take a slanting muscular attitude. This can be corrected only by careful attention to the symmetry of the bodily and mental functions involved. The expressive activities of children always tend to become sloppy and indolent unless their artistic sense is appealed to.) Mr. J. S. Taylor also tells us that 87 per cent of school children are wholly indifferent to the art of writing. Complaints are constantly coming from the heads of business houses that even our high-school graduates cannot write. Surely this is because the art is taught in a mechanical manner and, for the most part, by teachers who lack the sense of beauty and the ability to draw it out of the pupil. Bagley well says:

"The lessons in writing should be as thoroughly unified and as systematically organized as the development lessons in geography and grammar. \* \* \* It is common to look upon exercises in writing as "rest periods" for the teachers. As a matter of fact, *his direction and guidance are at no time more important.*"

The teacher with an eye to the æsthetic element in all this work will not only reveal to the child

the beauty of this art, by the use of the proper methods, but will also add a pleasure to the process of learning, which otherwise it must lack.

We come next to *drawing* and *manual-training*. These studies, like writing, are forms of sense-culture, involving chiefly the tactual and visual organs. Of the two, drawing is the more valuable; for it is the most cultivating of all forms of manual training. Its relation to writing has already been pointed out.

(d) Drawing and manual training.

Manual-training, including carpentering and other forms of constructive work is, we believe, for most scholars, time wasted, unless they have learned to draw well. Budersheim says that pupils in the German gymnasia who are deficient in drawing are, in an overwhelming number of cases, deficient in constructive manual work. The same is true, according to official reports, of the inmates of the Elmira Reformatory. Experience proves that it takes a relatively low order of intelligence merely to handle tools, but to handle them in the service of the higher sense of *form* and *beauty* requires first a trained sense of the æsthetic qualities of the art of drawing.

For true success in this art, therefore, the child should be encouraged to draw from the time he can hold a pencil, and express his ideas in the first instance merely for the pleasure of the thing, an accomplishment which cannot be achieved without continuous practice. All through the primary grades, and never more so than when the

Early start essential.

æsthetic interest begins to awake (and that is when it begins to see the inadequacy of its representation), the child must have this living interest in the art of drawing kept free from the depressing influence of too much mechanism.

All children find *color* a great aid in this work; but a child cannot learn to draw by the brush. Children must learn to *draw* before they can paint. Let them first draw, sparingly, of course, lines; then what they observe of truth in leaves, patterns, designs, objects (in outline) balanced, as nearly as possible, and, wherever possible, ambidextrously. And throughout this process let great care be exercised not to stifle freedom and spontaneity of expression. Dr. Albert Hein, of Zurich, justly criticises our average instruction on the ground that it crushes individuality. He observes, what we all know to be a lamentable fact, that many a child, showing real talent in the primary grades, has, by the time he has reached the high-school, had it killed by overdoses of cubes, squares, triangles, and lifeless ornaments, or "still life," nearly all of which could be drawn by foot-rules and compasses. The sense of beauty is thus injured. It must be rescued for the sake of the efficiency of this discipline as well as for the sake of the individuality of the scholar.

Drawing from  
nature.

It is also of the greatest importance that we guard our schools against the prevailing tendency to exalt unduly the relation of drawing to the work of the machine shop. Drawing from nature is the best way of doing this. We may admit

that for manual work, the study of linear, free-hand, mechanical drawing, together with some knowledge of perspective, is necessary; but let all this be accompanied by close and patient study of the beauty of line and color as seen in the sky, in the form of clouds and flowers, in the movements of birds and animals and human beings. Let the pupil be taught to feel the mystery and beauty of *light*. Let him learn the secret of nature's way of combining variety with unity, of the still with the living. Let the drawing lesson lead him, by natural stages, to these values, let it *mean* this to him, and the frequent criticism of this department of our work as being, except in rare instances, (chiefly in the case of the children of foreigners) perfunctory and mechanical, would be removed.

Manual-training in turn would not suffer from this thoughtful care for beauty of drawing. On the contrary the division between the two, which undoubtedly exists at present, would be obliterated; a sense of beauty would be carried over into them. And what that would mean to the industries of our country, such as the manufacture of furniture, leather goods, jewelry, fabrics, carpets, etc., to mention only a few, can be readily imagined. Instead of these industries being, as they now are, mostly in the hands of foreigners, with the French in the lead, our share of honor in them would be more than saved to us. Moreover, the individuality of our industrial output would, by this stricter attention to the æsthetic

Drawing and manual training aided by beauty.

factor of manual labor, mean millions in the pockets of the people, not to mention increased pleasure in creating objects of beauty. "A thing of beauty is a joy forever," would thus become more than a pretty thought.

(e) Aesthetic training of the "ear."

Attention will be called in a later section to the importance of delicacy of "ear" in the study of literature. The sense of *hearing*, however, does not have to wait for the stimulus of formal literary culture to become either coarsened or refined. The child is profoundly influenced by, and the direction of its moral and æsthetic emotions gets an early bent from, the kind of voices it hears about its cradle and in the nursery and school. The mother's voice, in particular, has a wonderful æsthetic power. And before the school days come, in the spontaneous activities of play, the child is already gaining a capacity for ear-ideation, a susceptibility to sound, ugly or beautiful, which determines its auditory reflexes perhaps for *life*. We cannot, however, stop to consider in detail many of the occult inchoate factors of auditory education, beyond the single remark that the child's avenues of audition cannot be too carefully guarded against crude and harsh natures. Our present interest in this section must lie in the more formal culture of the sense of hearing by means of singing and music in school.

Origin of æsthetic "ear."

Now, it is probable that vocal expression, like musical expression of all kinds, was an early



product and accompaniment of the joyful feelings excited by the *dance*. No race, however primitive, has been discovered without some aptitude for it and sufficient understanding to turn it to account. Whether we explain it, with Wallascheck, as the expression of "the rhythmical impulse in man," or, with Darwin and Spencer, as one of the primary products of speech, matters little. The *fact* is that practically all human beings now give vent to their feelings in this way; that children, in particular, sing as spontaneously as they dance or draw, and always improve by training.

It is possible, indeed, to produce a very high degree of efficiency in the vocal exercises of children by means of training. Wildermuth investigated the musical sense of a hundred German boys and found only 2 per cent without true musical ear — a remarkable illustration of objective heredity, and a splendid endorsement of the systematic musical instruction of German schools. There are, of course, considerable differences in the *degrees* of discriminative susceptibility to tones among children (The same is true of primitive races. Some cannot discriminate more than five notes. The average American child has a compass of about the same length.) But the point to be observed is that all are capable of a high degree of development; all can be led, by the proper methods, to appreciate the higher æsthetic qualities of this art.

Tone-pro-  
duction.

Two points are specially deserving of attention in the first steps. One of these is *vocalisation* or correct tone-production. Miss Lombroso says that Italian, French and German school-children show greater sensibility to tone than American children. This statement may be admitted; but it cannot be taken to mean that American children's voices are incurably or inherently unmusical, but only that they are relatively less developed, a common condition due to the lack of proper training, to our generally slovenly habits of vocalisation in speech, and to our neglect of the proper technique of breathing. With proper cultivation they may be indefinitely improved. Such a result can, however, be brought about only by the revision of our methods of teaching singing in the schools. It is customary to blame our changeful climate, and specially our winters; but it is nearer the truth to seek the fault in our bad habits, which are, according to James, "bred of custom and example, born of the imitation of bad models and the cultivation of false ideals."

Music should  
be adapted to  
the intelli-  
gence and  
feeling.

The second point to be emphasized in regard to our school music concerns the grades and styles of music to be used. In this matter, the essential thing is that these should be adapted to the intelligence and feeling of the child. Primitive practice gives us the hint we need. Miss Fanny B. Gates tells us that primitive people do not willingly sing songs out of place; spring songs in the fall, for example, or war songs in the piping times of peace, or satires at their solemn feasts, or

love songs in unsuitable situations. So *children should not be taught to sing in unnatural digressions*. The material used should be adapted to their intelligence, and should possess such an obvious fitness that they will easily see in it a natural channel for the expression of their emotions. And, as in the other arts, only those who are thoroughly trained should have charge of this work in the schools.

There would be less to complain of in "the American voice" if these two main considerations of vocal culture received the attention they deserve. Under proper cultivation the voices of American children might become as beautiful as any found among the European populations. Besides this, many throat and nose affections, now depressing the health of school children, could be greatly modified, if not absolutely removed, by the teaching of correct breathing and vital emotional expression. Music is at least a refined form of play, and children, in whom the play-impulse is always strong, never fail to realize its finer qualities when they are led by competent and sympathetic teachers to their source.

It is, of course, true that throughout the educational process we have been describing the mind works *as a whole* when it works efficiently. When, therefore, we speak of the play-impulse, of the sense of touch, or of any other of the senses, we can only mean the *whole* mind working in the particular direction of this or that sense, func-

(f) Nature study.

tioning in harmony with the other senses and mental elements. So when we now come to speak of *nature-study* we mean the application of the whole mind, mainly through the organs of vision and hearing, to the study and appreciation of the objects of the *physical* world.

The primary purpose of this discipline is to train the young mind to recognize, at sight, the common objects of its environment in their true order and relations, to cultivate a proper appreciation of their beauty; so that the mind may derive the fullest mental stimulus from this knowledge. It is by means of this study that we aim not only to quicken and satisfy the natural curiosity of the scholar, but to lead him on to a deeper scientific interest, in the reasonable expectation that he will retain this interest throughout life. We propose here a brief analysis of the æsthetic factor that enters into and inspires the first steps of this process.

By faked-up  
animal stories.

To begin with, vigorous exception must be taken to the "nature fakirs," who have so successfully catered to the public (schools included) by their marvelous books of animal stories and so-called "nature study" in recent times. Some of the defenders of these works, in which dogs, monkeys and even ants argue with the brains of grown-up men, assert that it does not matter much whether the child's nature-books are true or false, so long as they interest him, so long as they "appeal" to his love of animals, and to his imagination and sympathy! Now, aside from the

moral question whether a thing that is falsely told can ever be of real use for this or any other cultural purpose, we think that the fundamental principle and purpose of nature study is misunderstood by these writers. As we understand it, the purpose of this study is to train the perceptions, to induce habits of accurate observation, to strengthen the sense of order and relation; and, as a matter of fact, little else of any value can be accomplished among the young by this subject. Faked up stories, stories that do not rest on fact and truth, destroy the *love* out of which all real interest in nature must grow, whether that interest take the æsthetic or the scientific turn. Besides this, as these imaginative creations make no appeal to the æsthetic factor they do not really *train* the imagination at all.

Equally vigorous exception, too, must be taken to the opposite but quite common method of prematurely crowding the young mind with scientific explanations and technical terms. An excess of this in the first steps toward the comprehension of nature, and too little reliance on the instinctive love of nature in the child, is the bane of most nature study in our schools. We admit that this matter of orientating the child's mind in the order of nature should not be left, as it is for the most part, to "unconscious cerebration;" nor is it ever true, as Mr. Huxley asserts, that "beauty will follow even if she be not specially invited." Beauty should not be forgotten at any stage of the study of nature. But it is certain (results

Or by overdoses of technical instruction.

show this beyond any doubt) that if you prematurely crowd the mind with scientific technique before a real interest in nature has been kindled, or at the expense of this interest, the outcome must be a dual wrong: we kill the artistic as well as the scientific instinct at their very root.

It is not denied, of course, that the scientific approach to nature through technical terminology and law-making is necessary at the proper time, perhaps about the time when boys and girls have mastered fractions and some Latin; but it is not the child's mode of approach. There are significant aspects of nature, whose meaning must be wholly lost on minds burdened with such terms as *orgyia leucostigma*, *hyphantria textor*, *trypeta pomonella*, and many others to be found in elementary text-books on this subject. Far more educational, for all the earlier years, would it be for the child to be taken by competent teachers for walks in the country, his instinctive love of beauty tactfully appealed to and his curiosity slaked, *without books*, by the talk of the teacher, who presumably should be more of a seer than a scientist. Only thus can nature-study fulfil its mission as the chief agency we possess for keeping alive the child's interest in the physical world until it is ready for scientific technique.

The true  
attitude.

It is not surprising, in view of some of these mistakes, that so few children retain the disinterested love of nature, or that they frequently sicken of the subject, and turn to more stimulating, but less really cultivating, modes of

aesthetic satisfaction; thus losing the first and greatest source of beauty, that to which all other beauty and truth are but the sequel, — the beauty of nature. In our judgment it is poor pedagogy that calls this precious regard for the beauty of the world "caterwauling." Far from this being the case, we may safely assert, at least so far as the child is concerned, and probably also in the case of most normal adults as well, that the training of the visual sense to appreciate nature, as the mother of all the arts and industries, is no chance gift, but one that must be cultivated with great diligence and care. It is one merit of the older obbservational method, an example of which is seen in White's *Natural History of Selborne*, and also in much English poetry, that they tended, without prejudice to science, to redeem the average mind from the grossly scholastic and utilitarian view of nature.

The Attic Philosopher points a moral for all our nature teachers when he says:

"Fancy not to be able to forget, even for a single moment, his occupation: not to be able to look upon a flower without having to remember to what genus it belongs; or a rock, without observing its strata, and deciding whether it belongs to the primary, secondary, tertiary or alluvial group. I would not exchange my uncultivated admiration for nature for all the learning of a Bacon; for though I cannot hear the suggestions which it is ever making to a man of science, I feel its spirit playing on my soul, and I become entranced with the sweet melody which ever fills him who is able to enjoy

‘the boundless store

Of charms which nature to her votary yields:  
 The warbling woodlands, the resounding shore,  
     The pomp of groves, the garniture of fields;  
 All that the genial ray of morning gilds,  
     And all that echoes to the song of even,  
 All that the mountains’ sheltering bosom shields,  
     And all the dread magnificence of heaven;  
 Oh! how canst thou renounce, and hope to be forgiven!”

Or, to use the more prosaic words of pedagogy, we may say with Professor Chamberlain: “We ought to cease trying to kill the art that makes art.” The trouble is that in this department of education, as in all others, our schools are obsessed by the desire to *impart information*, instead of seeking to draw out the pupil’s own tastes and tendencies.

(g) Aesthetic perception and its relation to the study of language and literature.

The foregoing observation on the presence and activity of the æsthetic factor in some of the elementary occupations and studies of the school have, we trust, prepared us, in a measure, to consider its more obvious presence and activity in the study of *the English language and literature*, to which we now turn. We have to ask, Is this factor, the quality of beauty, adequately recognized and emphasized in the studies, by which the love of literature is promoted in our schools, specially in the earlier grades? The consensus of opinion (at least among those who are not only teachers, but lovers of literature) seems to be that it is *not*. We are being told that we are in constant danger by the prevailing method of



"clipping the wings of the imagination" and "damming the flow of emotion by a too rigid diet of formal teaching." Let us see if this composite change is borne out by analysis.

As a preliminary statement of the real aims of literary study, the following rules, drawn up by Prof. Henry Van Dyke, may be given:

1. It is a crime to use fine works of literature merely for purposes of grammatical or prosodical instruction.

2. It is wise in studying literature to begin at the beginning. Now the real beginning is the art of reading; that is, the ability to read with imagination, with sympathy, with pleasure. What beginners need first is to learn to read good books and to like them better than poor ones, though they may not be able to tell why.

3. Then come the higher studies of the history and the laws of literature. This is culture, "the habit of being pleased with the best and knowing why."

4. The method of studying literature should always be literary.

The child begins the study of literature then with the effort to master written and spoken language. A large part of this task is, almost inevitably, of the nature of drudgery; but much of this might be obviated if the process of learning were less mechanical than it is at present, and the child's interest in self-expression, always vitally at work and readily available, were enlisted. The inchoate æsthetic values of the process, as already

Cultivating  
the "ear" for  
the music of  
words.

suggested, are implicated *ab initio*, and should never be lost sight of, if we hope to create a sound taste for good literature. This, indeed, is recognized in the Montessori and similar methods of teaching children to read, where the creative impulse is again laid under contribution to assist the development of the visual and auditory organs in mastering it. What is not sufficiently recognized is the fact that reading should be at first *a training of the ear to perceive and take pleasure in the musical quality of words and their spiritual meanings*. Now, this pleasure can never be achieved by merely teaching the child to read; it must be done, if at all, chiefly by accustoming his ear to compositions containing æsthetic elements, like rhythm and melody; just as the "ear" for good music is cultivated by hearing the compositions of the great masters. Far too little of reading for "ear" alone is done in our schools, chiefly because it is hardly recognized as yet that the æsthetic sense has anything to do with learning to read. Consequently, few children reach the fifth grade with any taste for the beauty of language, or any "ear" for it when read to them.

But not only should this purely oral work be more copious; not only should the ear be cultivated by gradually developing the art of listening (of which more later); but literary works should, according to Dr. Van Dyke's rule, never be obscured by explanations or complicated by introducing problems of grammar or prosody.

They should be allowed to make their own impression. In this matter "ear" is the important thing; and the best preparatory work, in the training of the "ear" will always be that which helps the child to perceive for himself the beautiful and the true in literary form, even if he is quite unable to tell a noun from an adjective, a verb from an adverb, or write unaided a coherent sentence. Take the Bible. Now, whatever we may think about the propriety of regular Bible reading in our schools, there can be no question that, under the regime which permitted and practised it, its magnificent phraseology entered into the very structure of the scholars' minds, and as one writer has observed, our immediate ancestors, who were far more familiar with it than we are, "scoffed in the vigorous English of the King James version. It is to be feared that the generations to come will not have a vocabulary left in which even to *mock* effectively if we continue to thrust the English Bible further and further into the background." This is a great loss.

The next step thus becomes plain. For when "ear" has been accustomed to beautiful and vigorous language, and taste has been sufficiently developed, and not before, the attempt should be made to understand literature as an art. No definite time can be set for the beginning of this work; but if the preparatory work of arousing pleasure in good literature have been well done, the transition should be largely unconscious.

When literature should be studied as an art.

Ignored it cannot be, of course, without injury to the scholar's appreciative love of the beautiful in language and literature.

In this work, however, it is important to keep in view the true aim. This is not mere technical grammatical knowledge, or the ability to analyse literary forms. The power of literature, as a spiritual force in education, depends, for the most part, on certain moral and æsthetical elements that enter into it; and unless these elements are kept in view, while the details of grammar and prosody are reviewed, the study will fail to quicken the interest of the scholar; it will rather kill it. This matter is deserving of a closer investigation.

The danger of the present situation has often been pointed out. It was emphasised by the *Report of the Committee of Fifteen* of the National Educational Association (1895); and the years that have elapsed since their findings were given to the world, have only served to make it more and more obvious. The *Committee of Ten* (1894) had already drawn attention to it. Both these committees rightly insist that the object of the study of English literature as art is not merely to assist the scholar to comprehend a certain subject-matter and to grasp the significance of its structure, but also and mainly "to discover and appreciate the beauties of thought and expression." Both committees unanimously assert that the average work in English in our schools does not measure up to this demand, and warn

us that we are missing, for the most part, the best opportunities, not only of permanently preserving literature as a means of the culture for the imagination and the heart, but also the future purity and power of the English tongue in this country.

As already suggested, the evil begins with the failure to develop early enough the *ear* for beauty of language, an evil that appears all too obviously in the vernacular, in our slang, in our pronunciation of words and in our modes of speech. Mr. Henry James, writing of his recent observations of American schools and social circles, declares that no other country uses the mother tongue with so little appreciation of the syllabic formation of words, or with less sense of the rhythm and music of our sentences, calling attention to the atrocious vocalisation, the clipping of terminations, the misplacing of emphasis, and the deficient "ear" for beauty, that he found. (Under these conditions, for example, *haow* is used for how, *thinkin'* for thinking, *goil* for girl, *foist* for first, *dooty* for duty, *urritation* for irritation, *aint* for isn't, etc. Hundreds of examples could be given. As for sentences, how is it possible that the speaker's "ear" does not detect the barbarism of such constructions as these: "He was to the same house you was at last night;" "You should have went;" "It don't make no difference anyway;" "You was there, you was, too," etc., etc.).

Sources of  
corruption.

This condition of things is due to many causes; but one of the main sources of corruption is the crowding of technique before the sense of beauty has been awakened, thus killing the *ear* for the fine harmonies, the æsthetic possibilities, of the language. The committees, already mentioned, tell us with truth that "a training for four or five years in parsing and grammatical analysis on literary works of art, such as those of Milton, Shakespeare, Tennyson and Scott, may be a training of the pupil into habits of indifference toward and neglect of the genius displayed in all literary works of art." It is as if a mason should think that the beauty of a building consisted of its stone and mortar! The pity of it is that our grammatically overtrained scholars, while losing the power to *love* literature, are required by college examining boards to show chiefly what they know of the technique, not what they have been led by practice to absorb of the spiritual, the moral, and the æsthetic, quality of this art. Thus the evil, of which Mr. Henry James complains, has overflowed on the colleges and universities. The radical correction of these deficiencies of our English work will be no easy matter.

The study  
of style.

We have argued that the *methods* of studying literature must always be literary. Now, there are three things in literature which must be kept in sight if this rule is to be observed. The first is *style*, or the study of literature as a revelation of personality, "Style is the man." This is more primary, even, than the *form* of literature, as it

is also a more intimate source of satisfaction and pleasure in the study. The committees which I have already quoted, once again sharply warn us of the danger of ignoring this truth; reminding us first of the fact that through an author's style the pupil comes to understand *himself*, as well as the author he is studying; and secondly, that a large part of the great humanising and civilising power of literature is absorbed through its style, the *personal* equation being the *ultimate* equation of art. Now, this element cannot be appropriated by the stupid practice of writing biographies of the authors, or by studying the circumstances that led them to create their works. This helps but little. Style is a purely literary question to be studied in a literary way, by ear, by emotional sympathy, by æsthetical appreciation, by personal selection and assimilation.

Again, if style be the expression of the personal quality of literary art, the art should also be studied for the sake of its *ethical* quality. This, likewise, calls for a non-mechanical and quasi-æsthetic adjustment of the imagination and sentiments of the pupil. Actually, the artistic quality of style in a work of art cannot be separated from the moral. We insist, and rightly, that a work of art, such as a poem, or even a novel, should not only be different, in structure and form, from a sermon or an essay, but equally with the sermon or essay it should also be a contribution to the ethical culture of the

The ethical  
content of  
literature.

individual and of the race; the ethical element should have a setting of beauty. But the pupil should be required, in his study of it, to penetrate beneath the beautiful film of words to its ethical core; for *every true work of art must be morally good to be beautiful*. Our committees once again warn us that the mere grammatical and prosodical study of literature cannot fail to destroy this requirement of literary study. Indeed, they declare that the failure of the pupil to appreciate the higher ethical quality of this art is likely to kill his interest in it. What this loss must mean will be seen in the sequel.

The pleasure  
and profit of  
literary study.

Thirdly, the study of literature has its supreme cultural purpose in forming in the pupil "the habit of being pleased and knowing why." The acquisition of this habit is the final justification of such study. The question is, can this habit be induced in the absence of the proper appreciation of the element, which confers distinction and beauty, power, pleasure and profit, on the work and its study? Here again, our committees utter their warning note, telling us that current methods are tending to a mechanical dullness and mediocrity, and rarely to distinct and rational pleasure or appreciation.

That only a small proportion of the scholars in our schools ever get a permanent hold on the best literature is an admitted fact, proved by the circumstance that the majority, even of educated people, in this country, are reading more of the newspaper, the novel and the magazine than of



any other kind of printed matter. Now, as our committees have duly warned us, if we would raise the popular taste, we must wake up to the æsthetical and cultural opportunities which lie, at present, largely unrecognized, in the school study of English; we must come to feel, with Matthew Arnold, that next to religion, literature and especially poetry is the most important educational influence we possess; we must reduce the element of mechanism in the teaching of it, and aim to make our method of study literary. Only thus can "the habit of being pleased with the best and knowing why" be established, and the school work in this subject be made serviceable in the intensive culture of the mind. In short, the æsthetic values, power, beauty and perspicacity, must be given their proper attention in the effort to train the imagination and taste of the young along these lines.

It is along similar lines that the crusade for an improvement of the study of the modern languages, specially German and French, must be conducted. The two main reasons why the interest in this subject has dragged along so feebly in the past have to do mainly with the methods and aims which have guided our study of it. These have been of the most wooden and mechanical kind, utterly out of relation with life, and absolutely divorced from their æsthetic idiom, both social and personal, which after all constitute the great charm of acquiring any new

The study  
of modern  
languages.

language. The great idea in this country has been that modern languages are somehow useful in business, in politics, in diplomacy and in the civil service. It is well known that many students plunged into the study of Spanish, at the close of our inglorious war with Spain, for no other reason than that the federal authorities were offering positions, with good salaries attached, to citizens who could use it to effect in our new possessions.

Conditions have improved, as we have come to perceive that the true approach to foreign tongues is through the recognition of their racial idiom and literature, through our sympathy with the people who speak them, and through the perception of their individual æsthetic qualities, as expressed in the best examples of their literary and spoken products. The German reformer, Max Wolter, has brought out in the most striking and convincing manner the meaning of this work and its procedure.

The scandal of the situation in this department of our school work has consisted in this, that the scholars' interest has been deadened by incompetence and by a lack of true literary feeling. There are exceptions, specially in the case of foreigners who are teaching us their own native tongues; but as a rule high-school French and German is about as useful to those who study it as the canals on the planet Mars. If this valuable study were taught in a literary way, even grammar — the bugbear of the novice — might

be galvanized into something like life. By relating it to the emotions; by regarding it, as it really is, as the logic of expression, the limits of the pupils' intuitions would be widened, his social insight enlarged, his knowledge of human nature extended, and his moral and æsthetic resources increased, beyond anything known to the older methods, and thus a just criticism of this valuable study would be in a fair way removed.

From what has been said it is clear that our equipment for æsthetic education, through the study of language, is hardly equal to the necessities of the case or to the opportunities offered. Summarising our criticisms: Summary.

1. The most important asset in language study is the "ear" for what is musical and fine. Therefore, the "ear" should be trained from the first, even before learning to read. Vulgar taste in literary expression can be forestalled only in this way.

2. The grammatical and prosodical study of language should never be based on literary works. It should be acquired chiefly by the actual practice of composition and writing. Otherwise, the taste is likely to be vitiated for what is beautiful.

3. Only when "ear" for beauty of thought and expression has been acquired, specially in poetic forms, can literature be studied as an art. In this study the three most important things to be considered are, the genius displayed in the author's style, the ethical or spiritual element of

the thought, and the knowing why the art pleases us.

4. Modern foreign languages should be studied in accordance with these principles, as revelations of genius in its æsthetical forms, its racial idioms, and its literary beauty.

There are people (teachers among them) who sniff at these reforms. Goethe says of these, somewhat caustically:

"There are people who believe that those faculties by which a work of art is enjoyed require no more education than the palate needs for the enjoyment of various dishes; and they criticise it as they would some article of food. They have no notion of the kind of culture necessary for the full appreciation of a fine work of art."

With these words we may, for awhile, take leave of the subject.

(h) Aesthetic content of mathematics, history and geography.

So far nothing has been said of such studies as mathematics, history and geography. Is there anything æsthetical in them? Certainly there is; specially in mathematics, and even in arithmetic, as we shall see in the next chapter, when we come to speak of music. Each of these studies makes its own indirect appeal to the artistic emotions. The fact that this appeal is not so obvious as in literature, drawing or singing, is hardly to the point. For in no form of mental training can the activity of the æsthetic emotions be suppressed, unless, indeed, it is possible to suppress the mind itself, through which mental discipline, in all its forms, is acquired. Even the rigid formal accu-

racy demanded by mathematics is, besides being a discipline of the reasoning powers, an important training of the artistic sentiment.

What could be more romantic than history, if its romance, and not merely its lifeless skeleton, be brought to the front? In what better way could an American child gain a clear and warmly sympathetic insight into other races of mankind than by the study of their geography, provided the sympathies are enlisted and racial genius be appreciated, and not merely the location of rivers, mountain ranges, and cities? A geographical lesson can be made vital provided the arts and industries of the people, and the genius of the people themselves and the romance of the territory studied, be brought out. How, for example, could the geography of Greece, Great Britain or Japan be better appreciated than by the study of the civilisations which these countries have created, in which the physical environment itself has been so profoundly modified by their genius? The comparative isolation of such studies as these from everything that appeals to the emotions and sentiments, including the æsthetical, is no fault of the subjects themselves; it is not due to their necessary aloofness from the deeper feelings of the soul, but chiefly to the unrelieved mechanicalism of our methods of teaching them.

Enough has, we hope, been said to illustrate the central idea of this section, which is, that in

our routine school studies we have the means at hand for taking the first steps toward the training of the sense of beauty. In this, as in much else in life, the French proverb applies: *c' est le premier pas qui coute*. (It is the first step that costs.)

### III

We turn lastly to *school ideals*.

Relation of  
aesthetic training to character.

On a previous page, as the reader will recall, we said that our task was not so much to *find* a place for the æsthetic sentiment — that is something already provided by nature — but to recognize it and to provide ampler room for it in our school methods and aims. The question now before us is: are we, by current methods, producing a type of mind in which this sentiment is playing its wonted part in the formation of right character and ideals of efficiency? If not, upon what grounds can we justify its neglect? If it belongs, by right, to that unity of interests, which we call the personality of the scholar, must not this neglect result in the enfeeblement and coarsening of character?

Perhaps the most effective way to answer these questions is to consider, briefly, two popular objections which are frequently urged against the view of human nature maintained above.

It is said, that the tendencies of modern education are all against assigning a larger place to the æsthetic factor, because no essential interest of character or life would be served, under modern conditions, by according it more attention

than is already accorded it. School studies, say our critics, must be mainly adapted to facilitate and hasten the adjustment of the pupil to his vocation in the modern age in which he has to play his part, and their value must be judged solely from their relation to social efficiency in that sense, not their intrinsic worth for the culture of ideal character, not even for his individual efficiency and happiness. This objection is plausible; yet it rests on a fallacy, none the less real because generally ignored, namely, the fallacy of identifying truth with the consensus of opinion and majority rule. It arises, as Mr. John Jay Chapman says, "through a perfectly unconscious adaptation of the minds of our educators to the spirit of the age." The objection, therefore, loses its force as soon as we appeal from the court of public opinion to the supreme court of truth.

A second objection runs somewhat like this: Admitting the importance of instilling into the minds of boys and girls a belief that somewhere ideals, art, enthusiasm, unselfishness, service in the promotion of beauty and goodness exist; yet the very *vagueness* of this talk about æsthetic culture and ideals makes it impossible to consider, seriously, the making fuller provisions for it in the school curriculum. The æsthetic element in human nature, so the objector reasons, cannot as yet be trained by a *body of systematic knowledge*, such as we have in the so-called knowledge-disciplines, science and history, for such knowledge does not exist. It is upon knowledge, and

the training of the powers of understanding and thought, by knowledge alone, that education must stand. Therefore, it is impossible at present to give to art a larger place in the mental equipment of the pupils of our schools.

The answer to this objection is three-fold. In the first place, it is unhistorical and unpsychological. Even if it be granted for the moment that the feeling-side of human nature be, at first, a vague enough territory for educational exploitation, so also is the understanding in its crude state; everything is confused in the mind of the child. Now, the objector declares that it is by means of a *body of knowledge* that a trail is blazed through this primitive ignorance; that this exists for the *understanding*, but not for the *feelings*. But, again, this is not strictly true. A body of concrete knowledge *has* been accumulated, namely, in the *fine arts*, which is as objective, as positive and as clear, for the purpose of *emotional* culture, as science is for the culture of the *understanding*. *But it has not been communicated*. This is the real objection.

We shall see in our next chapter that before this deficiency can be made good a new methodology must be evolved. Meanwhile, let us observe that the germs of æsthetic feeling, which all the routine school studies contain, find their proper soil and growth in that body of knowledge represented by the fine arts; and that while these arts exist it is unhistorical to contend that our talk about the æsthetic factor is "vague."



Another answer to this objection may be stated thus: if the sense of beauty is deprived of its rightful inheritance in this "body of knowledge," the fine arts, will not the effect be to destroy the outcome of the education-process, producing asymmetry if not the positive distortion of character, and so defeat the comprehensive aim of education? Social efficiency, we are told, is the end sought by school discipline. Granted; but is not one element of social efficiency that very element of trained insight, which the objector seems to belittle? This, at least, is the contention of the present writer.

Lastly, in spite of the emphasis that is now being placed on practical and vocational, as opposed to cultural, aims, in the national system of education, the native power of the æsthetic sentiment and its development through training, specially in the first steps, will always make it one of the most important elements for good or ill in the culture of the individual. National character is judged by the revelation of the higher ideal sentiments in large social groups. This can be produced only as these sentiments are mixed in with the activities of education and made explicit in the school disciplines which develop the mind. In other words, habits of national feeling and thought are merely extensions, on a wide scale, of interests established in the early life of individuals, confirmed by training and experience. Now, if these interests become vital only by becoming part of the emotional

life, and exerting, from that center, the force of culture, we cannot be so unintelligent as to claim that all we have to consider, in national training and character, is the knowledge that confers practical power and enables the people to earn their livelihood and pay their way through the world.


The best  
fruits of  
education.

In a general way, that education succeeds in the best sense which secures for every pupil all the perfection of which his or her nature seems capable under school discipline. After all, the best achievements of the teacher are those which conserve all the resources of individual character and enjoyment, and result in the establishment of character in habits and sentiments that reflect the conscious choice of what is best. Such habits are not the product of chance; they imply the gradual refinement of the whole mind in ideals, the strengthening of these ideals by study and practice, and the culture which this process implies. Professor James says, "We all tend to grow in the direction of the best established reflexes." Are not the "best" reflexes those which rest upon the habit of taking pleasure in what is most refining, beautiful and noble?

When the graver problems of life come, as they must, and the school training gives way to the severer training of social life, what studies will endure in the affection and interest of the pupil? Let the following personal testimony of a great American educator give the answer:

"What I learned of arithmetic, geography, grammar and history has been useful to me, but it has not proven so thoroughly practical as the insight I gained into the feelings and the heart by means of art. I learned to trace these feelings from their origin to their maturity as convictions and ideas. In the study of literature and art I learned to see how a blind instinct becomes an emotion, then a well-reasoned thought, and then an action, and last of all a habit. I learned all this from the objects of art and discovered it in myself. I came to know human nature and to understand human life as they are." (W. T. Harris).

With these words we may rest our case for the present. They confirm, with high authority, the view taken in the preceding pages, and give us warning that we must, in education, observe the eternal law that "first in beauty shall be first in might." When, in the first steps of school work we give place to this law, education will be more truly human, representative and national than it is, or can be, on the principle that all we have to consider is "Knowledge and mental discipline." This may be all we are seriously considering at present, but it is not all of human nature. While we remain obsessed by the idea that the chief business of the school is to *impart information*, and not to inspire the pupil with the joy of creating, this condition is not likely to be materially changed.



## CHAPTER IV

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### METHODS OF DEVELOPING TASTE

(171)

"But what are we to do? We cannot make artists of ourselves. Pardon me, you can — and you ought. Art is for all men to learn, because all are concerned with it; and it is so simple that there is no excuse for not being acquainted with its primary rules, any more than for ignorance of grammar or spelling, which are far more difficult sciences. Far less trouble than is necessary to learn to play chess, or whist, or golf, tolerably."

—*Ruskin.*

## CHAPTER IV.

### METHODS OF DEVELOPING TASTE

In the foregoing chapter we have seen that play is a vital function of human nature, and enters largely into many of the simpler forms of education. We have also seen that when this function is subjected to æsthetical influence it may be the means of much valuable culture, otherwise unobtainable. Enough has been said, perhaps, to show that the play-impulse is closely allied with the art-impulse; that it does not mean mere indolence, or sensuous enjoyment, or even physical relaxation.

Training the  
play impulse.

It follows that, æsthetically speaking, there may be quite as severe a training for play as for work; and it is one object of this and succeeding chapters to indicate how this training should proceed; also that this training involves a good deal of distasteful drudgery, as all serious and sincere forms of enjoyment do. In spite, however, of this seeming obstacle, at no time can this discipline be used to better advantage than when we are young and have some leisure, and our minds are energetic and flexible. The question is, how we should work; what aims we should seek; what methods should be employed; what results we should expect. It is with these matters that this chapter will be occupied. We shall consider it from several points of view, because the question of method in æsthetical education involves many delicate sub-

ordinate problems, each having some bearing on the result. Of no subject is this more true than of the training of the æsthetic sentiment and our appreciative enjoyment of the beautiful.

## I

Principles  
of General  
Method.

It is not necessary for our purpose that we enter here into a detailed discussion of the general methods of teaching. Suffice it to say that in æsthetic training the following principles are followed, as in other subjects of mental discipline: (1) Method, in teaching, is based on the psychological laws of mental growth furnished by the experience of the race and of the individual. (2) It proceeds from the simple to the complex, from the individual notion to the general notion. This follows from the first principle. (3) In the acquisition of knowledge, *emotion* often takes the initiative, always warms the thought-process with interest, and is never absent from the effort of the will when it works at its best. Our methods of teaching must recognize this principal. (4) The process of learning is essentially a process of *adjustment* of teacher to scholar, of scholar to teacher, and of both to their spiritual inheritance, vocation and destiny. Method is the means of effecting this adjustment. (5) The efficiency of any method of teaching is seen not so much in the ability of the pupil to perform certain regulated acts as in his general grasp of the subjects taught, in his mental resources, his interest in and appreciation of their value, and in his will to



use knowledge and power for the promotion of the public welfare.

These five principles are accepted as a general framework into which the special methods to be employed in art-training are fitted.

But before we can outline what these methods should be, we must, as already suggested, endeavor to come to some agreement on certain preliminary questions, upon the way we understand which, in large measure, our practice and interpretation of them will depend.

One of these concerns the relative importance, in the education of the art-impulse, of *technique* and *beauty*. This question regulates the whole problem of art-training, and reappears, as we shall see, in the more complex subject of taste. Let us briefly state the case, and draw the conclusion which seems warranted by the facts.

Twofold aim  
of aesthetic  
method.

Now some teachers believe that the chief value and therefore the central aim of art-training lies in its relation to the pupil's need of discipline, and those who hold this view naturally emphasise its *technical* features and adjust their methods thereto accordingly.

Others maintain that its value, while it includes this disciplinary aim, lies beyond that, namely, in its refining influence, in its relation to the pupil's sense of beauty, and to the development of his enjoyment and taste for art. Those who hold this view naturally stress its *aesthetic* features and adjust their method thereto accordingly.

These two views are not radically divergent, as we shall see. Meanwhile, let us briefly illustrate the distinction.

In drawing.

Take drawing. Some teachers believe that the value of this discipline lies in the drill it affords, in the skill it develops and in the mechanical perfection with which the work may be done. They stress technique and tend to exalt its practical importance in, and relation to, the industries and the useful arts. Others, among them Mr. Spencer and M. Ravaisson, believe that the highest meaning, even of technique in drawing, lies in its relation to the perception and expression of beauty. The latter authority gives it as his opinion that

"The best means of drawing any object whatever will be to study objects in which are found, in the highest degree, those qualities which constitute their harmony and beauty, in such a way as to appropriate the *spirit* that characterises them."

In this conflict of aims, perhaps too much has been made of the distinction in question; for while, in our *aim*, we may over-emphasise the one or the other, and so distort the result, it is, in reality, impossible to draw a hard and fast line between them. Beauty is no chance revelation, but rests solidly on perfection of technique; technique, on the other hand, has its fullest meaning only in the revelation of truth and beauty. It follows from this that either aspect, *taken alone*, must be necessarily a half-truth and if followed

in our method of teaching will be misleading in practice.

If this be so, technique and beauty in the art of drawing ought not to be separated; and the most efficient methods of teaching it will reflect the consciousness of this whole truth. For in reality, the *form* of the object or group of objects, whose faithful representation, if beautiful, constitutes the subject matter of the lesson, involves first the discipline of technical drill and practice; but technique must, in every instance, be taught solely because it is the indispensable preparation for the higher stages of perception, where beauty is the quality sought.

If we ask, as we are bound, which is the more valuable element in this training, the answer is the latter. Beauty is the sole justification of this, as of all, art-training. M. Bachelier says, combining both views:

The aesthetical element the more important.

"It is *beauty* which gives the preference to the industries of a nation and increases the value of crude material a hundred fold. All the trades relating to the arts are carried to their perfection only through the æsthetic principles of drawing."

It is impossible, then, to escape the drudgery which the mastery of a technique of drawing involves; but our method fails if the pupil be not taught to perceive the absolutely subordinate place it occupies in relation to his enjoyment of beauty, and to take pleasure in the training on this account. The fact that it is technique, formal

drill, that receives the chief attention at present, thus weakening the pupil's sense of beauty and crippling his spontaneity and freedom of expression, does not render the current belief on this subject, and the method that conforms thereto, a true guide to the highest benefits of this discipline.

**Music.**

The same general course of reflection may be applied to *music*. But as in this art the distinction between technique and beauty appears more obviously, it seems the more necessary to insist on the subordination of the former to the latter in our methods of teaching.

There is not at present a strong demand in our schools, as there is in Germany and England, for a high standard of technique in the musical training of the young. We agree with Mr. Philip H. Goeppe that this is the weakest point in current methods of American musical culture. The public schools are, it is true, improving in this respect, but so far little impression has been made, especially on boys; and the educated American who loves music intelligently is still almost an exception. As a nation we are far behind the Germans and English in a profound and reverent perception of the beauties of the tonal art.

Let us note how this deficiency bears upon the question of method. First of all, our methods should be directed to the more thorough cultivation of tone-perception by *ear alone*; and for this purpose the chief agency will be, at any rate in

the case of the majority of school children, the habit of listening to good music. For the child absorbs the *spirit* of music long before it comes to understand its technique. The writer has by numerous tests experimentally verified this truth: *Children can be taught to prefer good music to music that is inartistic, if they hear enough of it*; but unless they hear it from the first and continuously, their ear for it is corrupted and their musical taste inevitably grows vulgar. No greater mistake, therefore, could be made than to act upon the belief that "popular" music, music promiscuously gathered, music written down to the supposed level of the child's "taste," music that is cheap, second-rate and often false in rhythm, can be truly serviceable for the development of musical ear, or for the training of our pupils in the enjoyment of the beauties of this most living and moral of the arts. What, indeed, could be more obvious, from the standpoint of æsthetic evolution, or from the more intimate standpoint of the child's incipient sense of beauty, than the principle, that *if the emotions are to receive a permanent musical bent they must be nourished ab initio on the best of this art*? How otherwise shall we make it easier for the rising generation to escape vulgar ideas, which degrade the moral nature and corrupt the feeling of social sympathy?

Technique is, of course, as indispensable in music as in drawing; but, as in drawing, technique is employed in music solely for the

purpose of revealing *beauty*. This is the true order in all forms of art. Therefore, the crucial question in methods of music teaching is not *How much* but *What kind* of training we give in this art in our schools. *Non multa sed multum* defines the true aim. In other words, the general conditions of human nature and the demands of art lead us to stress the *aesthetic quality* of music more than perfection of technique. Technique cannot, as we have said, interest the vast majority of those who come under the musical discipline of our schools, at least not to a great extent. It is more important, therefore, to develop the perception of beauty of tone, to cultivate the sense of rhythm, so that the taste may be educated along right lines, than it is to try to make skilled performers. But this is, by far, the more difficult task.

These considerations give us the true point of view from which the question of method in art training should be discussed.

## II

Qualifications  
of art teachers.

We come now to a second question, *the kind of teachers* needed to give this training effect in practice. The chief, the most indispensable desideratum is teachers whose training is equal to the task which the ideal conditions and aims of art impose. The best of methods is useless unless this need be met.

The art teacher is, in a certain sense, born not made; but no teacher of art can dispense with the

thorough training which perfects nature's gifts. Unfortunately, there is a popular impression abroad that very little culture is needed on the part of the teacher to meet the requirements of the art work in our schools. Aesthetic training is often thought to be quite consistent with a confused ignorance of its technical principles; one needs "the artistic temperament"; that conceded, education to teach art can be largely dispensed with, or need not be extensive or thorough. We may, perhaps, demur to the view that every art teacher needs a liberal general education to fit him for this work, though this is always a great help; but no one will dispute the fact that art can be taught *well* only by those who have been thoroughly trained by special knowledge and practice. We insist that the doctor, the lawyer and the clergyman must lay the foundation of their life-work in sound learning and broad culture, and in the special technique of their professions. Why should the standard be lower for the teacher of art? "Thou that teachest another, teachest thou not thyself?" Even waiving the necessity of a liberal general education, then, there can be no rational defense of the expedient, so frequently resorted to in our schools, of entrusting the culture of the æsthetic perceptions of young people to teachers whose perceptions are often not as well developed as some of those whom they attempt to teach.

We should demand, therefore, in the interests of educational efficiency in this department of

school work, the following qualifications in art teachers: (1) a good, if not a liberal, general education; (2) the manifestation of special aptitude for art; (3) technical training of this aptitude; (4) ability to teach; and (5) proved success in it. There are, we know, some teachers who "sniff" at such demands; but such teachers, on the most charitable construction of their attitude, cannot have the remotest idea of what æsthetic training involves. The inveterate prejudice and conservatism which such an attitude discloses is equalled only by its ignorance and presumption. As soon would we trust the training of the art-impulse to an incompetent teacher as ask a blacksmith to repair the mainspring of a watch, or a butcher to perform an operation for appendicitis. One must be something of an artist to *do* something of value in the delicate art of training the æsthetic organs of others. Only those whose perceptions are pure and disciplined, in short, will advance the perceptions of others to the stage of true insight into the beautiful.

All discussion of method depends upon a sufficient supply of teachers equipped to give this principle effect in practice.

### III

The Problem of  
Individuality.

But this question of method is further complicated by another difficult problem, arising from the side of the pupil, namely: how to teach art so that *every member of the school shall receive the benefit of the training which he or she indi-*



*vidually needs.* This is the rock upon which so many of our school methods split. We are here confronted by such questions as these: Shall we ignore the actual personal differences of talent that obtain in the school, grade it how we will, and level up the individual to the required position of his neighbor in a democratic whole? Shall we hold to the official standard, arbitrarily set, for the measurement of mental efficiency, in any grade, or to the requirements of personality? Shall we individualise and seek, by an elastic method, to perfect each pupil in his own natural tendency? If so, how are we to surmount the difficulty of grading the unequal powers of expression of the class? How can the point of contact be established and maintained where talent and temperament vary all the way from the feeble to the strong? Should there not be a special grading of pupils according to their æsthetic talents, as there is a grading according to their intellectual and moral talent, the unusually gifted being sifted out from the less gifted?

We must recognize, at the outset, that this problem is, by no means, merely a question of school principles or of our methods of art training. It derives its ranking importance from the fact that æsthetic individuality is a question of *life*. It can even be perceived in extra-human nature. Thus Professor N. S. Shaler, in his interesting work, *The Individual*, writes:

"In considering the great question — in some respects the greatest we now have to face — as to the ways in which we may bring individual men to the exercise of their full powers, it is most important to consider the part which the instinct of representation has had in the development of the mind. We see traces of this motive in the lower animals. It is particularly evident among the birds; and, in the form of gesture, it is well indicated in the near kinsmen of mankind, the monkeys. Even the lowest men, however, show a far greater need of such representation than any of the brutes. They quickly and universally acquire the resources of dress and manner. They soon advance to the stage where song and the dance serve the need. Along with these go the development of the plastic arts; and here and there literary invention helps the abler minds. When we consider these instinctive means by which men managed to educate and enlarge their imaginations, and compare that education with what our later civilisation has brought about, we see one of the evils of so-called culture. In our conditions *there is little chance for the individual to grow by the exercise of any of his creative motives*; he is restricted to mere imitation."

So speaks the evolutionist.

In the school.

If we translate his views into the more concrete terms of the school and class-room we can see the gravity of this problem. Thus, in a graded class, say of twenty or thirty scholars, the teacher is confronted by a group of human beings, who bring with them various mental gifts, which the school is organised to serve. It should always be remembered that it is the child that creates the school, not the school the child; I speak, of course, in an educational sense. These gifts are always unequal, even in the best graded schools;

for in every grade some scholars are brighter than others, more gifted in some subjects than in others, and thus confound our best systems of grading them.

This is especially true of the varieties of *aesthetic* talent. In a drawing class, for instance, some will draw better than others; so in a singing class, some voices will be sweeter, some ears more refined and musical; but none are without some gifts or the desire to use and enjoy them. It is these "gifts" which we are to discover and develop.

These inequalities are among the most difficult problems that confront the teacher who works with cut-and-dried methods. Such methods have often been accused of ignoring the rights of individuals, in the supposed interests of arbitrary school standards; as if the schools were in a conspiracy to force the minds of children into preconceived moulds, turning them out "like sausages from a machine;" so that by the time the fourth or fifth grade is reached the pupil is thoroughly machine-made, so far as his creative mental processes are concerned. This, as I have said, is the rock on which our methods ultimately split; our too easy assumption that children have no ultimate and radical differences of mental gifts that should be respected in the process of training: we teach them too much in the herd. Now the facts of evolution and life are all against us in this. *Life cannot be machine made.*

Individuality  
must be rec-  
ognized.

What, then, should be the attitude of the teacher and the purpose of his methods of art-teaching, in view of these interesting inequalities of individuality, these varying creative motives, these different gifts of representation and emotion in the class? First, he should discover and recognize them, acknowledging with Milton, that they are among "the originals of nature in their crude conception," and give them their true place in the culture of each mind and heart.

It is true that the creative motives, however marked, do not "in their crude conception" constitute the ultimate perfection of the pupil; for that is the product of his methodical development through education; but the chief business of education is so to develop these "originals of nature" by training that they may not be weakened in the individual, but trained to play their role in his preparation for life. To ignore them in the interests of system is to place a heavy premium on the future social efficiency of the pupil. No child should leave our schools and go into life "like a sausage from a machine;" he should go forth with an individual character all his own.

The school  
needs it.

In the second place, the teacher should recognize that the school itself needs, for its own good, to give larger place and play to the individual force of each scholar; needs the disciplinary advantages which the grading of such incalculable factors always brings with their fullest recognition. Their subordination to arbitrary mechanical standards is one of the very sources of that

lack of spontaneity, freedom and originality, of which recent critics have complained in our scholars, and which all lovers of true culture must deplore.

Education, of course, must be prosecuted in harmony with a technique of discipline. Indeed, the function of the school becomes operative only when "the originals of nature in their crude conception" are placed under the methodical limitation of a curriculum. But in this process there should be due care to provide for the individual differences of human nature. The spirit of the school should not be narrower than its constituency in all the variety of its gifts, and no course of study, no method of teaching, will ever succeed, in the best sense, in producing true culture that contradicts or mechanically limits them. In placing educational restraints on the individual, therefore, our methods of mental discipline should throughout be guided by the purpose to harmonise "the originals of nature" into an ideal of power and beauty, large enough to include all degrees of representations and creative motive, obtaining among the scholars. As the Buddhist proverb puts it: "We annul the individual only that his individuality may be brought forward."

(It is difficult to see how this can be achieved without the adoption of a special system of grading, by which the talented are segregated from the less talented, in each grade, and taught separately. Pupils deficient in capacity to appreciate

*this is a dilemma*

the beautiful, or in ability to master the elementary technique of any art, cannot profitably be trained to appreciate and enjoy the same objects as the more favored. Into this question, however, we cannot enter here. It will solve itself if we adjust our primary methods to meet the individual needs of the pupil, instead of, as at present, forcing the individual into a pre-arranged and arbitrary system, which merges the individual in the mass; if, in short, we thoroughly individualise in our teaching.)

## IV

Unity of the  
aesthetic field.

Another of the special problems of method refers to the part which the fine arts should play in the development of the individual artistic gifts of the pupils in our schools, and in the practice of our methods of teaching them.

The analogy of racial and individual experience may be alluded to in this connection. The beginnings of art, in the race and in the individual, disclose the fact that beauty is viewed in a *unity* of life, rather than as a separate field of interest; as, indeed, little different from the useful and practical; and, for a long time, development takes place mainly within this general field. It is unity which is the unique fact that governs the primitive attitude towards all manifestations of feeling.

Diversity.

But not less significant is another tendency, in obedience to which this unified field has been broken up into separate fields, each employing a

different medium and technique, according to the degree of differentiation in each case. Here the arts, though still one in essence, are many. Out of the crude feeling of unity, art has evolved into the arts, architecture, sculpture, painting, music, literature and so forth.

On one side of it, art is viewed as a single evolutionary process governed by beauty; on the other it is many, and in its manifoldness the differentiating element is the development and perfecting of technique. In short, art has come to perfection by the subdivision of its one field of beauty and life, and each step of this process has been accompanied by the invention and elaboration of its own technique. Now, both factors of this history have been essential elements in man's training for enjoyment, and exerted their influence in the methods by which art has become a popular force in the culture of the race and of the individual.

All methods of teaching are similarly based on the law of unity. In teaching a child we proceed upon the assumption that its interests are all interrelated in the one field of its experience. We start with unity, with the individual, and to this we always return. On the other hand, the child's interests are, through the tension of social and individual effort, slowly differentiated. He begins to see "men as trees walking," and later the clear-cut conception of "a man." Out of the confused unity of its life there evolves the beautiful world of art, diversified in form, color and expression,

Application.





special aptitudes of the individual, not upon any necessary discreteness in the one field of the arts.

Hence the individual differences of taste or æsthetic sensibility discoverable among the pupils in our schools would, ideally, require *all* the arts for their adequate development. For we now know, by experimental methods, that in the specialised taste, tact, knack, or gift of a pupil, lies *his* chance of individual development in art, and that it takes *all* the arts to ascertain what direction this may be in.

It would be difficult, we admit, especially under the present conditions, to conform our school methods to these indications of racial and individual experience; (the second or technical part of it would be almost impossible); but we do claim, most emphatically, that these pregnant hints of historical evolution point towards an *ideal*, to which our methods of art training should approximate; as only thus can our pupils' capacities for enjoyment in art be in a fair way to be recognized and developed, let them be as varied as they may, and the rights of individuality in their crudest æsthetic forms receive the attention they need.

Relation to  
method.

We must be satisfied, meanwhile, to reiterate the statement, that the fine arts provide the school with a homogeneous field of marvelous richness and variety, affording unlimited scope both for æsthetical and technical training, and for the development of individual capacity and taste. If this field of interest is ignored, specially in the

training of *boys*, the result can only be decay on the moral levels of personality, resulting in asymmetry of character, which leaves so many unsolved problems, and so many ominous doubts, to be overcome. Finally, if method be the means of effecting the adjustment of the individual to the race, past and present, one of its chief problems is to discover and use the fine arts for the development of individual taste, as we now use science and history to develop the practical sense.

## V

So far our discussion of methods has been largely negative. We now come to some of the more positive aspects of the problem. In this section we shall outline some of the means to be employed to adjust the individual to his æsthetic inheritance, to train his taste in enjoyment, and to quicken what Shaler above has called "the creative motives." For these purposes we may mention four methods.

(1) Art  
history.

First, the best general means of cultivating all classes of minds in their æsthetic *milieu* is, of course, the study of *art history*. By this we mean nothing else than the connected account of the products of the æsthetic impulse, regarded as one field of interest and value in the general story of human culture and civilisation.

This story would naturally begin with primitive art, and be followed by Oriental art, both of which are well calculated to interest and cultivate the æsthetic perceptions and representative

powers. The glories of Greek art, with the gradual emergence therefrom of Christian art, constitute a chapter of absorbing historical interest, showing how the extraordinary power and beauty of the former shade off into the more spiritual and romantic beauty of the latter; how the *soul* for the first time becomes of more importance than the body. Next come the seething eddies of Medieval art, with its realism and naturalism; revealing, as no former epoch does, the intimate connections of art with nature and social life, and leading, by a process of evolution, as inevitable as gravitation, to the eclectic tendencies of modern times.

These periods, thus roughly characterized, bringing out all the arts in turn, constitute *one* connected and continuous story, as a branch of general history. Indeed, this subject could easily be taught as a part of the history lessons, if "history" meant to us the *whole* story of human life, instead of the current conception which makes it the story of politics alone, chiefly of our own country.

In the teaching of art history, however, the following counsels should, in large measure, determine our methods. In the first place, the *graphic* or pictorial method should be largely used. The value of this study is, as we have already pointed out, that it is a training of the perceptive activities, the imagination and the emotions, resulting in the appreciation, and the clear visualisation of choice ideas and judgments

Graphic and  
pictorial  
method.

about art and life. For the best success of this work, the whole process should be accompanied by the actual presentation to the eye or ear of the objective works which are the highest specimens of their epochs. The history of the development of the fine arts, architecture, sculpture, painting, music and literature, or any other product of the æsthetic impulse, is thus made concrete; the inner perceptions are related, at every stage, with the objective example, either in their originals or in reproductions, and so trained.

Art and Social life.

In the second place, in teaching art history the dependence of art upon society and personality should be emphasised. Art can never be taught for its own sake, but only for life's sake, because the controlling and directing forces of general civilisation have had everything to do with shaping the epochs, in determining the style and, to a great extent, the ultimate form of all the arts. For example, the intellectual and social conditions of Italy in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries gave rise to the art of the Italian Renaissance. That art was a product of the soil; the popular culture was behind it; the people's religious life, their love of the beautiful, their industries, their politics, their morals, their social customs and fashions, even their follies, had much to do with it. Obviously, the correlation of the art of that period with the spiritual and social conditions, in the midst of which it arose to its magnificent heights, should be pre-

served. So with all periods. In other words,, treat art as you would politics, i. e., as a movement in the life of the people.

Again, the biographical method should also be employed. Some teachers would use no other. But, while acknowledging its value in imparting interest and personal charm to this study, it has the serious defect of failing to give the pupil the necessary idea of the unity and continuity of the successive periods, in which the individual artist is, after all, only a connecting link. It also obscures the truth that all the arts are connected in life and in the general historical situation of each great period. But when taken as *supplementary* to the more general view, briefly outlined above, it has positive value. Biography.

Its advantages are twofold. It enables the pupil to understand more clearly the subtle and elusive relations between the personality of the individual artist and his work; between his temperament, genius and taste, and its products. It also furnishes a wealth of refining and uplifting examples of noble effort. Perhaps no kind of biography is so warm with genuine human feeling, so replete with noble sacrifice for high aims, so courageous in struggle, as the biography of the great artists. While it is well, perhaps, for the pupils in our schools to learn to admire great soldiers, statesmen, citizens; I venture to think that the story of such men as Leonardo da Vinci and Michel Angelo would be quite as valuable; while for the quickening of the perceptions and

imagination, for the particular training of the enjoyment of beauty, they are, of course, indispensable, second, indeed, only to noble poetry.

(2) Composition.

Next to the study of art-history, and aiming more directly at the development of that clear visualisation of ideas which is the *raison d'etre* of objective art, we mention the study of *composition*. By this we mean the structure of the work of art, its theme, its treatment, its purpose and aim, its total meaning, as fitted to produce in the pupil the feeling of pleasure, and to satisfy his sense of beauty and value. It goes without saying that the teaching of this branch of art requires considerable technical knowledge and skill on the part of the teacher.

The best works to be used.

Method here will accordingly be governed by the following considerations: First, it is imperative that the best works alone be employed for analysis. The reason for this is that the old masters of the fine arts have been the founders or discoverers of all the great principles of composition, and the formers and reformers of good taste in succeeding generations. Their works, therefore, have a prior right to be understood and enjoyed; the sources of their power should be made known, their technique studied, their influence appreciated. In this study the pupil will secure a firm basis for his own taste and judgment; and, perhaps, who knows? for his own creative work in later life.

Again, the fundamental law of artistic composition, *unity in diversity*, should guide all particular analysis of works of art. It matters little, perhaps, upon what aspect of the work studied attention first falls, the unity, (the subject taken as a whole) or the story it tells in its diverse detail. Actually, the mind analyses and synthesises intuitively while studying the composition of any work of art. Its first impressions consist of a series of rapid shocks of attention where detail is superficially observed. This is the order of sense-perception. But the *aim* should be to secure clear visualisation of the whole idea; the manifold, the particulars of plot, of sub-theme and episode, should be grasped in a unity of thought and feeling.

Lastly, the study of composition should raise, if it does not answer, the question of the significance of the work studied. It will prompt the enquiry, *why* the artist employed the ensemble of images and thoughts and sounds and signs in the way he does; what inspired their meanings; what lesson he desired to convey; what emotion he sought to arouse; what is the living fact or universal experience to which he gives living embodiment; what is the moral or religious intention, if any, of his work, and whether he has carried it to an universal expression or interpretation. A composition is thus studied as an index of the higher states of mind of its creator, which, as Goethe said, enfolds the deepest secret of all art.

Ethical  
purposes.

To feel this for ourselves is the fruit of study alone.

(3) The practice of expression.

Next to art-history and composition comes *the practice of expression*, a much more difficult method to employ, owing to the afore-mentioned unequal representative gifts of the pupils. The purpose underlying the employment of this method is to enable the pupil, as far as possible, to understand ideas of value in their appropriate outward embodiment; to help him to relate the content of his own thought with its outward form, by word, by note, by pencil or by brush. As with other methods, the basis of success in this work is accuracy of inner creation and visualisation. For this, the pupil needs to be trained first to *observe*; for representation depends upon clear and truthful *perception*, which can be mastered only as the pupil is taught to exercise his powers of vision, expression and imitation.

It is, indeed, surprising how few people, even adults, can recreate or represent the exact truth of what they perceive or hear. One is reminded of the reply of the college freshman, when asked to describe what took place at a social function he attended: "Oh, it was fine, it was *fine*, it was FINE"! The fact is people are quite unpractised in the art of expressing themselves. They *look* but do not *see*. Their organs of vision and hearing are surfeited; but their powers of clear visualisation, reproduction and expression are atrophied. Things, rather than values, interest



them, and exercise a sort of tyranny over their senses. Thus, in our minds, life's values get out of focus; and the inability, or the unwillingness, to tell the exact truth of what we feel or know becomes a moral danger; for when an experience is viewed indifferently, it becomes misleading and even false. Lawyers, crossexamining witnesses in court, complain of the difficulty of getting people to tell the exact truth, even of those events in which they have taken some part. Now, to tell the truth, to express a thought, with clearness and sincerity requires, besides incessant practice, *a great deal of training of the instinct of creative representation*. Indirectly, the practice of expression is a valuable contribution to this end.

And this effort should not fall short even of original and independent creation. This will not be so difficult, provided the pupil has been encouraged from the first to express himself as an individual, to give his own ideas and feelings "a local habitation and a name" in color, form or word. It seems difficult because our formal methods of training tend to restrict the creative impulse; because we crowd the growing mind with facts, and as a result the creative motives, which lie dormant, are smothered by the mass of undigested material.

Creative effort.

*Intake* should be balanced by *output* in education. For education is not merely the assimilation of a certain amount of knowledge not otherwise obtainable; it is a method of developing power

by adjustment, a means of the expression, as well as of the furnishing, of the mind. The technique of education, like the technique of art, is absolutely subordinate to its aim, and self-expression is the most important, as well as the most universal, principle of this training, as it is also the surest evidence of spiritual activity and interest in creative work. Practice in this art is, therefore, one of the purposes which our methods of art-teaching should provide for throughout the course.

(4) Appreciation and judgment.

The last of the special methods of developing the æsthetic individuality of the pupil is the method of training the faculty of *appreciation* and *judgment*. One of the best means of promoting this aim is systematic, personally-conducted, visits to art galleries, museums, symphony concerts and, with moderation, the theatre. The value of these visits, however, will depend entirely on the previous preparation of the pupil to appreciate art-history, composition and the practice of expression. Very small, indeed, is their educational value for those whose perceptions and feelings have not been thus trained; but with this previous pedagogical preparation granted no opportunity for the training of the critical tastes and judgment could be better chosen.

Criticism.

In addition to this, the more advanced pupils should be encouraged to read, or have read to them, the criticisms of competent authors, who

have made art their specialty. A writer like Ruskin, who is a seer as well as a critic, leads the mind and heart to the intimate secrets of power and beauty in creative art, which cannot fail to influence the taste and guide the judgment to approve what is good in art and enjoy the revelation.

In these ways the judgment of taste can be trained and put to service, and the individual be trained to perceive ugliness and falsehood about him, and set to work to correct them. Perhaps a start could be made in the class room, whose æsthetic richness or poverty would serve as a vital point of contact for the practice of the pupil's critical faculty. Certainly, the average American street, often marred by vulgar advertising signs, dull and inartistic buildings, poor statuary (specially in the form of soldiers' monuments), in short by a horrible motley of ugliness, revealing an incredible lack of individuality from state to state—would furnish a wide field for the exercise of the critical faculties. Children and young people must be trained to perform this important social duty of seeking out the sources of unhealthiness and ugliness in their environment.

And it is while we are young that attention should be turned to these things; for when we come to later life, we shall, then, with fresh experience, grow continuously in the power of enjoying the human mind at its best, which will become more and more a part of our being.

Good taste is as easy to acquire as indifferent or bad taste, and is, though it costs more at first, vastly more economical in the end. There would be fewer prisons and juvenile criminals to support for one thing; and perhaps a more peaceful and harmonious industrial outlook would not be the least beneficial consequence of a population trained to enjoy beautiful things.

As an encouragement in this effort, let the reader again peruse the quotation from Ruskin at the head of this chapter.

## CHAPTER V

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### THE EDUCATIONAL VALUE OF THE DRAMA

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"Theatrical art, like every other art, has for its foundation truth — conformity with nature. The more the importance of this is felt, and the more the poet and the actor rise to the realisation of its importance, the higher will be the level attained by the stage."

—*Goethe.*

"The spectator of the drama is a far older student than the reader or the listener. The organs of sight have been the direct media through which innumerable generations of mankind have received all the knowledge and culture they ever received."

—*Hazlitt.*

## CHAPTER V

### THE EDUCATIONAL VALUE OF THE DRAMA

Two reasons may be assigned for introducing the art of drama into this discussion. First, because the dramatic impulse is one of the strongest in human nature; and secondly, because this art has played so large a part in the education of the human race. Culture, indeed, may fairly be measured by the progress of this art alone, which enlists in its service all the other fine arts, and is, in its highest state, the synthesis of them all.

That the drama does not occupy the position among educational agencies that it did in former times is a fact patent to all. Even in our institutions of higher learning it does not exert the power it once did, while contemporary drama can hardly be called *cultural*. We shall have something to say about this as we proceed. Meanwhile, we note the fact and draw the inference: To recover this noble art should be one of our most cherished aims, for the sake of both art and education.

It will be convenient in this chapter to divide our subject into four parts, as follows: (1) The nature and definition of Drama; (2) The educational significance of the chief dramatic forms,

Tragedy and Comedy; (3) The educational value of acting; and (4) The relation of the school and the stage.

## I

The Psychology  
of the dra-  
matic impulse.

The dramatic impulse is born, not made. Everyone acts as naturally as he dances or sings. Mr. Richard Mansfield, a philosophical artist of his profession, once said, "So universal is the habit (of acting) that when a man ceases to act we cease to believe in him." Drama is only the natural instinct of representation and expression, the creative motive, in one of its many embodiments.

The *psychological origin* and nature of this instinct may already be clearly discriminated in the make-believe of child's play. And this manifests itself as soon almost as it is able to control its organs and select its ideas, as soon as the sense of the fitness of action to express ideas is sufficiently developed, and that is as soon as it enters into intelligent social intercourse with others. A social medium is all that is necessary, and this is already provided in the warm sympathetic fellowship of the home and the family. Even where the environment of the child is crude and uninspiring, it will indulge its dramatic impulses, and its small efforts, besides being full of vivid perception and lifelike portrayal, will often disclose much of the passion and the more or less conscious illusion of genuine drama. In this complex of psychological activities we have the probable genesis of drama.



Illustrations abound in the now voluminous literature of childhood and primitive culture-forms. For example, Sully, in his *Studies of Childhood*, tells of a little boy, not yet four years old, who spent a whole wet afternoon painting the furniture with the dry end of a bit of rope in imitation of a workman. Tiring of this performance he then imagined himself, in turn, all the animals and heroes of whom he had heard, such as Jack the Giant-Killer, Robinson Crusoe, a bear, a lion and other wild creatures. Another fairly uniform illustration is the fascination that dolls possess for little girls, before which they pretend untold tragedies; play that they are ill, put them to bed, hold tender conversation with them, call in a doctor and a nurse, change the sheets of their beds and care for their food, just as though they themselves were the patient. Professor Brander Matthews tells of a German lady who lived for years with her *alter ego*, making a constant companion of her and getting all her new ideas from her — an obvious adaptation of the same motive. And so on.

It is through imitative and interpretative acts like these that children break into the world of routine (which soon palls) and give rein to their dramatic impulses. Thus they gain a warmer, more imaginative and really truthful insight into life, and learn by *acting* out their feelings and thoughts in make-believe.

In primitive culture, the myth, the fairy tale, the legend, the doggerel rhyme and the folk song

have served a like purpose. These culture-forms imply, to be sure, a more rhythmical and steady medium for the expression of the dramatic activities, supplying them with appropriate, if more conventional, material; but here, no less than in the more spontaneous play activity of children, we find imitative and creative elements, together with plot and action, and even gesture and emotional emphasis, not to mention also obscure indications of logical and moral ideation; in fact, all the more important elements of developed drama. The literary element alone is wanting, or weak.

As the child, like the primitive man, develops in body and mind; as its experience is better organized, as the result of the economising and harmonising of its sensations and perceptions; as education and the influence of culture modify the creative motive by bringing it into contact with more perfect art,—the dramatic impulse is still further chastened and refined, and the instinct of expression and representation is correspondingly strengthened. But it is not essentially changed.

Primitive  
drama.

Tylor is probably right in his view that the earliest formal drama arose out of the identification, on the lower levels of culture, of *dancing* and *acting*. He instances the faithful imitations, by North American Indians, of the pawing, rolling and biting of dogs and bears, in their set dances. Montegazza traces it to an original *gesture language*, which preceded speech and

writing, and Mallory's exhaustive study of the sign-language of the Indians, in which the bodily postures are used to convey ideas, lends much color to this theory. Miss Lombroso correctly observes in this connection that

"The child uses gestures first to express his thoughts and feelings, because it is at the same time the quickest and the least fatiguing method, and, when later he abandons gesture for speech, it is as a matter of economy, because the words we have continually used in his presence and hearing have become familiar to him, and he is able by their means to express with greater ease and preciseness a larger number of facts and sensations."

This induction is also probably true of primitive man, and explains in part the way the spontaneous forms of dramatic play evolved into those of the more formal literary type.

These speculations show that primitive drama was the product of primitive instincts and needs. Perhaps a better idea of these germinal dramatic forms can be gained from some illustrations. Here are two, the first taken from Grosse's collection, the second from Matthews':

Illustrations of  
early drama.

"An Aleut, armed with a bow, represented a hunter, another a bird. The former expressed by gestures how glad he was he had found so fine a bird; nevertheless he would not kill it. The other imitated the motions of a bird, seeking to escape the hunter. The hunter, at last, after a long delay, pulled his bow and shot; the bird reeled, fell and died. He danced for joy; but finally became troubled, repented having killed so fine a bird and lamented it. Suddenly the dead bird arose, turned into a beautiful woman, and fell into the hunter's arms!"

The other illustration, taken from Professor Matthews' work on *The Drama*, represents a more advanced stage, and contains an obvious resemblance to the well known episode of the attack on the Deadwood Coach by the Sioux. The drama proceeds without words:

"On a moonlight night some hundreds of spectators gathered in a clearing of the woods lighted by a huge fire, and on one side there was seated an orchestra of about a hundred women. The first scene consisted of a herd of cattle (men dressed up) which came out of the woods to pasture in the meadow. The black players had painted themselves appropriately to their characters. The imitation was skilful; the motion and behavior of each were amusingly natural. Some lay on the ground and chewed their cuds. Others stood and scratched themselves with their horns and hind feet, or licked their companions or their calves. Others rubbed one another's heads in a friendly way. After their bucolic idyl had lasted a little while, the second scene began. A band of blacks was perceived creeping upon the herd, with all the precaution which the natives used in such cases. At length they were near enough, and two cattle fell struck by spears to the highest delight of the spectators who broke out in enthusiastic applause. The hunters began to skin their prey, dress it and cut it up, with all the most painstaking exactness. The third scene opened with a trotting of horses in the woods. Immediately afterward a troupe of white men appeared on horseback. Their faces were painted a whitish brown; their bodies blue or red to represent colored shirts; and the lower parts of their legs, in the absence of gaiters, were wrapped with brushwood. These white men galloped straight up to the blacks, fired and drove them back. The latter collected again and a desperate battle began, in which the blacks beat the whites and drove them back. The whites bit

off their cartridges, fixed the caps on their guns—in short, went through all the motions of loading and firing. As often as a black fell the spectators groaned, but when a white man bit the dust a loud shout of joy went up. At last the whites were disgracefully put to flight to the unbounded delight of the natives, who were so excited that the merest trifle might have changed the sham fight into bloody earnest."

It is, of course, a far cry from these crude attempts at drama, which proceed entirely by means of gesture and acting, without words, to literary drama as we know it. But let us follow the story a little further.

Stages in the  
Evolution of  
drama.

The Greek drama, like primitive drama, grew up in close connection with the festive or ritual life of the people. It attained considerable perfection, even in its earlier forms, but finally attained the literary stage. The epics of Homer, the tragedies of Æschylus, Sophocles and Euripides, have not only worked over the old material preserved, to a great extent, by oral tradition, but they reveal a superb grasp of dramatic purpose, the result of long years of training in cognate spheres of quasi-dramatic expression, specially in the ritual festivals of Dionysius, Bacchus and other gods and of the ritual arts. Scope had thus already been provided for the exercise of many of the creative elements of drama in disconnected form; and when poetry was added to the national cultus, every possibility of high dramatic art was given. The great dramatists of Greece were the product of these forces. More—

over, her great masters went farther; for they pressed into the service of the drama the other fine arts, architecture, sculpture, painting and even music, and thus demonstrated the truth, once for all, that the drama is the greatest of the fine arts, the art where all the forms of beauty may be blended.

Influence of  
Christianity.

The dramatic instinct suffered a temporary arrest when Christianity came, bringing new spiritual motives to the life of the race, thus affording new material for the criticism and interpretation of life. At the same time the dramatic impulse was probably never more profoundly moved than it was by the Christian epic; to the core that is dramatic, even realistic in its dramatic force, and, for the time, it swept all "mere art" aside as trumpery and artifice. Every great spiritual revival performs this service for art. At such times men touch the deepest levels of the spirit, re-read the mystery of life from higher points of view, from which they never afterward wholly recede. So Christianity indirectly added new strength to art and to drama in particular.

This was felt first in the drama of the Middle Ages. Bosanquet has shown that the Renaissance, for example, as a spiritual movement, owes much to the peculiar service rendered by the Christian story in preserving the continuity of the æsthetic consciousness. The roots of that great æsthetical revival were buried deep in the soil of the Christian religion. The new religion, for one thing, carried men back to nature and

human history. It revealed a really tragical moment in the death of Christ, which became a touchstone of more humane and universal sympathy; while the tremendous moral earnestness, which saw in holiness the perfection of beauty, was a distinct advance. The old ideas of sin, punishment, atonement, heaven and hell were transformed from these new ethical standpoints. In these new motives for old convictions lay the germs of a new drama, striking examples of which are seen in the miracle and morality plays of the Middle Ages, which form an interesting link between the earlier and the Elizabethan drama, and in which new data are seen already visibly transforming the stage into a pulpit.

In the more recent developments of the dramatic impulse, specially since Shakespeare, we notice, as we might expect, when the great social upheavals of the European races are recalled, the emergence of a splendid *national* drama, taking on finer poetic and technical perfection. No great Christian race, except the American, is without its master dramatist and its triumphant national drama. The chief nations of Europe now have a noble literary drama. The influence of Greek models is visible in it; but growing as it did out of great national religious and social upheavals, it has attained a more independent and individual position, and, in Italy and France at least, attained a comparatively mature form at an early date. Many of these early attempts at drama were, however, unliterary, mere masks, in fact,

Recent developments of drama.

consisting of jesting and gesture-comedy. But wherever life is pitched to high motives, the poet "arrives," and thereafter the people have their standard literary drama. For the English race, this happened in Shakespeare.

In our time the fortunes of the drama raise many delicate and ominous questions; but its parentage cannot be mistaken, in the light of all that has gone before it. Its ancient sponsors assumed for it worthy vows, which it will be impossible for the future, however dubious, to ignore.

Definition  
of drama.

From this brief sketch we may catch a glimpse of the nature and working of the dramatic impulse, and gather the elements of a definition of the art of drama which may serve us in this discussion. We notice, then, three elements. First, the unliterary element. In its earlier forms, as we have seen, no words were used, but gestures, or imitative, interpretative action, together with stage properties, color, and other accessory aids, verisimilitude in the portrayal being conveyed chiefly by these means. Second, the literary element. This came with written language, and then only when language was so far perfected that it could be used as the medium of conveying ideas in words chosen because of their rhythmical power to move the emotions. When this happened, it became essential to the idea of drama that action and language be employed as mutually interpretative elements in the art; and the lan-



guage, if not exactly in verse, yet in a form of sufficient power, becomes the chief means of expressing its beauty and truth. Third, the element of stage-craft, of which more later. In the light of these facts, drama may be defined as *the portrayal of life by means of action and language, at once truthful and beautiful, with the aid of stage accessories that harmonise with its purpose of illusion.*

Now an art, springing so spontaneously out of the instincts of human nature and advancing, at every stage of human intelligence, to greater and greater perfection of form, could not fail to profoundly influence culture, or occupy a dubious or uncertain position in the education of human beings. Mr. Hazlitt truly says:

"The spectator of the drama is a far older student than the reader or the listener. The organs of sight have been the direct media through which innumerable generations of mankind have received all the knowledge and culture they ever possessed."

To satisfy and cultivate this ineradicable impulse of human nature, the drama was invented; to preserve it the drama should be understood. The part the school should take in promoting this aim will become more obvious as we advance.

## II

The evolution of the drama has furnished no more fruitful educational distinction than that between *tragedy* and *comedy*, whose significance we must now briefly consider.

Tragedy and  
Comedy.

This distinction came about gradually. In the beginning of art, even in early Greek art, the lyrical and epic drama, the character and the narrative play, were in a state of disorder, and remained so until reflection was brought to bear upon them, and their mutual relations and differences made clear. Professor Butcher tells us that a lyrical element survived, even in the Greek tragedies, which was often quite undramatic. And, as we have seen, in the later Elizabethan days, the stage sometimes became a pulpit from which a sermon was preached, or a platform on which a moral lecture was delivered, while the action of the play was forced to stand still. Many of the mystery and miracle plays were little else than a mixture of moral lecture, mimic pantomime and tragedy, frequently impressively conceived (as in "Everyman"), but at no time pure drama, that is, drama sustained throughout by its own action.

Influences were at work, however, even in the Grecian period, which tended to differentiate one type from another. Thus Tylor observes that:

"In Greek drama the business of the dancers and chorus was gradually separated from that of the true actors, who recited or chanted each his proper part in the dialogue, so that the player could move his audience by words of passion or wit, delivered with such tone and gesture as laid hold on all who looked or listened."

Here, probably, we have the psychological occasion for a clearer distinction between comedy and tragedy, namely, in the attempt, on the part of

the actor, to move his audience to the opposite poles of emotion, tears or laughter.

It was Aristotle who, with the work of the great Greek dramatists, specially Sophocles, before him, finally placed the distinction on a rational basis and pointed out its poetic and dramatic significance; and we cannot do better than briefly review his theory of tragedy in this connection. In the *Poetics*, which deals chiefly with the nature of tragic drama, his definition of tragedy is given in the following words:

Aristotle's  
theory of  
Tragedy.

"Tragedy is the imitation of some action that is serious, entire, and of some magnitude, by language embellished and rendered pleasurable, but by different means in different parts, effecting through pity and terror the correction and refinement of the emotions."

The reader will perceive the resemblance of this definition to the general definition of drama given on a previous page. Let us analyse it and so gradually grasp its meaning.

First, then, tragic drama is "the imitation of some action," by which Aristotle means it must have a well-defined *plot*. Commenting on this he observes:

Plot.

"Suppose any one to string together a number of speeches in which character is strongly marked, the language and the sentiment well turned — this will not be enough to produce the proper effect of tragedy; that end will much rather be answered by a piece defective in each of those particulars, but furnished with a *plot* and texture of incidents artistically constructed."

Rational development of plot.

Again, for the "proper effect" of tragedy, the plot must also be "serious, entire and of a certain magnitude." And yet it must constitute a whole easily understood, carrying weight by reason of its moral elevation and purpose; for the aim of tragedy is to impress the feelings by what is morally good, what ought to be, and *must* be, considering the characters, their roles and the action itself of the play. To produce this effect the plot must be both probable and without exaggeration; must be logical, inevitable and impressive, or the poet's invention will fail of tragic effect.

Language.

Again, the tragedy must be presented "in language embellished and rendered pleasurable by different means in different parts." The resources of poetry, rhyme, melody, and even meter, should be laid under contribution. It should not only have well regulated dialogue, but poetic form; for tragedy is not only fact, but art; it is poetic truth, not science; its aim is truth, not information. The *Oedipus*, which was Aristotle's critical model, had these characteristics; and all truly great dramatists have felt their necessity in the purest forms of this art.

Pity and terror the tragical emotions.

Again, the object of tragedy is to excite in the spectator the feelings of "pity and terror," and by their portrayal to effect "the correction and refinement of the passions." This is Aristotle's famous doctrine of *katharsis*, or purification, about which so much controversy has raged. Without entering into the merits of the many

different views held on this point, it will be enough here to note the single fact that Aristotle founded his doctrine on the dramatic contrast afforded by the struggle of human frailty against the overpowering authority of the gods, i. e., between man and fate, the portrayal of which inspires the so-called tragic "pity and terror." Greek tragedy had worked this motive to its limit, and it furnished Aristotle with abundant illustrations of his doctrine. In the *Oedipus*, for example, Sophocles has employed it with telling effect. As the reader will recall, the poet reveals his hero as the victim, the unwitting sinner, against the fates that preside over the destinies of men. Had he done otherwise, Aristotle argues, he would have raised disgust in the spectator rather than pity or terror, and so defeated the true purpose of his art.

We see the same dramatic necessity in the tragedies of Shakespeare. *Macbeth*, for instance, is the titanic play that it is because the central character portrays the inevitable consequences of blind political partisanship struggling against destiny or fate. As the plot develops Macbeth grows into a criminal of a colossal, heroic mould. He kills his king under his own roof, resorting to

"murder as if it were a legitimate political method and converts the opportunities of usurpation into a consistent practice of tyranny. The character of Macbeth thus moves us to pity and terror by the massive simplicity of his purpose and the directness of his actions."

His whole course of behavior, however, can have but one logical end. The fates are against him. His evil courses will become the ministers of his own undoing. His corrupted conscience already makes a coward of him. His deeds lead inevitably, irresistably, to the tragic *lusis*, or end. And when Macduff enters, in the last scene, bearing Macbeth's head, and says,

"Hail, King! for so thou art: behold where stands  
The usurper's cursed head;"

we are relieved that justice is done; our feelings are "corrected and refined," which is the true effect of tragedy.

From these illustrations, it will be clear that the object of tragedy is not to reconcile all the elements of a dramatic problem in a happy solution, but to move us seriously, and to "purge" our emotions of their selfish and ~~egoistic traits~~. It is essential to the proper effect of this dramatic form, then, that the evildoer, even though he act unwittingly, be destroyed, and the moral order vindicated by the manifestation of retributive justice or fate.

The nature  
of Comedy.

Comedy has had no Aristotle — a circumstance which makes it difficult to sketch its nature and limits. Indeed, no classification of these two dramatic forms can be regarded as perfectly satisfactory, in the light of the historical fact that there have been a great variety of mixtures of both. Comedy has over and over again found its

germ in the lighter scenes which have been incorporated into tragedy as a concession to the popular appetite for entertainment. The realistic drama of the Elizabethan period affords many illustrations of this, and, as we have seen, the Greek drama itself bears witness to the same mixture. Still, it is possible, and, for purposes of education, necessary, to distinguish the emotions addressed in the comedy-form of drama. Let us, at least, make the attempt.

Perhaps the most comprehensive generalisation from the facts justifies us in saying that comedy is the literary representation of the laughable or the ridiculous. In distinction from tragedy it addresses the lighter emotions, tragedy appealing to the stronger and more serious. Springing out of the same creative impulses, each takes a different course to realise its special aim, comedy dwelling on the opposition of the small to the great, tragedy of the greater to the greatest, according to the emotions addressed.

From the point of view of *content* this distinction becomes clearer. Comedy naturally finds its proper *metier* in the petty vices and peculiarities of commonplace people, in the love affairs of incompatibles, in family incident and homely pathos, in anything, in short, that bears on the superficial phases of human life. In its essence, comedy is engaged in revealing the complications brought about by the opposition of the individual to the advancing social order, of which he is a part, whose authority he seeks to set aside, and

Content of  
Comedy.

whose vindication his opposition only serves to bring about.

For example, Cervantes portrays his hero, *Don Quixote*, as a chivalrous knight, attempting feats of daring and courage in an age which has completely outgrown the forms of chivalry which he practises. The humor of the situation arises largely from the ineptness and futility of the attempt. So Scott, in *Woodstock* and elsewhere, creates many comical situations simply by portraying the excesses of Protestant sectaries against a background more advanced and stable than their own. Now, when the lesser thus masquerades as the greater interest, the result is endless contradiction and the confusion which provokes laughter.

Laughter.

Much laborious effort has been expended in the endeavor to determine the nature of laughter; but in spite of the researches of Darwin, Piderit, Spencer, Dumont, Bergson and others, no exact psychological cause can be assigned for it. What will make one person laugh will not make another do the same thing. It depends largely on the taste of the person. The fact is that the causes of the comic reaction of emotion are complex. That laughter, however, always causes pleasure is, we believe, indubitable; but it can hardly be maintained that pleasure is the sole cause of laughter. Other elements have to be considered.

Its cause.

To begin with, the comic situation to cause laughter must always possess some marked incongruity, which to our perceptions, presents



ideas in an unusual relation. Ribot rightly observes that these ideas must also be objectively given simultaneously, suggesting that a thing is and is not at the same time. Thus a monkey makes us laugh, because it reminds us of, but is not, a man. Here the simplest comic effect which causes laughter results from two ideas, those of an animal and a man, contradictory and incongruous in themselves, and possessing nearly the same importance and intensity, becoming suddenly concretely visualised.

Laughter, according to James, also involves certain vague organic feelings, which tend, at the slightest provocation, to set up involuntary reactions, resembling those assumed by the comical character. Some of these are reminiscent of pleasures long ago relegated to the reflex region of the mind, but which are ever ready to escape outwards in muscular contractions, as in tickling, and in other obscure forms of sensuous pleasure. The imitative instinct undoubtedly aids in the reproduction of these states.

There is also the curious association of laughter with the exercise of brute strength, sometimes called "horse-play." Hobbes mentions the savage laughter of the victor treading his victim under his feet, the glee of the Red Indian scalping his foe, and adds that this peculiar form of "humor" arises from "a sudden glory or conception of some eminency in ourselves in comparison with the infirmity of others or with our own formerly." We notice that children, at play, often laugh

explosively when their strength, cunning, meanness or prowess has been demonstrated against a rival. Perhaps in such fiendish delights we have instances of fiercer racial pleasures, now happily overlaid by gentle art, the fruit of civilisation and culture. The situations depicted could hardly be described now as humorous. To our way of thinking they are more cruel than laughable.

Humor.

In *humor* we have an example of a subtler and more complex emotion. According to Höffding, we have here "the sentiment of the ridiculous based on sympathy." A fuller account is given by Ribot:

"This state (he says) consists in seeing simultaneously and indissolubly the petty side of great things and events, and the great side of the most trivial things. It is the synthesis of two antithetic elements: the destructive and contemptuous laugh which makes us feel ourselves superior; and the indulgence, pity and compassion which places us on a feeling of equality with others. This emotional manifestation may be simply a passing whim, or it may be a permanent trait of character, a peculiar manner of understanding nature and human life, striking an average between optimism, which finds everything too bright, and pessimism, which sees the ugly side of everything."

The grotesque.

The *grotesque* is frequently a source of humor; but it must be remembered that a character is never grotesque or comical because it is ugly, but because it is laughable in itself, and appeals to our sympathies on that ground. There is the sharpest kind of distinction between a carica-

ture and a humorous portrayal. "Only that is truly comical," says Bosanquet, "in which the persons are comic for themselves as well as for the spectator, and escape all seriousness, bitterness or disappointment when their futile purposes are destroyed by the means they take to realise them." Shakespeare's greatest comical creation, for example, *Falstaff*, though a grotesque figure, is rightly described as "the absolute hero," though always laughable by reason of his habit of disturbing the social order, which, instead of condoning his behavior, reinforces his actions to his own hurt.

Goethe's portrayal of the character of *Mephistopheles* affords a striking example of another type called "Satanic humor." The poet, in this portrait, has merely appropriated the medieval conception of the devil and hidden him behind many human characters, through which he masquerades as a traveling charlatan, a nobleman, a magician, a rat-catcher, a showman, a doctor, a cleric, a common jester, etc. Goethe's Mephisto is humorous for his own sake, as well as for the spectator or listener; he knows he is acting a part, and fun-provoking as he often is, he is strictly true to his character as a mischief-maker. It only harmonises with the purposes of comic art that the very courses which he adopts to realise his malicious ends are self-destructive. Thus comedy, from the point of view of the lighter emotions, reaches the same resolution of its problems as tragedy, and the circle is completed.

Satanic  
humor.

We may say, then, that comedy is that type of drama whose object is to raise laughter. As distinguished from tragedy it usually has a happy ending, and throughout employs quaint situations, light dialogue and light character portrayal. It may or may not trench on the humorous and the grotesque, though when it does it approaches the farce and the burlesque, which are not essential species of comedy. It reaches its true aim by incongruity in the characters, to which the spectator instinctively feels himself superior.

Educational  
significance of  
the distinc-  
tions.

Let us now briefly indicate the educational significance and value of these discriminations. We need not delay long on this point; for it is now commonly admitted that, in the school study of English literature, the pupil should learn to appreciate and recognize objectively these characteristic species of drama. Perhaps it is not so clearly perceived that the important matter, in teaching, is to relate the whole subject to the pupil's sense of dramatic values and to his æsthetic emotions and judgment. A word or two on this point may not be unwelcome. Let us, therefore, consider briefly the advantages which the pupil should gain from this study.

Their relation  
to the love of  
literary art.

The study of drama in the two forms of tragedy and comedy should, first of all, increase the pupil's love of literature as a reflective art, and as a means of developing his powers of logical thought and feeling. The reason of this is found, of course, in the fact that the elements of drama

(character, plot, etc.) are always of a certain intensity and interest, not found in ordinary life, and therefore provocative of attention and thought.

The tragic form, because of its simpler and more didactic style, its more serious moral and æsthetic aim, makes it peculiarly serviceable for this purpose. No pupil of average capacity could be set the task of mentally recreating the series of dramatic situations portrayed in such plays, say, as *Julius Caesar* or *The Merchant of Venice*, without having his sense of æsthetic values considerably quickened, and his powers of logical thought and feeling exercised to an educative degree, while the moral effect of the study would more than justify it as a valuable form of mental discipline.

The pupil's thoughtful insight into life is thus correspondingly enlarged and refined. A mind furnished with appreciative insight into the principal characters of Shakespeare's plays, to mention our greatest dramatist, would be a gallery upon whose walls hung portraits, scenes, landscapes, full of absorbing incident and undying memories, affording not only pleasure but concrete knowledge of high value. Not the least profit that would arise from such furnishing, would be the deeper insight the pupil would gain into his own soul. One of the tragic poets of Greece has truly said:

"Wheresoe'er a man observes his fellows  
Bear wrongs more grievous than himself has known,  
More easily he bears his own misfortunes."

Influence on  
the taste of  
the student.

A second advantage of these studies is this: The pupil's *taste* is thereby refined, strengthened and purified. Of course, the better the models studied the more certain will this be the case. For good taste cannot be formed on second-rate drama, or on second-rate art of any kind. Therefore, epic drama is better food for reflection and for the taste than modern musical comedy.

No truth needs to be more stressed in this connection than this, that the crude æsthetic feelings of young people have to be purged, if we hope to obtain for them a sound criterion of good and bad taste, and, for this purpose, they need careful training according to the best models if they are to become sources of elevating pleasure and not of corruption. No period of life is so propitious for this discipline as the period when human beings are making their first acquaintance with the literary arts.

"Youth (says Professor Santayana) in these matters governs maturity, and while men may develop their first impressions more systematically and find confirmation of them in various quarters, they will seldom look at the world afresh or use new categories in deciphering it. *Half our standards come from our first masters.*"

In short, a pupil's first, fresh appreciations are the determining factors of his vital judgments of what constitutes good or bad drama for the

rest of life. Hence the educational importance of the distinctions mentioned above.

It is only thus that the masters of tragedy and comedy can become the means of self-culture to the pupil, and this fact alone should give them a premier position in the school study of literature; while, as a practical proposition, nothing seems more certain than this: that if we desire a clean and elevating drama, it must spring from the demands of those whose taste has first been trained to appreciate it in its *best* forms, and thus provided with a *criterion* of judgment between what is good and what is bad art. Towards this end the understanding of the distinction between tragedy and comedy is an indispensable contribution and valuable aid.

### III

We come now to the third point in our discussion: the educational value of *acting* plays.

From the historical point of view, acting, even in schools, has had an important influence in social evolution, which, if now fallen into desuetude, is more or less organic to any complete conception of æsthetic education. To take an illustration from the unfamiliar story of early Latin drama as practised in Germany, Dr. Ward tells us that the practice of acting dramas continued without abatement throughout the earlier half of the 16th century and after. The plays performed were largely based on classical or biblical subjects.

Acting in  
schools.

"These compositions," says Dr. Ward, "may be called school-plays in the most precise sense; for they were both performed in the schools and read in class with commentaries specially composed for them; nor was it except very reluctantly that in this age the vernacular drama was allowed to intrude into scholastic circles. It should be noted that the Jesuit order, which afterwards proved so keenly alive to the influence which dramatic performances exercise over the youthful mind, only very gradually abandoned the principle, formally sanctioned in their *Ratio Studiorum*, that the acting of plays should only rarely be permitted in their seminaries. These productions, which ranged in their subjects from biblical and classical story to themes of contemporary history seem generally to bear the mark of their authorship—that of teachers appointed by their superiors to execute this among other tasks allotted to them." Dr. Ward then adds that "the extraordinary productiveness of these dramas, and the steadiness of self-repetition which is equally characteristic of them, warn us against under-rating their influence upon a considerable portion of the nation's educational life during a long succession of generations."

This situation represents a far sounder attitude towards drama, viewed in its educational significance, than the present one.

Drama implies  
stage acting.

Now drama was created for the stage and to be acted. Whatever is artificial, whatever is unworthy or unpleasant about acting, has grown out of the perverted minds of those who have sought to control it for their own base purposes, and belongs not to the essence of the art. We shall not stop now to discuss the question of the "reformation" of the theatre. The real problem for us, as educators or students of education, is



whether acting is, or is not, *per se*, a worthy and elevating exercise of the powers of the mind, suitable for the purposes of æsthetic discipline in the school.

And this question depends on another, namely, whether a pupil is or is not capable of training in the true nature of drama and its appropriate interpretation on the stage by means of speech and gesture. It is our belief that there is a large, though neglected, educational value in dramatic acting; but as the point is in dispute, or doubted, it may be well to briefly argue the case, before we attempt to estimate its value.

And, first, let us ask: what is acting? Now, whether we take the point of view of the child, or of a finished artist like the late Mr. Richard Mansfield, the kernel of the problem is this: to realise the ideal relation between a thought and its appropriate emotional expression in action. Acting, in other words, arises from the desire, inseparable from human nature, to give expression to intense feelings and choice ideas. *Dramatic* acting is simply an instance of this desire, carried to the point where character, created mentally beforehand, calls for the imitation of action by action. No drama, therefore, is more than potentially such until it is *acted*; and in the acted drama the central problem is the conception, realisation, and expression of the relation between thought and action by action.

Nature of dramatic acting.

Controversy has raged at this point as to whether, in his endeavor to realise this relation on the stage, the actor must, besides assimilating

Are emotion and feeling essential elements of good acting

the ideas of the dramatist, also *feel intensely* the part he plays. This problem, old almost as the human race, became the subject of a heated debate in 1770, in which Diderot, the French philosopher, took the leading part. In this dispute, Diderot took the ground that a good actor will never give way to his emotions in his interpretation of drama. It is interesting to notice how he justifies this position.

Diderot's  
views.

He says that extreme sensibility in an actor betrays him into falsehood in four ways, any one of which would be enough to destroy the portrayal of the relation in question, between his conception of the role and its objective portrayal. (1) Extreme sensibility is always accompanied by a tendency to dispense with study and to rely on momentary inspiration. (2) It betrays an actor into a strong inclination to become incarnate in the dramatic character he portrays, to live in it and it alone, to feel all its emotions and endure all its agonies. (3) It also involves the temptation to become absorbed in the business of the scene, making consciousness for the time being one with it. (4) It leads him to express his own moral nature instead of that of the character intended by the author. In short, emotion is almost necessarily an evidence of the actor's weakness; it argues in him an extreme and disturbing vivacity of imagination; it discloses a morbid habit of mind, which must interfere with true and refined expression, not only in acting,

but in all art, and for that matter in life, to the extent that art *is* life.

It is, of course, true that the intellect and imagination may so control the physical organs of expression that the outward characteristics of an emotion may be portrayed without the actor's own emotions being especially aroused, i. e., by the direct action of the will on the muscles and nerves. But the disputed point is whether this view represents the *highest* æsthetic possibilities of dramatic art.

The ancient rhetoricians, Aristotle, Quintillian and Cicero, are practically unanimous against Diderot. What do the actors themselves say? Let us take two or three personal testimonials as given in Mr. William Archer's book, *Masks and Faces*, where the reader will find the subject more fully stated. The elder Salvini, probably the greatest tragic actor of recent times, an accomplished scholar and artist, delivers himself in no uncertain way on the disputed point:

Testimony  
of actors.

Salvini.

"If you do not (he says) weep in the agony of grief, if you do not blush with shame, if you do not glow with love, if you do not tremble with terror, if your eyes do not become fiery with rage, if, in short, you do not intimately experience whatever befits the diverse character and passions you represent, you can never thoroughly transmute into the hearts of your audience the sentiment of the situation."

Miss Clara Morris, an American actress of great intelligence and emotional sensibility, bears this remarkable testimony:

Clara Morris.

"You must feel, or all the pretty and pathetic language in the world will not make other people feel. I never go on the stage but that about four o'clock in the afternoon I begin to suffer. My hands get cold as ice, my face gets hot, and I am in a nervous tremor because I am afraid I shall not cry in the play. All the tremolo and false sobs in the world will never take the place of real emotion."

Beerbohm  
Tree.

Sir Beerbohm Tree, who stands in the same class as Charles Young, Macready, Keene and Irving in the British school of actors, says:

"I do not believe any emotion can be satisfactorily portrayed outwardly unless the inward emotion exists also; and I think that the effect upon an audience will generally be in proportion to the power of self-excitation possessed by the actor."

Results of the  
testimony.

These instances, which might be multiplied from Archer's collection, are enough to bring out the following points: (1) that acting involves a clear consciousness on the part of the actor of the relation of character to action; that in order to give this relation vividness, he must possess emotional and imaginative sensibility; (2) that if the audience is to be effectually moved, the portrayal of character must be based upon a sincere inward feeling of its emotional quality; (3) that no actor can produce the illusion of his role by intellect alone; it must also have that element which involves, in a peculiarly intimate way, the emotional temperament and even the moral character of the artist; and (4) that only a cold, and relatively insincere and artificial effect can result

where true emotion is absent from the actor's art.

It is not surprising, perhaps, that under the artificial conditions of the French stage, prevailing in Diderot's day, a more formal doctrine was considered truer. Those conditions tended to divorce art from life; so that the illusion of reality, which it is the business of the stage to create, came dangerously near being conscious delusion. A closer attention, however, to the dependence of action and thought on emotion in our time has led to a clearer perception of the sources of dramatic power. The intellectual conditions under which, in our time, a first class actor labors, are, moreover, more exacting than those of the eighteenth century; but the result has been a nobler conception of the art; and, in spite of obvious lapses, especially in comedy, a widening of the educational mission of the drama, especially of acting, has resulted as well.

Let us now briefly indicate the educational value of these insights. The pupils in our schools, of course, will, in most cases, never know, or need to know, anything about the subtle technical questions that confront the professional actor; but there are many opportunities in the school exercises for cultivating the taste through emotional expression, which might be improved.

Educational  
value of acting.

For instance, a valuable opportunity for studying the relation of thought to action, and its portrayal through speech and gesture, is

Rhetorical ex-  
ercises should  
be dramatically  
considered.

afforded by the rhetorical exercises, the declamations, recitations, and other literary studies of the school. These studies suffer, at present, from the lack of attention to the dramatic element. For the most part, they are nothing but feats of memory; and, indeed, they could be little else under present methods. But once the dramatic element is added to them, i. e., once the pupil is made to *feel* the sentiment, thought or character to be expressed or portrayed, the whole thing is transformed, and its educational value immediately enhanced.

The technique  
of speech.

A sincere recognition of the dramatic motive would naturally lead to other useful reforms in these æsthetic diversions of the school. It would compel belated attention to the technique of *speech*. The neglect of this is, as we have seen on a former page, a national fault. And why should it not be so?

"Neither our schools nor our colleges (says Mr. Henry James) do anything that is worth while in the teaching of the proper intonation or the correct pronunciation of words; and this neglect on the part of the schools is reflected in the home and even in so great an educational institution as the stage. The same is true of our national legislature where the average speaker enunciates and pronounces his words execrably."

There is no reason why our ear for the beauty of our language should be uncultivated and crude—a fault that could in large measure be corrected if in rhetorical speech, declamation, and so forth, if not in the acting of drama, speech were more

carefully studied in its relation to intellectual and emotional expression.

With a view to this it should be early impressed on all children that the parts of our speech, the syllables of our words, the tone of the voice, the true technique of breathing, correct vocalisation, which discriminates the shades of articulation, are among the most precious of our familiar tools. Mr. Henry Alden truly says:

"Speech forms part of our manners, and a man or woman who enunciates properly is apt to show a commendable degree of cultivation in other respects."

This is undoubtedly true; and there is no reason why this quality of good manners and taste could not be a national possession, if, in our schools, the young were trained to a right perception of the relation of emotion to expression through speech. Acting, even in the accepted elementary form of rhetorical and declamatory utterance, if not in drama pure and simple, would compel attention to this matter.

A classic play, like *Julius Caesar*, if studied with the implication with which it was written, i. e., that it was intended to be *spoken* and *acted*, would likewise serve the double purpose of training the pupil in the true expression of the emotions, and in the enjoyment of the fountains of pure English. But, so long as the relation of thought to expression, either in speech or acted gesture, is ignored; so long as the dramatic impulse in human nature is smothered by formal

memoriter teaching, soon to be forgotten, the quality of beauty in speech will be lost, and much of the pleasure of literature absolutely buried out of sight.

The actor's art has this lesson then for the school: it teaches us not to belittle accurate and refined language, language which is, as Aristotle has said, "embellished and rendered pleasurable by different means in different parts."

The bearing of all this upon the practical life will be more clearly indicated in a later chapter. Meanwhile, there is a dramatic sense in which the remark of the wit is true: "it is the syllable that rules the world."

#### IV

The School and  
the Theatre.

We come now to our last point, the relation of the school to the professional theatre, upon which a few practical remarks may be made.

The moral  
function of  
the stage.

First, the modern stage, if it is to be educational in the best sense, must be restored to its ancient position. The composers of our drama should more generally regard the theatre as a place of culture, not of mere amusement, and set themselves to compose plays that meet the demands of the ideal in this respect: plays that the people *ought* to study and approve. This is the irreducible minimum of idealism necessary to restore the modern theatre to its pristine position as a great moral force in the life of the people. So long as this ideal demand is ignored, the prejudice of large numbers, specially of religious people, against it,



will be morally justified. At present, it can hardly be contended that it fully measures up to it. The vast majority of modern plays are insipid; leaving us with no bracing sense of the supreme worth of the daily struggle. They too often fail, even with all the ingenious accessories of modern stage realism, to influence our sense of beauty or persuade our judgment, and rarely tell us anything that is one remove from the commonplace. Now, the art that does not aim to do more than please or amuse us, cannot have a high educational value. Such art dies with the occasion which calls it forth, and so far as æsthetic culture, or moral influence is concerned, is not worth while.

Good drama will also require good acting. Any improvement in the drama, therefore, creates the demand for a better educated, a higher grade, of actor; and this, in turn, implies that the public will be educated to understand what good dramatic acting means.

Good acting  
required by  
noble drama.

Given these two things, healthy, elevating drama, and good acting, the way would be clearer than it is at present for the closer correlation of the school and the theatre in the work of elevating the people's taste.

The school, meanwhile, can do much by teaching the young to admire the works of the masters and so help them to discriminate between good and bad drama, and good and bad acting. The ideal school, as we have seen, would have its own theatre, to serve as a point of contact between it

and the stage. Why should not the professional actor be occasionally seen, as in Germany, on the "boards" of the school stage, to give dramatic study both inspiration and example? Why should not the pupils also go *en masse* to a good play for the appreciation of which they have been duly prepared? This would be a wise investment of philanthropy, and do much to promote a good understanding between these two great moral institutions, which would be to the advantage of both. The pupils would thus have an object lesson of all the points touched upon in the preceding paragraphs. They would also learn to discriminate between drama and its opposite. Perhaps school plays, composed by the pupils themselves, would not inappropriately be one result of this practice.

The assistance  
of the home  
needed.

Much can also be done by the *home* as a supplementary agency in this work, specially in familiarizing the young with good drama and in educating the taste for its literary and artistic qualities. The school text books also might help; but they are, at present, specially in the primary and secondary grades, incredibly poor in dramatic substance, their psychological atmosphere inconceivably inane, when we consider the power of the dramatic instinct in children of these grades. It is not at all surprising that they fall flat and prove uninspiring to the vast majority of those who use them; that they make no appeal to the child's average sense of reality, or to the love of incident and pungent dramatic flavor, which is

the essence of the emotional life of the child. The home should, and, to a certain extent, does, make good this lack, by supplementary reading of a more stimulating sort. Parents may do valuable educational work in this connection by wisely choosing the reading of their children. They would also serve the cause by restraining their children from attendance at indifferent or low grade theatrical performances, including moving-picture shows, which can only injure the dramatic sense. That would be a great gain.

From the high schools and colleges, too, much may of right be expected from the gradual introduction into them of dramatic studies, in which the nature and kinds of drama are considered and, as already suggested, occasionally acted. These studies should, at their minimum value, enable any intelligent student to judge what is good drama and to appreciate its nobler qualities: while the practice of presenting good plays, acted sometimes, or even written, by the students themselves, after due study by the student body as a whole, would do more for the elimination of base drama, catering to the passion for amusement, than much fulmination from the pulpits and platforms. Another step in the right direction would be the establishment of special lectureships in the universities devoted to the study of drama and the theatre, and their educational interests.

Convinced as we are of the high disciplinary value of dramatic studies, and of acting in particular, and the expediency of training the people

The High  
School and  
Colleges.

to appreciate the beautiful in this noble art, it would not be unnatural if we also believed that so powerful an agency of education and moralisation as the stage deserved a more appreciative study, specially by pedagogical students, and that, so far as practicable, it should be made more generally available for educational purposes among citizens of both sexes and of all classes.

Conclusion.

We thus return to our central question once more. Is enough being done by the school, or by the dramatic profession, to bring about a higher degree of taste in this respect among the people? Is the theatre assisting the school, and, vice versa, is the school assisting the theatre, in solving the problems of public morals through the agency of drama? Is the stage holding up to us a mirror in which we may not only see ourselves as we are, but know our nobility as well? Is the drama true to nature and art? Is it subservient to ideals of high moral and æsthetic purity, strength and power? Is it inspired by the spiritual insight and energy necessary to impress and convince us of the superiority of truth to falsehood, of beauty to ugliness, of self-sacrifice to selfishness, of love to hatred?

However we answer these questions will not alter the fact, abundantly illustrated in the history of the drama, that the stage is, and is more likely to be in the future, the principal medium through which vast numbers of our people will get *the only culture they will ever receive*. Should

we not, therefore, come to understand it for its own sake, as well as for our own enjoyment and edification? Of the theatre should we not speak as of a "temple of art and beauty," and say with the poet —

"In a world of little aims  
Sordid hopes and futile aims  
Spirit of Beauty! high thy place  
In the fashioning of the race.  
In this temple, built to thee,  
We thy worshippers would be,  
Lifting up, all undefiled,  
Hearts as lowly as a child;  
Humble to be taught and led,  
And on celestial manna fed;  
So take into our lives  
Something that from heaven derives."

—*R. W. Gilder.*



## **CHAPTER VI**

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### **DEMOCRACY AND ART**

(245)

"What! it will be said, and is all this to be taught to schoolboys? No; but the first elements of it, all that are necessary to be known by an individual in order to his acting wisely in any station of life, might be taught not only to every schoolboy but to every peasant. The impossibility of equality among men; the good that arises from their inequality; the honorableness of every man who is worthily filling his place in society, however humble; the difference between productive and unproductive labor; the relation of the products of the mind and hand; the true value of works of the higher arts, and the possible amount of their production; the meaning of civilisation, its advantage and dangers; the meaning of refinement, the possibility of possessing refinement in a low station, and of losing it in a high one; and, above all, the significance of almost every act of a man's daily life, in its ultimate operation upon himself and others — all this might be, and ought to be, taught to every boy so completely that it should be just as impossible to introduce an absurd or licentious doctrine among our adult population as a new version of the multiplication table."

*Ruskin.*



## CHAPTER VI

### DEMOCRACY AND ART

Mr. Benjamin Kidd concludes his striking work on *Social Evolution* with these words: The New Democracy.

"The fact of our time which overshadows all others is the arrival of Democracy. But the perception of the fact is of relatively little importance if we do not also realise that it is a new Democracy. There are many who speak of the new ruler of nations as if he were the same idle Demos whose ears the dishonest courtiers have tickled from time immemorial. It is not so. Even those who attempt to lead him do not yet quite understand him. Those who think that he is about to bring chaos instead of order do not rightly apprehend the nature of his strength. They do not perceive that his arrival is the crowning result of an ethical movement in which qualities and attributes which we have all been taught to regard as the very highest of which human nature is capable, find the completest expression they have ever reached in the history of the race."

If this be so, as we do not doubt, then one of the most pressing problems we have to face must be that of preparing the people, to whom this new power has been given, to enter into and accept all the obligations which life imposes.

Our one truly elemental poet, Walt Whitman, who may also be claimed as *the* poet of democracy, was ceaselessly dinning into the unheeding ears of his generation the fact that the future of

democracy, so far as its vital truth and success were concerned, lay within these United States of ours, where the ideal of a free people coming into the full possession of power first had its birth. This may be, to some extent, a patriotic, if not a poetic, exaggeration; but no clear-sighted student of contemporary social tendencies can doubt that the promise which the new democracy holds out to the world depends, in overwhelming measure, for its fulfillment, upon the manner in which our people are prepared to play their part in the concert of nations, in creating the atmosphere in which this great movement can thrive and attain its end, as the latest and most momentous movement of the spirit of man.

One thing seems inevitable in view of this new situation, namely, that our hereditary educational ideals will need considerable enlargement if a free people, still wanting the elements of the finest humanities, are to attain to their highest development and to their legitimate power and happiness. They will have to include in their outlook much besides knowledge and mental discipline; something larger even than vocational training and all that that popular expression involves; because man himself, who is the subject of the educational process, is not wholly intellect and will. Many writers and observers are hopefully maintaining that the rights of personality and individuality, so much neglected in all mass movements, will reassert themselves and greatly modify our educational and social practice. Mr.

Mackaye has only recently contended that the future happiness and enjoyment of the people will depend less and less upon the mechanical drill of the school, the shop and the factory, and more and more upon all those interests which depend on emotion and the social sympathies, i. e., upon art, morals and religion. Without delaying to argue the point, we think it reasonably certain that the man who approaches life, in this new age, with an imperfect grasp upon his total resources will not measure up to the standard it is creating.

The momentous and fateful experiment in deomocratic social organisation which is now proceeding all over the world will be a failure — one of the most destructive the world has ever witnessed—unless we manage somehow to reconcile the life and labor of the people with those great humanising agencies, which hitherto have been the principal civilising influences among the nations; among which *art* has a particular claim to recognition at the present moment, because it is the freest, the most accessible and, on the whole, the easiest to understand by all the people.

The full force of this conception of the dynamic mission and function of art in the nation's training for life can only be brought out by a comprehensive use of it in interpreting current ideals. It is, therefore, the object of the following pages to indicate the several ways in which national training in art — by which I mean the social em-

bodiment of the beautiful—is destined to modify those ideals, and lead our people to a richer and happier life.

## I

Democracy  
and  
Education.

Let us begin with first things. Now, it is a truism of our academic as well as of our popular platform philosophy that *education and democracy are inseparable interests*. This is so obvious that we do not need to stop to prove it. Education holds the key to the critical situation which the arrival of Demos has created. Like any other new-born thing his greatest need is training for life.

But the question, *what kind of education* is needed to fit this "new ruler of the world" to live completely, as he should, is the one which we are anxiously debating; because keen observers have already spied decadence even in the newest and most approved types of behavior so far produced under the new conditions. Many of these leave much to be desired from a moral and æsthetic point of view. Dynamite, as a moral agency, is hardly less attractive or promising than prison ballads, even when inspired by the obvious power of genius. Without severe training, such forces become anarchic, not civilising. This (as we trust) *temporary* prostitution of power in an age of mechanism pushes us back to certain foundation principles, which must be considered, however briefly, before we can hope to straighten out the tangle in which our ideals have become enmeshed.

What, then, is the purpose of education in a democracy?

The discipline of school work may be likened to the tuning up of the instruments of an orchestra; and whether they produce harmony or discord, depends upon the question whether this preliminary work is well or ill done. Dropping the figure and stating the prosaic truth, the purpose of education and school work is to give all the people as complete an outfit of habits and ideals as, under the limitations of human nature and social life, is possible. More than this we have no right to expect of the school.

Now it is clear that the endeavor to fulfill this purpose must fail, and degeneration set in, unless it is inspired by faith in ideals, interpreted and harmonised in the light of a comprehensive reading of all the facts of human nature, and by a sympathetic, as well as rational, determination to satisfy *every need* of the same. Education must be adequate not only to meet all the normal practical demands of the individual, but it must even anticipate the emergence of unsuspected instincts which, because they *are* instincts, belong to the self-preservation of mind. The child at school is father to the man of the world; and manhood brings with it new and oftentimes entirely peculiar needs. As parent, bread-winner, citizen, friend and saint, as well as scholar, the individual needs such a preperation for life as shall enable him to grapple with problems long held sacred to the few who enjoyed unique

opportunities for culture. Man is not only a practical animal; he is even more than a being endowed with thought and reason; he has feelings, and these are often more decisive in determining his conduct, and even his material success, in life, than his powers of thought.

7 Consequently, democracy demands, for its efficiency, an ideal of education that squares with *all* the facts of human nature, an ideal large enough to meet the demands of the new spirit of the times, an ideal that will chasten and refine the new rulers of the world, who, according to Mr. Kidd, have come to stay. Given such an ideal, and also the means of realising it, the school has done *its* part, if it have vitalised it, and prepared the people to live in accordance with it. The question is, is modern democracy conscious of what it really needs? Has it any ideal of culture? Has modern education done its plain duty in fostering in the people the reverence for their own spiritual possessions, in which their richest and most enduring life consists? These questions involve us in a brief examination of the facts.

Strength and  
Weakness of  
the current  
ideal of  
Democracy.

The current democratic ideal, according to all accounts, leaves much to be desired. Indeed, there is good reason to believe that our experiments in democracy have not been consciously inspired by ideals at all, but much more by the desire of economic and material supremacy. Our aim has been the blind one of success rather than the realisation of ideals; it is *strenuous* rather

than *complete* living that has so far occupied our attention and bids fair to do for some time to come. To preserve and increase our intellectual and artistic efficiency has seemed a less worthy pursuit. We have rather been insisting on the paramount importance of attacking the problem of life as though the alpha and omega of existence were to be found in action alone. Consequently we exalt and admire the man of well-directed power, intelligence, energy, skill and pluck, without paying anything like the same amount of attention to spiritual values, culture and happiness. We preach, in season and out of season, the imperative call to each and all to play their part in the great industrial and political struggles incident to the progress of civilisation, without considering what it is that civilisation consists in, and largely without the inspiration which comes from faith in "the higher life." This is our ideal, if we have one: the ideal of strenuous social activity. Our educational aim has accordingly been to foster and develop a race of hardy citizens, capable, in limb and mind, of *work*, a race of enthusiasts, but not necessarily a race refined and subdued by ideals of goodness, beauty and truth.

Now, this ideal, while it is not without its admirable and essentially useful features, shows signs of internal weakness and exhaustion. In the first place, those who have come most fully under its spell find, sooner or later, that it is one-sided, exaggerated, and the pursuit of it nerve-

destroying and unsatisfactory. To be ever working and doing; to test every value of life by the standard of action and success, grows irksome and tedious. This is, and must always be, the case, even with those who have an unfailing fund of ambition to spur them on. The strenuous life, in other words, fails as an ideal, because it is not true to the whole of human nature. In sacrificing feeling and sentiment to the interests of thought and action, it commits a crime against nature; for it must ever be remembered, as M. Gerard observes, that "the higher aspirations of man, his moral, intellectual and æsthetic wants, are just as truly his nature as are the wants of the body."

This sacrifice has deeper consequences in national life and character, and entails losses more precious, than appear on the surface; for the loss of feeling and sentiment, or any weakening of them, means more than the loss of the creative effort, whereby poets and prophets live. It affects the entire nation, paralysing their life, crippling their aspirations and poisoning their religious faith with indifference. It means, for the people, a weakening of the powers of resistance to internal decay, a lowering of the social tone, a diminishing of the sources of happiness, and a pessimistic and anarchistic construction of destiny. All these tendencies may be observed at work in the democratic ideal of civilisation of the present day.



In the second place, this ideal seems to be, as at present interpreted, inseparable from a certain crudity of culture, an exaggerated self-assertion, a certain glorying in mere bigness and strength, even in a certain coarseness in both speech and manners, which can never be regarded as anything else than a confession of weakness. With this phase of the current democratic *Zeitgeist* we shall deal more fully later on. Meanwhile, it is pertinent for us to ask how far this weakness arises from the lack of sound training in the higher arts of life, and all they mean for civilisation? By laying so much stress on activity; by claiming the right to assert and exploit one's crude self, are we not in danger of losing the forces which have been, in all the great civilisations of the past, the sources of permanent satisfaction, the loss of which has always been the harbinger of their decline and fall — culture, faith, art, morals and religion? If this should prove to be the case, we can see what this state of civilisation must inevitably lead to — a state in which beauty and moral ideals are omitted, and the worth of life is estimated in material terms alone or in terms of mere brute force.

But, thirdly, from the special point of view of art, with which we are here chiefly concerned, the most serious criticism of the new democracy has yet to be considered. For Taine, Renan and Hartmann maintained that art inevitably degenerates in democracies, because the democratic ideal brings with it a certain bluntness or dead-

Is Democracy  
unfriendly to  
Art?

ness of feeling and sentiment. Let us consider the *pro* and *con* of this contention more in detail.

It is pointed out by these thinkers that the great art of the world has so far been produced under social conditions of an aristocratic, plutocratic, or monarchical character; that, so far, democracy, in and of itself, has produced no first rate artist; that the art of this country depends on that of Europe for its ideas and its technique, native art being unoriginal, imitative and clever, rather than creative.

They also point out that the democratic spirit is the reverse of the aristocratic, lacking the emotional and artistic atmosphere; since democracies inevitably tend to equality, in political, economic and social opportunity, while the latter tends to the establishment of the authority of genius, or the creative mind.

It is further claimed that democracies are naturally unfriendly to artists because they (the artists) live by occupations not directly productive; an artist, under democratic conditions, being compelled to labor for his living like other citizens and on the same competitive terms. Now, our philosophers claim that this requirement is fatal to the production of art. Art thrives best in conditions where there is the most liberty and independence, even of the so-called necessities of life, where the artist does not have to worry about money. The creative impulse, which is largely a matter of instinct and emotion, demands

freedom of a sort that democracies cannot provide, and never will (?) provide.

Finally, we are told that democracies do not and cannot appreciate the beautiful, because they lack the feeling for it. They do not admire and cannot comprehend noble work, nor can they sincerely admire and encourage the artist, because they do not understand either it or him.

This heavy indictment against democracy must now be met. Taking it up, first of all, link by link, we may say, in reply, that the arrival of democracy, as a serious experiment on a large scale, is a comparatively recent event, and therefore little time has been allowed, as yet, to develop and marshall its æsthetic powers for creative effort; that what may *seem* to be lacking in the quantity and quality of its art, may be more than made good in the larger opportunity, in the more opulent, novel and powerful inspirations that belong to it *in posse*. Artists, both here and abroad, have already begun to recognize the rich virgin soil we possess for the production of noble art. Even the art so far produced is far from mean; at its lowest appraisement much of it has been truly representative, and prophetic of what can be produced by a people when, by education, they are generally fitted to demand something better. In spite of the limitations of the strenuous ideal, already mentioned, we have our Hall of Fame, and if all of those who occupy niches in it are not entitled to seats on Parnassus,

The case for  
Democracy.

some of them, we would fain believe, are known to the gods.

Further, and as a mere matter of fact, we would venture to ask, have aristocratic societies always been as friendly to genius as our philosophers would have us believe? Is it not a matter of history that many of the greatest artists of the past have been condemned, by their patrons, to live in comparative poverty and obscurity, in monasteries, or as the hangers-on of some court noble or entourage? The biographies of men like Cellini and Leonardo and Michel Angelo, hardly warrant a flattering opinion of their employers, and certainly not one that can be appealed to with confidence by those who compare aristocracies and democracies in this respect. The same, we think, is generally true when we consider the contemporary and popular appreciation of art work; though here it must be admitted that the force of tradition and culture is distinctly in favor of the older societies.

But let us give our philosophers a still more comprehensive and unbiased consideration; for that there is truth in their main contention, when applied to current democratic ideals, is, as the reader will have observed, one of the deepest convictions of the present writer. The new democracy as it is developing at present is beyond all question indifferent to art, to culture, to beauty, to æsthetic and creative effort. Where our philosophers err, (and it is a fatal critical flaw in their argument) is in supposing that

human nature is *necessarily* the weak slave of current types of social organisation; that æsthetic fruitfulness is a matter of psycholological climates, of geographical environments, even of statistics, of political formulæ, of governmental, official and class influences. That these influences exert an important *secondary* power upon artists, as upon all men, no one doubts; but it is equally obvious that art may spring to life in any era, or in any country, and under all forms of social organisation, simply because the art impulse, from which art arises, is an inalienable possession of human nature, and is far more the product of *training* than of external conditions.

The force of the argument, therefore, cannot be taken to carry with it the condemnation of democracies *as such*, any more than of other forms of political organisation; but only of *both*, and, indeed, of *all* forms of social life, *in so far as they do not provide the necessary educational conditions for its development in the nation*. The criticism has point only so far as there is any failure of duty to the artistic side of human nature and its need of training.

The kernel of truth, then, in the views we have considered, is that the older societies, by reason of their age, tended to set a higher and more rigid *standard* for the art they produced than the freer and more loosely-organised society of the present day. In democracies, a higher and a lower art are permitted to co-exist and influence taste; the "masses" as well as the "classes" have their own

The truth in the criticism of current ideals.

modes and styles of artistic expression, and their own order of artist. This is not the case to the same extent in societies more rigidly disciplined. Hence among us the comic farce, the vaudeville, the moving picture, the romance of the assize court, the tales of travel and adventure, the "comic" supplements of the Sunday newspapers, flourish longer and constitute a larger part of our creative effort than elsewhere. It is often crude and frequently borders on the baser kinds of art, but not infrequently much of it is done with discrimination and taste, and satisfies the demands of an artistically immature people in a way that a higher art could not hope to do, until all are educated to appreciate something better.

Instead, therefore, of putting the blame on modern Democracy, regarded as an ideal, for any failure to produce the higher art, it would be more to the point if our critics would come to a complete understanding of what Democracy means. They would then perceive how much broader, really, are the opportunity and the motive for æsthetic activity, never, perhaps, more promising than now, *provided it is preceded by an era of national education along creative and artistic lines*. If, by any perversity of thought and practice, the new Democracy should become permanently wedded to a narrow industrialism, in which preference and power are given to material things alone and welfare is measured by the purse and not by the pulse, then the doom not only of great art, but of civilisation itself, would

be settled. Fortunately, that fatal choice has not been irrevocably fixed, and, we believe, it will not be.

At the same time, it is well for us, who are on the tidal wave of this new movement, to know how insecure our position is; how incomplete the current ideal of democratic civilisation is. Wordsworth anticipated a palpable weakness of that ideal when he said:.

"The world is too much with us; late and soon,  
Getting and spending, we lay waste our powers."

In all countries that have chronicled the arrival of Demos we find this; and it is rapidly spreading even in the mystical and romantic East. Everybody *seems* busy with nothing more important than getting, possessing and using wealth, or with controlling the means of producing it. Our pet remedy for every ill, including those of the intellect and heart, is to control "the balance of trade." This is the most serious delusion now darkening the counsels of our captains of industry and our financiers. It is still open to doubt if the great mass of the people are equally infatuated with these ingenious tricks of trade. England, the mother of all modern democracies, in spite of her Cromwells, Hamptons, George III's, and Warren Hastings, has found time and place for a Shakespeare, a Purcell, a Christopher Wren, and a Turner. As regards ourselves, we may, in some sense, congratulate ourselves that we have not yet fully achieved a democratic

ideal. Among us civilisation has rather taken the form of a modified aristocracy, tending to an oligarchy of wealth. But unlike the older democracies we have time in our favor, and there is still a precious opportunity to prepare for something better. Meanwhile, admitting the fact, as we must, that the material and commercial standard of prosperity at present exercises an oppressive authority, crippling creative effort for the time being; yet the incomplete destiny, the inexhaustible enthusiasm, the forward look of a young nation; the earnestness of our educators, and the mighty working of the forces of the Spirit in the heart of the plain people, make it probable that our current ideals of democracy will be radically modified and ultimately lead to art of the grand style, which will place beyond all cavil the truth that democracies are as friendly to art as monarchies.

Training  
essential.

This we confidently predict will be the case, *if all the people are trained to prepare for it.* This provision granted, we may trust the instincts of the people to create their own art; and this art is likely to be more universal in its outlook than the art of the past, because the genius of democracy is cosmopolitan, and more tolerant of varieties of personality, talent and genius than the art of aristocracies. The art of the future should make medieval art, specially its religious art, seem provincial. Democracies do not flatter or toady to greatness. Should not the art of democracies be reflective, therefore, of the pas-



sion of humanity and brotherhood, and should not this passion, which inspires all that is best in the new Democracy, become the spiritual basis of the future?

These and similar tremulous hopes, which imagination projects upon the film of the mind, may be realised on only one condition, namely, that *human nature is nurtured in the catholic way*; that education meets *all* the claims of the spirit, and that life be, at every point, interpreted to comprehend the whole vocation of man. Few have gripped the heart of the problem as well as our own poet, Lowell, whose lines I venture to quote in closing this brief critique of current ideals:

"This Western Giant, coarse,  
Scorning refinements which he lacks himself,  
Loves not nor heeds the ancestral hierarchies,  
Each rank dependent on the next above  
In orderly gradation fixed as fate.  
King by mere manhood, nor allowing aught  
Of holier unction than the sweat of toil;  
In his own strength sufficient; called to solve on the  
    rough edge of society  
Problems long sacred to the chosen few,  
And improvise what elsewhere men receive  
As gifts of Deity; tough foundling reared  
Where every man 's his own Melchisedek —  
*How make him reverent of a King of Kings?*  
Or judge self-made, executor of laws  
By him not first discussed and voted on?  
For him no tree of knowledge is forbid,  
Or sweeter if forbid. How save the ark,  
Or holy of holies, unprofaned a day  
From his unscrupulous curiosity

That handles everything as if to buy,  
 Tossing aside what fabrics delicate  
 Suit not the rough and tumble of his ways?  
*What hope for those fine-nerved harmonies*  
*That made earth gracious once with gentler arts,*  
*Now the rude hands have caught the trick of thought,*  
*And claim an equal suffrage with the brain?"*

## II

How æsthetic  
 education  
 would modify  
 the demo-  
 cratic ideal.

The foregoing resumé of the strength and weakness of current ideals of democracy, has, we hope, prepared the way for the freer discussion of the practical question, propounded by the lines of Lowell, — how this Western Giant is to be refined by "the gentler arts"? We have now, in other words, to justify the contention, which we have been making, that art must, along with morals and religion, be admitted to a wider influence in the cultus of the people. We ask, will it work? If so, how? What good would accrue from a more active interest in æsthetic values on the part of our educational institutions, when their programs are already overloaded, and complicated almost beyond endurance?

We shall, in replying to these legitimate demands of the practical man, endeavor in this section to indicate, in detail, some of the ways in which the training of taste might modify the habits, customs and ideals of the people, and so help to correct and refine the spirit of the new Democracy, which has arrived and assumed the controlling power for good or ill over the future of civilisation.

We may begin at the bottom, and consider the relation of this training to *health, in relieving the excessive strain of life.*

Art, the  
Reliever.

Now, that there is a therapeutical value in this training is a psychological principle now rapidly passing out of the stage of experiment. All our psychologists now recognise that the strain of mental work in one organ, or set of organs, can be relieved only by the definite and directed employment of others, or by a change in the use to which they may be put. Thus the photographer, who does a good deal of delicate and exhausting work in retouching his negatives, rests the eyes by closing the lids, or by diverting attention for awhile to other work. *He relieves one sense by working others.*

The same principle applies to perception, reasoning and volition. These activities, which are taxed in the training process sometimes to the point of paralysis, need the enlargement and rest which come from attending to the multitude of objects in nature and art, which embody truth in forms that call out the emotions, the imagination and taste, things that confront the senses and consciousness and convey to them a spaciousness, and therefore a *relieving* influence, which is health-giving.

In our schools, then, it is essential to health that stimulating studies should be offset by restful studies; the senses need change from over concentration, without the total letting-up of attention. The photographer does not use his eyes

more than the pupils in our schools; and the white paper of the text-book, or writing pad, does not help things; indeed, the dull gray of the old slate was less injurious; and it is not surprising that, under the strain, there are frequent collapses involving nausea, headache, fainting, and serious ocular evils. The absence of systematic and scientific diversion, or relief, which may be provided by æsthetic study, must partly be held responsible for this. Merely, therefore, as a contribution towards the *relief* of the great strain of modern education, and later on of life, art must be regarded as an important element of democratic efficiency.

Art and the  
Rhythm of  
work.

Again, art training has its practical bearing on *the rhythm of work*. The subtle effect of this training in the lubrication, so to speak, of the physical mechanism, escaped attention until Büchner, Scripture and others revealed its bearing on the involuntary activities, including those of the organic functions. Like all scientific discoveries, this one is seen to rest on a practical observation, namely, the fact that the performance of any series of acts, involving muscular coördination and control, is greatly facilitated by being done smoothly, economically, and with a trained sense of their rhythm. We have seen, in our second chapter, that unconsciously, yet none the less instinctively and intuitively, everyone seeks a rhythmical order of attention, habit and movement. All vital phenomena obey the

same tendency: ease of motion, harmony of co-operation, with the least expenditure of force, belong to their essence; and human beings are not less exposed to the necessity to seek, and largely to create, for themselves, under the impulse of this need, a similar rhythm in their work.

Asthetical training is an important contribution towards this end, which it promotes by injecting into the mind and its activities economy, harmony, system and order of operation, from the unique point of view, not of dialectic or passive conception, but of active intuition. Take drawing. (Music would be a better illustration, but we take the less obvious on purpose). The value of this study, when guided by æsthetical principles and ideals, consists in the demand it makes on the regulated and simultaneous activity of the eye, hand and brain, which are thus brought under central control; whereby perception is enlarged and educated in a field of beauty, and trained to function in a more harmonious, economical and rhythmical manner. A person whose senses have been steadily trained in this large yet balanced way has a keener sense, and a more intelligent insight into the economical expenditure of his forces than one who lacks this training. Without some training of this kind his acts are likely to want the fine coördination and rhythm which they require, while he who has it is quite likely not only to detect its absence in others but also to possess a practical advantage over them.

Music has even a more positive influence in this direction, owing to its more direct appeal to the sense of rhythm. No one can be cultivated in this art, however superficially, and not have his physical and mental reflexes profoundly, though perhaps unconsciously, modified. Plato, perceiving its relation to popular culture in this sense, said that no rule of music could be changed without upsetting the foundations, the rhythmical working, of the state. We can see the truth of this by studying the influence of the introduction of chromatic harmonies into modern music upon social life, or by comparing the music of Bach with that of Debussy or Strauss, or classical music with "rag-time."

It would be easy to show, by a comparative study of different countries, that where the greatest amount and the best kind of artistic culture has prevailed, there exists, on the whole, the most highly coördinated and rhythmical condition of life and labor. No social system is perfectly rhythmical, of course, and we do not indulge the silly supposition that such system ever can exist; change is the ultimate law of life; but change can be rhythmical, and we believe that it is an incontestible fact that art has been, and still is, an important factor in making for finer adaptations among human beings and for more stable social equilibrium; that social operations are always more steady and harmonious and rhythmical in their working where this is the case, as,

for example, in Switzerland, than in those ~~cases~~ where it is insufficient or ignored.

As regards this country, it is open to question whether our constantly jarring system of social operations could not be made more rhythmical if a more bracing atmosphere of art and beauty surrounded them. The moral tone of our highest social groups is none too high, certainly not so high that we can afford to dispense with a single refining influence, specially an influence so intimately connected with all routine activities as art, to preserve them sound.

Because these effects of art and art-appreciation on the rhythm of work are indirect, intangible, subjective and largely unconscious, is nothing to the point. It would be more to the point if we calmly considered whether, as Mr. Lafcadio Hearn says, the art genius of an industrial nation does not, in the end, contribute more to economic supremacy and productiveness than the abundance of its raw material or the cheapness of its labor. Milton said, "Wealth is of the heart, not of the hand. There is nothing that makes men rich and strong but that which they carry inside of them." If so, we have no right to withhold from the people the opportunity to absorb that culture, which it is the peculiar province of art and art training to bestow. To thousands who are in bondage to the industrial machine Swinburne's inspiring message might then become more than a pretty thought:

"Art, sister of sunrise and herald of life to be,  
Smiled as dawn on the Spirit of man and the thrall was  
free."

The grind of toil, at any rate, might thus take on  
a more imaginative and joyous rhythm.

Art and  
Social Aims.

Again, if art training rests the senses without letting up attention and perception; if it promotes rhythm of work, as we have just seen; it would still more obviously *open sources of ideal satisfaction to the people*, the majority of whose lives lack uplift; it would tone down, at least, the materialistic *tendency* of the times, with its love of display and power, together with the luxury and extravagance to which this love always leads. It would correct taste by making it less vulgar.

The material forces of civilisation lead us away from nature and simple dignity, and therefore, away from an ideal construction of the aims of education and life. Now, the infusion of the quality of beauty into both education and life would do much to carry the minds of the people back to the fountains of happiness and power, help them to banish the spirit of self-indulgence, and introduce them to the satisfactions that are invisible and eternal.

Writers like Ruskin, William Morris, the Rosettis and Tolstoi have long been warning us that our chief danger lies in the subordination of our ideals, moral, æsthetic and religious, to the more positive claims of industry and wealth, which have so far favored wastefulness and ex-



travagance. True, their teaching encounters the almost invincible opposition of the practical man who argues that such philosophy, if widely adopted—a philosophy that refuses to consider any divorce of art and work—would undermine ambition, tend to slacken the rate of profitable production and reduce the strain of competition, which is “the life of trade.” But in spite of the practical man, there is nothing our democratic society at present needs to be reminded of more sharply and earnestly than of the dangers, to the higher satisfactions of life, inherent in an industrial civilisation; that faith in material progress and industrial activity never has been, and never can be, a panacea.

That so many should continue to think so is a mistake full of moral consequence. Even now, with the splendid triumphs of our industrial democracy before us, it cannot be denied that the materialistic and secular ideal, which we have pursued so strenuously, has only resulted in complicating rather than in simplifying life, by multiplying unnecessary wants and confirming the spirit in such discontent and nervousness that restlessness bids fair to become a permanent feature of the American temper. Notwithstanding our great material progress we are not happy, joyous, free from anxiety, unless we, too, run the feverish race for wealth, unless we, too, have our thirst for the pleasures, which wealth alone can buy, slaked. The universal experience of this mood is that it grows the more it is indulged;

and as this nation has indulged it more than any nation known to history, there is ample justification for the criticism that we are the most unsatisfied people in the world today.

The results of such a pursuit of what is, after all, a sordid and limited ideal, have so far *not* warranted the confident expectation of its devotees. Physical disorders, premature exhaustion, the reaction of an outraged nervous system, the collapse of the human economy on the moral level, the decay of personality, are not admirable fruits of American strenuousness. We readily admit that industrial evolution has made a few men richer—so rich, indeed, that, in wealth, they stand without any parallel in the world's history—and it has also won greater freedom of opportunity for all the more fortunate ones; but it has also limited and vitiated many of the gentler and simpler pleasures of life; it has cheapened our enjoyments and made us careless of honesty and perfection in our work.

The return to nature and art in the education of the people is one of the first steps to be taken toward a completer and healthier ideal. Any ideal of education which permits or panders to the desire of extravagance in any form, in dress or in expenditure, must be false even from the economic point of view, not to mention the psychological and the historical. For nothing is gained by the individual from mere prodigality, from expenditure for its own sake, from spending wealth on that which cannot satisfy the soul; and

it is a doubtful good which compels the workers of a nation to produce articles for other people to possess or use, simply that they may rival their neighbors in the abundance of the adventitious accessories of life.

Simplicity and beauty are closely akin; and both are finer, more educational, more moral, and, strange to say, far more accessible, than extravagance and waste. In the interest, therefore, of a simpler and more truly beautiful life, both in mind and in work, art should be made a subject of universal study in our industrial democracy, and the imagination and taste of all classes should be so cultivated that all would discover in beauty and perfection of work, sources of ideal satisfaction, which would justify the ascription of art as "the Reliever."

Again, and as a consequence of the position just taken, this training should lead to *an indefinite enlargement of the mental vision and to the love of what is truest and best in life*. On this point we venture to quote the French writer, Desprièrres, who says:

Art and  
breadth of  
Vision.

"Social life, like the individual life, is a boundless one, because the moral and æsthetic horizons are infinite. Beauty, in art, in nature, in thought, assume a thousand shapes, in the humblest and the most exalted; there are, if one might so express it, innumerable degrees of beauty and it is necessary that this should be so. It has been maintained that art should be popular, democratic, accessible to all; and this is true; but any one who pretends that it should not at the same time be representative of

the *best* deceives himself and shows that he little understands the character and functions of art. . . . Art cannot thrive or achieve permanence except at the price of a sustained effort to reach the *highest* beauty; the æsthetical sentiment is extinguished when it does not attain the *best*. . . . It is therefore only when a soul finds pleasure in more thoughtful and delicate expressions of beauty that it becomes inaccessible to low and unworthy temptations; the soul that is attached to the vulgar pleasures afforded by inferior art can never resist those temptations. Intelligence, love, morality, artistic invention, talent itself declines as soon as they cease to grow. Intellectual culture, like moral culture, favors the continuous elevation of the people; *but to guide this process humanity needs the best art*, the only art that upholds and attracts to itself the uncertain and wavering crowd. Art must seek the best and at the same time aim to be a popular force; if it is to furnish us with diverse and elevating enjoyment."

This broadened vision, which the process of training in the best secures, should be found, if anywhere, in our schools. But it is precisely there that it is missing. What proportion, we may ask, of college graduates have, during their course of training, come to know the power of Beethoven, the distinction of Titian, Angelo and Valasquez, or can explain to themselves why "the old wine" of literature, specially drama, is better than the newly brewed plays of the contemporary stage? There are some who unquestionably could answer this question with insight and good taste; but the majority, we fear, would not be able, and would be unashamed of their inability.

Who is to blame? The elective system? The American atmosphere? The democratic ideal? The home? Wherever we locate the blame, our *tendency* is towards conformity to the average, and not towards the noblest and best that life affords; towards the showy, the extravagant, the complicated, the irrational-fashionable, and away from simplicity and beauty. The multitudes do not know that simple elegance is more wholesome and in better taste than cheap and elaborate imitation; that an environment provided with a few fine things, suggestive of the *best*, is really more conducive to culture in what is perfect and good, than one in which display is the rule and luxury a necessity.

It is necessary to insist on this, because an almost invincible prejudice persists in associating art and beauty with an enfeebling and soft luxuriousness. Even in schools and colleges the pursuit of the beautiful is quite often regarded as a useless, because an expensive, taste, reserved for those who have the talent and means to indulge it. On the contrary, if we wish to impart breadth of vision, soundness of morals, appreciation and pleasure, to life, it is rather by renouncing these impossible ideals of the few and learning that *the best art is always the most popular*. It is only thus that life itself can become beautiful, and conduct become, as D'Annunzio says, "a work of art to be lived in communion with men whose souls habitually seek the best."

The great masses of the people, uninitiated into these mysteries, and compelled to work without an inkling of their meaning, push on their way in the midst of environments too often unrelieved by any ray of inspiration.

"One of the greatest accusations against our industrial system (says Dr. Rauschenbuch) is that it does not produce in the common man the pride and joy of good work. In many cases the surroundings are ugly, depressing and coarsening. Much of the stuff manufactured is dishonest in quality, made to sell and not to serve, and the making of such cotton and woolen lies must react on the morals (and the taste?) of every man that handles them. There is little opportunity for a man to put his personal stamp on his work. The medieval craftsman could rise to be an artist by working at his craft. The modern factory hand ("hand"!) is not likely to develop artistic gifts as he tends his machine. The economic loss to the community by this paralysis of the finer springs of human action is beyond all computation."

The only way to avert this loss is to educate and train the finer springs of human nature. Such training, as Desprièrres says, is not for the few alone. The best in art is for the mechanic and the maid as well as for the millionaire. For all alike art has the same dawn, the same invitation; and the more perfect the art the more faithfully is its promise fulfilled. Its sunrise of noble ideals, its choice ideas, its repose and passion, its high aspiration, break upon all whose faces are turned towards it. Unless our educators and publicists wake to the realization of this truth, the increase of wealth, or welfare, among us is

only likely to darken our counsels and destroy our vision.

"Ill fares the land, to hastening ills a prey,  
Where wealth accumulates, and *men* decay."

Once more: *the education of the people's taste for beauty and perfection in art and work should bring about a more disinterested and unselfish attitude towards the problems of life, by opening to them sources of happiness which do not depend on their effort or money.*

Art induces  
a disinterested  
view of life.

It is increasingly difficult, in these days, to secure and maintain a thoroughly disinterested attitude towards any of these problems, in spite of the scientific revival; not but that science, properly speaking, naturally contributes to that spirit, but our *tour d' esprit* requires the bending, even of scientific research, to practical aims. Our people have little patience with research which offers no solution to pressing problems; philosophic comprehension, which ought to be the most coveted prize of our culture, is an extremely rare thing among us.

Hence one of the commonest criticisms heard of our democratic culture is that our thinking is superficial; ideals do not receive their proper valuation; we are impatient of the authority of the past; we clip the wings of the imagination by our rigid uniformity of education; we live by arbitrary and often absurd social conventions; we classify people according to fashionable rules, not according to their worth. In consequence

we lack the taste for what is serious, sustained and deep; we dislike "unprofitable" study, and culture is not supposed to be popular among us.

Whatever of truth there may be in this frequent criticism has undoubtedly been accentuated by the absence of art traditions among us, and by the fact that, so far, we have signally failed to produce, in the majority of our people, the habit of reflection or the desire to browse at will in the vast territories of truth and beauty with no expectation of reward except the pleasure such habits afford.

The Greeks entertained a higher ideal and were in happier case in this respect than we are. In philosophy and art they have left us an example of disinterested patriotism, of which we cannot be too mindful and which we cannot be too eager to imitate and improve. As we have before pointed out in these pages the æsthetical ideal in the Greek consciousness won for itself a place in their world-view which influenced their theory and practice of politics, ethics and religion, not to mention their science and government. From their example the world should have learned, once for all, that æsthetical ideals are a sure, perhaps the surest, measure of civilization, and cease to have original power only when the soul ceases to have the open vision of that which is perfect and good, a catastrophe which is repeated when men lose the habit of disinterested admiration and thoughtful wonder.



We, in this country, are fortunately forbidden, by the strength of our individual aims, to slavishly imitate the past, however great; but, be it observed, we have been, and still are, eclectics in all matters referring to art: we have been, and are still, living on the artistic dowry of Europe. And here lies our peculiar danger. For, under the present régime of "practical" education, we are likely to want the spirit of comprehension which alone can inspire our artists and thinkers to preserve our national individuality, while recognizing our necessary dependence on the continuity of the classic past. This is because we have paid too little attention, in the education of our people, to those ideal forces, which, though intangible, have so much to do with man's spiritual development from one age to another, central among which is the ideal of the perfect and the beautiful. The spirit of the new democracy, with its emphasis on work and wages, needs more than all else the breadth, disinterestedness, sympathy and comprehension which training in these ideals would bring to it. The average American needs deliverance from over-concentration of mental effort; he needs decentralising, — to be taught to radiate in many directions, finding interest in "unprofitable" relief studies, about which he at present knows next to nothing. *This centrifugal movement must begin in his education, and will, we predict, come into its own as a result of a renewed*

sense of the connections of art with economic changes now in process of evolution.

Influence of  
Art on  
Morals and  
Manners.

Again: *the influence of these studies in the life of the people is likely to manifest itself in their morals and manners.* The imitative principle, which M. Tarde has decisively proved to underly all social phenomena, makes it imperative, specially in a democracy, that the example of good manners be maintained in every walk of life. People tend to pattern their behavior after those with whom they are associated in school, business, trade or profession. Every craft tends towards a system of social ethics or traditional etiquette of its own, which is significant and indispensable to the initiated; but there should always be a higher standard, set by refined taste and judgment, which discriminates between what is traditional and what is real: in every social group a goal is needed which limits the strivings of humanity, requiring a wider training and a more educated sense of fitness, truth and beauty.

Americans, we know, are not without a naturally fine sense in these matters—nowhere in all the world, perhaps, is such deference paid to woman as among us, and excessive as it may be sometimes, it is the pregnant germ of all refinement in the behavior of our men. Outside of this large endowment, however, our national manners leave much to be desired, and propound a moral problem to the school which cannot longer be

evaded without serious consequences in the life of the people.

The rising generation shows a lack in this respect which is more than a mere deficiency. Their most generous champion cannot credit them with being particularly or purposely polite, obedient or deferent to parents and teachers, and subsissive to those in authority in church or state. In one particular, (the use of profane and even blasphemous language) there has been a decline, arguing, besides moral decay, a loss of fine feeling, of good ear for the beauty of the mother tongue, pointing to causes deeper than wilfulness. The causes of this phenomenon have employed the attention of moralists, but as an artistic problem Professor Lounsbury hits the point when he says:

"To a very great extent the practice of swearing is specially characteristic of a rude and imperfect civilisation. With the advance of culture profanity declines. It declines not so much because men become peculiarly sensitive to its viciousness, but they do to its ineffectiveness — the growth of refinement both in the individual and in the community. Much must be allowed in the case of particular persons for the influence of early training and association. Exceptions are, therefore, too numerous to lay down any positive rule; still, it is safe to say in general that a man's intellectual development is largely determined by the extent of his indulgence in profanity."

The growth of this evil, which now includes large numbers of women as well as men, is not a good commentary on contemporary morals and manners.

In order to correct these and similar excesses, we need in our schools a crusade in the interest of clean, artistic speech as the sure index of clean artistic thought. Manners are the flowering of morals, and both spring from refined feeling and imagination. We need to show more definitely than is our wont at present, that good manners and morals are parts of the art of living, as this is the fruit of a trained sense of what is fitting in all situations of social intercourse, private as well as public.

Art and  
Sport.

Take our sports. Perhaps there is no field of activity so important, specially in the earlier years of the citizen's training for life, as the playground. "Waterloo was won on the playgrounds of England," is more than an euphemism. All educators now admit that play has a most important bearing on the national cultus; that alertness, quickness of perception, economy of action and adaptation, accuracy of calculation, judgment, endurance, patience and self-control are among the valuable powers developed by its means. But it is not so generally understood that sport has an æsthetic and even a religious aspect which it is fatal to ignore.

Our sports just now are running the gauntlet of public criticism on the composite charge that they are honeycombed with commercialism, professionalism, vulgarity, brutality, cheating, and even prejudice. It is pointed out that these evils are inseparable from our sporting ideals and

from the American way of conducting them. Sport has been syndicated, and hence has ceased to be a purely disinterested and recreative function, and become a business or a gambling occupation. Football in particular has come in for special censure on account of its brutality. This game used to be a healthy exercise, cultivating good temper and generous feeling, but as now played it appears, to one observer, no longer as a noble pastime, but as "pugilism in the mass", with few of the vices of the prize ring absent from it. This may be an exxaggeration, but no friend of the sport will deny that, for the time being at any rate, a gallant game has been ruined.

The reformation of football, or any other of our national sports, cannot be accomplished all at once, certainly not by changing rules or by legislation. Back of all this and deeper than all rules must be the general refinement of the people in rational and refined feeling and action. The play-impulse can and must be trained on its moral and artistic sides. The Greeks did this work nobly in their athletics. Their average excellence in sport was probably higher than ours, as is that of the English and Irish to-day. In individual performances alone we excel, and then, according to Major Woodruff, chiefly by the aid of foreigners.

And the excellence of the Greeks was due more to the poetry and art which their Olympic competitions inspired than to any rules. But potent

as this influence was, the infatuation for records invaded even their contests and so spoiled them. As a recent writer has observed:

"Literature and art purified and refined athletics for a while, but at the same time by encouraging competition intensified those very evils which result from excessive competition, and when the Panhellenic movement had spent its force, and strife and faction once more resumed their sway in the Greek world, the decline of athletics was rapid. Nowhere is excess more dangerous than in athletics, and the charm of poetry and art must not blind us to that element of exaggeration in the hero-worship of the athlete. The nemesis of excess in athletics is specialisation, specialisation begets professionalism, and professionalism is the death of all true sport."

Only by refining the play-impulse, we repeat, can we prevent aminality, cunning, brutality, and professionalism from killing our sports, and rescue them from the control of the speculator and gambler. If our youth were trained to ideals of grace and dignity, honor and fairness, politeness and manliness, they would reflect these qualities in those situations where they stand most obviously on trial, in their games. In short, *refine the man*, and you necessarily refine his sport. Teach him the meaning of Emerson's remark: "A beautiful form is better than a beautiful face, but beautiful behavior is better than a beautiful form", and you necessarily transform all his estimates of what is proper and fitting in ambition and action, in sport as in any other form of conduct.

So far we have been dealing for the most part with the earlier life of the citizen. Let us now briefly consider some of *the wider and less obvious correlations of our subject with public life, with politics and industry, among others.*

Art and  
Politics.

And first, *politics*. There are many ways in which the artistic sense of the nation should avail in political life; for example, in the public discussion of important questions, in the press, on the platform and in parliamentary debate. This country has not wanted orators in the past who have wielded extraordinary influence over the minds of their fellow citizens through their oratory. George Washington was capable of a direct, dignified and noble speech; Patrick Henry, Daniel Webster and Lincoln had more passion, perhaps, but they also could wed thought and speech with felicity and beauty, thus preserving the best of our English traditions. Such a practice was a liberal education in good English for the people, aside from its influence in right feeling and thought.

Everybody who remembers and honors these traditions regrets the decline, in these days, of this art, as he must also the absence of those conditions in the schools which alone can raise a race of orators. It is a loss to our social assets that so few of our public men can set logic on fire; that so many of them are satisfied with cheap rhetoric, not eschewing even slang, and indulging in partisan feeling and special pleading; that we seem no longer capable of the "prophetic jeal-

ousy" which sets the people thinking; that they are so often half-hearted, insincere, utilitarian and self-seeking.

Some of my readers may still remember Mr. Gladstone's speeches on the Armenian atrocities. It is now a matter of history that in those speeches lay the chief cause of the moral indignation, and the revulsion of feeling, which followed in Europe upon his eloquent denunciations of the crimes of the unspeakable Turk. Phrases in those efforts have become classic, such as the characterization of the Turk as "the one great anti-human specimen of humanity." The fearful vehemence of his eloquence may be appreciated from this specimen:

"There's not a criminal in a European jail nor a cannibal in the South Sea Islands whose indignation would not rise at the recital of that which has been done, which remained unavenged, which has left behind all the foul and all the fierce passions that produced it, and might again spring up in another murderous outburst from a soil reeking with blood and in an atmosphere tainted with every imaginable deed of crime and shame."

This prophecy has been fulfilled many times and found the "Christian" nations supine and afraid. The days of such eloquence seem to have entirely disappeared; nobody seems capable of this fiery zeal in the cause of suffering humanity. Why?

Perhaps it is not correct to say that we no longer have any ear for it; but it cannot be denied that our ears are rarely gratified by hearing



or reading it. The cause of this decline of a noble art is complex. It is partly due to the decline of moral earnestness among those charged with official responsibility, partly to the advent of so-called "practical" politics, and partly to the importance of "business legislation", which leads to a more or less temporising spirit on great questions involving the moral welfare of humanity. The chief object of our politics seems to be to show the people how well off they are in purse rather than in conscience and life. To whatever cause or causes this decline may be due, there is no doubt that the loss of this art, even in the lower styles called "spell binding", is the loss of a great agency of popular culture and reform.

The citizen of taste reads his daily paper and the magazines with mixed feelings, and in proportion to his love of the beautiful art of writing and speaking he will be filled with suspicion that in the avalanche of muckraking verbiage, not only is "the still small voice" drowned, but no serious effort is made to save it from complete ruin *post mortem*. In making out a "case", truth and balance of statement, not to mention chaste and refined speech suited thereto, seem to be less important than the snap judgments which secure abundant sales; temporary advantage seems more desirable than soundness of views, bluff and noise more than conviction and correction. Now such prostitution of mental power and good taste in speech and writing can be checked only

by the education of the people to perceive the imposition of this sort of thing; that is to say, by training their taste for truth and beauty as revealed by the best models of oratorical art.

Art and  
public  
questions.

Again: *Many questions submitted to the people for consideration and political decision involve some reference to the standards of good taste, and are of such a nature that only a developed sense of the soundness of their judgment thereon can guide them to a valid opinion.* Let us suppose that the propriety of renting advertising spaces at or near one of our great national parks, like Niagara Falls, comes before them. This is not so far-fetched a proposition; for the state of New York had only recently to consider the granting of certain franchises to business concerns, asking the use of the water power of our sublimest natural phenomenon for industrial purposes. Those who have visited it of late will have observed how much of its beauty, its individuality and grandeur has been destroyed by the erection of unsightly power houses, belching forth steam, and displaying other paraphernalia of this age of mechanism. Suppose that an interested party approach a legislator to secure his vote in favor of the letting of these spaces and power. Suppose the legislator to hesitate. Here he stands between two alternatives: the permanent preservation of a sublime spectacle of power and beauty and the temporary advantage of increased comforts and "business", a situation

occurring more frequently in practical politics than is commonly supposed. How is the legislator to settle his judgment of this issue, unless he brings to its consideration a taste trained to appreciate the social as well as the æsthetical advantage to the state of so noble an object of beauty? How shall he rebuke and shun the sinister influences of the lobby? How convince the commercial agent that a franchise is not necessarily a boon to the public because a number of influential capitalists want it? How resist the temptation to degrade the forests, the streams, the mountains, as well as beloved Niagara, and thus outrage his moral sense and sow the poison of political corruption? Above all, how can he face the poetic scorn of Niagara itself, now unsightly, bereft of beauty, gradually being exhausted, and ceasing to be the inspiration of thousands of men and women who rejoice in it as one of nature's noblest works of art?

Many other instances are occurring almost daily, where our landscapes are being spoiled by the same fundamental coarseness of political taste. Mrs. Rebecca Harding Davis says:

"Almost every railway in this country is fenced on both sides by huge boardings, representing gigantic cows, pigs and other beasts, advertisements of dealers in drugs, whiskey, shoes or trousers. Behind these hideous bids for money lie tranquil valleys, landscapes as fair as any Claude painted, and sometimes vast ranges of mountains full of the peace of God. The sight of all this immeasurable beauty is hidden from the travellers who pass through the country, in order that a few dealers may sell more

tobacco and whiskey. No one protests. Trade apparently is more valuable than beauty to the average American."

I submit that questions like these are more safely handled by citizens whose moral and æsthetic sense has been developed by education than by those whose sole consideration in politics and life is business. It will be argued, perhaps, that the average American citizen is not, and never will be, qualified to form a sound judgment of artistic, or quasi-artistic, questions which his country propounds to him, questions of municipal architecture, city improvements, building of parks, the erection of statuary, etc., and that no one thinks of submitting them to him for decision or even for comment. This may be granted; but the admission does not carry with it the implication that such questions *ought* to be matters of indifference to him, or, indeed that they *now are* to those of his number whose artistic training has attained to any degree of development. And we doubt whether, where taxes are levied for public improvements, a citizen's opinion can be ignored in preference to the opinion of the business expert. The location of the town pump is not wholly a question for the mechanic to solve. It may involve the symmetry of a street, the convenience of residences, their beauty, and the good name of the townspeople. On our fundamental theory of government a citizen can only be lawfully taxed for utilities in whose creation he has had, or *may* have, a representative voice and share.

The present unfit condition of our citizens to consider and decide upon public questions involving, more or less, some reference to art and beauty, must, I think, be admitted. It is this consideration that renders him the prey of his own or others' ignorance and baser nature, as well as the sport of the corrupt politician. We do not argue that the training of the nation in art would by itself be a complete safeguard against the disfigurement of our forests, landscapes, and cities, but we most emphatically contend that it would quicken the moral sense, render us less susceptible to coarse and vulgar leadership, awaken in us values not wholly mercenary, and therefore go a long way toward redeeming our political life from the sinister influences of the selfish and sordid crowd that has so long fattened on the people's ignorance and on their own graft and greed. By emphasizing the æsthetic factor in our national culture and aims, much of the ugliness of American life might be literally *voted* out of existence. And this, as the thoughtful reader will admit, would be an immense gain to our moral welfare and happiness. At any rate an emotional element making for economy and harmony will thus have been injected into the study of political issues, and the possibility of a social adjustment that excludes disorder, selfishness and ugliness will have been advanced a step nearer realization.

## Art and War.

Still larger questions, such as the cause of *international peace*, are affected by this argument. In spite of the fact that art has glorified war, the artist is, in the nature of things, the friend of peace. Professor Mather has pictured this claim so vividly that his words may fitly be quoted here:

"If anyone imagines that the arts cannot and do not furnish most of that which makes the peaceful state not merely sensible, but delightful, let him imagine with me a state of universal peace and prosperity wholly deprived of the ministry of the arts. There would be sanitary dwellings in that land and doubtless baths and gymnasiums, but no green boulevards would bring the country into town nor would the grassy rises and skilfully arranged copses and paths of parks simulate nature in her most ingratiating aspects; for these things, though we do not realise it, are part of art. In our Utopia . . . there would be building but no architecture. Doubtless, our inæsthetic peaceful State would commemorate its dead, but neither graceful column nor jewel-like memorial window would be found in church or civic hall. Worship there would be in model ventilated churches, but vault would not be married to column . . . nor would organ or choir fill the sanctuary with calming and uplifting strains. There would be history and literature, dull statistical pages from which enthusiasm had been scrupulously eliminated. The popular novelists would write in the manner of August Comte and Karl Marx. The glory of the form of man would be interpreted solely in terms of labor, hygiene, and childbearing; the daily pageant of the sun and the progress of the seasons in terms of crops, for the sculptor and painter would be lacking. The stress of sex and the need of fellowship would persist, and people would mate as advised or permitted by the health officers, but no lover would set down in verse the glow of all who love, no song would immortalise the finer rhythms

of passion, no playwright would capture or player represent the follies, sublimities and endearing oddities of human nature. There might be a theatre coldly reflecting society, but no art of the drama, no music, no poetry. . . . Would peace on such terms be desirable or for that matter endurable? Would not mankind, virtually deprived of the hazards and joys of the imagination, to regain them, betake itself once more to the hazard and joys of war? For every ennui, head breaking would once more come into vogue."

As this writer sees, when art declines men decline. The peace problem will be solved not by diplomatic agencies alone, but by every word of rebuke that springs from the heart of man, trained to regard art not as a lovely but costly superfluity, nor war as a divine sentiment. The key to this problem is the culture of the individual soul in things of true beauty and real power.

Lastly, consider *the relation of national training in beauty and art to industrial efficiency*. To begin with, the immense field of manufacture provides the amplest of grounds for the development and application of the sense of beauty and constitutes a reason why our citizens, from the poorest to the richest, should be trained to utilize it in their arts and crafts.

In this field, as Ruskin so eloquently and persistently maintained, all work should be done for the love of it and because it is *worth doing*. William Morris and the leaders of our own arts and crafts guilds have likewise insisted that only

Art and  
industrial  
efficiency.

that work is truly useful that is vitally and permanently inspired by artistic insight. The most *useful* bridge is always the most *artistic*. No work, indeed, is idle or useless that in any way furthers economy and ease of adaptation, that, so to speak, lubricates the wheels of the social mechanism or tends to perfect its intricate and subtle workings. But this object, this freedom and spontaneity of industrial operation, can be secured and preserved only through the *art* we are competent to embody by this means. Hence all work that fails of this aim is, in the end, self-destructive, even in the narrowest economic sense, and can have but one result, namely, the uncovering of our esthetical nakedness, and thus threatens our industrial efficiency.

Instructive confirmation of this truth is constantly coming to hand in the shape of consular reports from foreign countries. From France, for example, comes the warning that the classes of goods we sell to France are entirely different from those that France sells to us. We sell for the most part raw material, while France sells us manufactured articles in almost infinite variety, the special value and attractiveness of which consists in their *artistic* superiority, their fineness of material and the good taste with which the material is worked up or the product designed. Here is a pertinent illustration of our argument. Here we see the radical difference between the industrial output of a nation that *trains* its population to appreciate the beautiful and one that



does not, with the financial odds greatly in favor of the former; for France is the richest country in the world.

Our consul in Paris, apparently awakened to the importance of this matter, and anxious for the future of American industries, in competition with such artist-nations as the French and the Japanese, says that above all other things, it is "the instinct of artistic taste, fostered and developed by education and governmental influence, until it has become a national attribute", that makes France the most prosperous nation in the world. It is, he continues, because "she commands the rarest and surest of assets—the esthetic taste which creates models and standards for other peoples and the consummate handicraft which multiplies in the product ten, twenty, or a hundred times the value of the material of which it is composed", that she maintains so high a degree of industrial efficiency. He therefore sounds the note which we have tried to sustain throughout this volume: *there must be a change in our methods of education.*

"Every consideration of economic foresight dictates that while yet the balance of natural advantage remains in our favor the foundations should be laid, deep and strong, for the *higher and more subtle industries*, the products of which are so appreciated in America and which now come almost exclusively from the old world."

America must prepare, by education, for an *artistic* revival, before this consummation can

be brought within the range of reasonable fulfillment.

Mr. Lafcadio Hearn uttered a similar warning and taught a similar lesson, with Japan as his text, when he said, "The art-genius of a nation may have a special value against which all competition by cheap labor is vain." These warnings contain a wisdom far ahead of our educational perception and practice in this country at present. The same idea had been voiced by Ruskin in England in such words as these:

"A nation or a man cannot be affected by any vice or weakness without expressing it legibly, and for ever, either in bad art, or by want of it; and there is no national virtue, small or great, which is not manifestly expressed in all the art and industry which circumstances enable the nation possessing that virtue to express."

In view of this growing importance of higher taste in industry it would be impossible to predict whether or not, as Greece conquered Rome by her art and thus conquered her conquerors, and, in large part, determined the future of Western civilization, people like the French and Japanese, possessed of a profound and developed esthetical sense (and to these we shall have to add, in the near future, the millions of China) will not, in the long run, conquer those countries whose one endeavor has been to extend their political and commercial influence, and once more change the whole character of civilization. With no more territory to seize, is not a new ethos, with *art* as

one of its central inspirations, an inevitable event of social evolution?

It is true that from Europe and the Far East we have little to fear in the line of scientific invention and enterprise; but it is equally true that these have not been the ruling forces of history. Indeed, it is only too plain that these advantages may coexist with baseness and dishonesty, fraud and graft, inefficiency and low ideals, with immorality and hypocritical religion, and their attendant evils. Once again it must be said that national efficiency depends not on wealth but on *the all-round training and character of the individual citizen*, upon his delicacy of feeling and strength of judgment, quite as much as upon his physical strength and learning. That the possession of taste and refinement is not, as is so often declared, debilitating to the nation and productive of "mollycoddles," has been abundantly proved in the case of Japan. For work or war that æsthetic nation is perhaps as well equipped as any in the world to-day. This shows that a trained instinct for beauty may be a national asset far more valuable, when united to an earnest and enlightened moral enthusiasm and patriotism, than bigness of territory or abundance of labor and high prices. Prophecy is not the sphere of this book; but these interesting possibilities of modern world-movements should warn us of the folly of neglecting our own artistic individuality, lest we capitulate to the hypnotic East and lose our hold on the future.

## Summary.

To sum up:

It is obvious, from our discussion, that esthetical education would, if made a national aim, modify the spirit of democracy in many important directions, and demonstrate that fine art and American life are not irreconcilable. We do not for a moment accept the pessimism which maintains that they are. The argument which we have put in rebuttal rests confidently on the facts of human nature and on the good judgment which, after all, controls all our social endeavors after a fuller and richer life. Facts have been presented in sufficient abundance, I hope, to show that our artistic immaturity, though undeniable, is rapidly attaining the dignity of a *conscious sense* that the provisions for creating an atmosphere of beauty should be granted. *Education is the principal agency to be relied upon in this reform*, and it devolves on our teachers and leaders to remove every occasion that impedes progress in this direction.

The inadequate provision in our system of education for art is the serious hiatus in our culture, which is more than threatened in this age; it is near being strangled. For this reason we believe American culture is not representative, and is making little or no appeal to the *best* in human nature. Our people are at present wholly unfit to produce a national art, and they will remain so until they have been trained to appreciate the disinterested love of the noble and the beautiful. Mr. A. J. Symonds says of us:

"We have huge uncultivated populations, trained to mechanical industries and money-making, aggregated in unwieldy cities or distributed over vast tracts of imperfectly subdued territory, composed of heterogeneous elements, reduced by commerce and science and politics to a complex of shrewdly-acting, keenly-trafficking, dumbly-thinking personalities, bound together by superficial education in the commonest rudiments of knowledge, without strong national notes of difference, and *without any specific bias towards a particular form of self-expression.*"

How is this *bias* towards a truly national form of self-expression to be attained except through the development of our individuality in esthetical creation? And how, without training, from the earliest faint dawn of the sense of beauty, are our people to appreciate aright their own peculiar genius and produce those objects of beauty and power, which is their highest social function? How are they, without careful special education, to view life not as a scramble for wealth and leisure, but as a whole inspired by rational ideals? How are they to set a higher value on moral beauty than on commercial success? How can they come to see life less as a problem of the higher mathematics or as demanding the cunning of the beast of prey, and more as a problem of personal culture in truth, beauty and goodness?

A partial answer to some of these questions has been given in these pages. It might also be shown that in addition to this esthetical training, modern democracy will also need more explicit moral and religious training, if it is to fulfil the

task, given to it by God and destiny, among the nations of the earth. Our plea is:

“Leave the poor  
Some time for self-improvement. Let them not  
Be forced to grind the bones out of their arms  
For bread, but have some space to think and feel  
Like moral and immortal creatures.”

## CHAPTER VII

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### THE WARRANT FOR REFORM

(301)

“Finding the world of Literature more or less divided into Thinkers or Seers, I believe we shall find also that the Seers are wholly the greater race of the two. A true Thinker who has practical purpose in his thinking, and is sincere, as Plato, becomes in some sort a seer, and must be always of infinite use to his generation; but an affected Thinker, who supposes his thinking of any other importance than as it tends to *work*, is about the vainest kind of person that can be found in the occupied classes.”

*John Ruskin.*



## CHAPTER VII

### THE WARRANT FOR REFORM

We have reached the end of our studies of the thesis with which we began. It only remains that we place the whole subject in a fitting framework of broad philosophical theory, where the particular is merged in the universal, and the practical is seen to possess the warrant and value of the ideal.

#### I

It is generally conceded that the discussion of questions relating to education, or the means and methods of education, should appeal to philosophy for their final warrant. Not all discussion of school problems, however, appeals to this court; and for two reasons among others. One is that few are capable of making this appeal, owing to the general lack of critical training. Indeed, much of the so-called discussion of education and its values is little distinguishable from the baldest empiricism or guesswork; much of which resembles the pleasant animated chatting which familiar spirits indulge on subjects in which they are mutually interested. There is nothing against this practice; indeed, it has positive value so far as it goes; but it is not a substitute for the ripper wisdom which a knowledge of philosophy supplies.

The Appeal  
to Philosophy.

Lack of  
Critical  
Training.

Critical reflection on the fundamental concepts of their profession is in fact much rarer among teachers than is commonly supposed. One has only to suggest some more or less radical modification and readjustment of the school program, or a new scale of educational values, like that of the late Mr. Thomas Davidson, to call about his ears the protests of the professional teacher, who has his *eidola tibi*, to defend which is a point of honor. Thoughtless innovation is, of course, to be deprecated, if not resolutely opposed. But many teachers have yet to learn that the *value* of any new adjustment of the machinery of education to satisfy the demands of human nature cannot properly be determined by appealing to the authority of custom and tradition; that, in the last resort, all such questions, together with said custom and tradition, must be carried to the court of sufficient reason, i. e., to philosophy.

Inertia  
of Public  
Opinion.

Besides this uncritical attitude of the professional teacher, it often happens that educational reforms are delayed through the inertia of public opinion, which is even harder to overcome than professional prejudice. A particular reform may be obviously needed, but the sentiment of those immediately affected, or in whose hands the right to effectuate reform rests, may be, and often is, behindhand with its moral and practical support.

Take the practical argument for the recognition and adoption of a more liberal attitude and policy towards the æsthetic element of education, and the development of human nature in accord-

ance therewith. Now, this may be, and, we believe, *is*, clear and indisputable: every unprejudiced person must admit our national deficiency in comparison, say, with France or Japan. But, in spite of all that is said or done, we adhere resolutely to the old view that *knowledge* is the exclusive concern of education; our theory and practice being that culture is not for the masses; that wisdom, religion, creative activity, or "ideals," need not be directly inculcated or defined, but left to the indirect influence of school discipline, to the chance influence of the teacher's personality, or to what he may, by precept or example, happen to impart to the plastic nature of the scholar. Public opinion, at least, has no direct responsibility for anything but the "practical."

If it be said, in reply to these two common Qualifications causes for delayed reforms, that they do not represent American educational philosophy, the answer is ready: American educational *practice* is inconsistent with its philosophy in this respect. For the study of art, from the strictly æsthetical point of view, is not now, and never has been, a serious concern of our national system of education, if we may be said to have any such system. It is not now and never has been a compulsory subject even in high schools, except in a few states; while in colleges and universities it is commonly relegated to the professional schools, or to the already swollen list of "electives." If the subject be not contemptuously neglected, it is

more frequently considered useless, and that for most of the tax-paying public settles the matter.

Now, if this be the right attitude towards a subject which has been in the past and might still be, under more favorable auspices, one of the most important means of national culture and civilisation, there seems to be no adequate reason for the existence of beauty, either in nature or art, and no possible relation between it and the efficient forces of spiritual life in the nation. But the question remains: is this so? Are the fine arts superfluous accomplishments, mere "frills and fads," the absence of which will not be missed? Or are they still, as they once were, necessary to a complete expression of the national life, and therefore something to be understood and valued by the people? Is Professor Laurie exaggerating when he says: "*Art is the most potent instrument of education?*" And can that nation be considered efficient, in the best sense, that lacks a trained art-instinct and a sympathetic appreciation of what is noblest in the vast field in which this instinct has hitherto found expression? Is there not even a *commercial* value in the artistic sense of a nation, which is far more precious and indispensable to it than the abundance of its raw material or its cheap labor?

he Drift  
Thought.

To ask such questions is almost to answer them. Yet public opinion, though slowly drifting in the right direction, is still unprepared to express any positive convictions on them or to take the ad-

vance steps required and recommended to make them effective. This is because we have been narrowly educated along these lines, and because we have not yet begun to apply a liberal policy of conservation to the resources of our higher life. From the indifference thus arising, there is only one court of appeal, namely, to philosophy.

It is admitted, of course, that even this final court cannot be absolutely unprejudiced. It is the easiest thing in the world for any one to resort to specious reasoning even in philosophy in support of a point of view, especially if it is apparently neglected. We are all liable to see what we *want* to see. We should, therefore, beware of setting up what might appear to be an old error under the guise of a new truth, for, as Goethe says, "There is nothing more prejudicial to a new truth than an old error." But this danger, which is a real and not a fancied one, can be successfully transcended only by an appeal to the broader and calmer spirit of philosophy, the sphere of the whole, where particular views, either of nature or reflection, which are fragmentary when taken alone, are synthesised and their individual importance critically estimated. An opinion will stand, in the last analysis, only on its own organic strength; its independence is appearance only; but so long as philosophy is as elastic as life, as rigid as truth, scientifically determined, nothing but good can come of the heralding of new views. For philosophy is not a closed dogmatic system; it must change with the progress of knowledge,

as man's mind seeks his larger self in the diversity of the world and life. The question is: will the new view *work* in harmony with the whole of knowledge of which it is a part? If it can, the province of philosophy is simply to assimilate it to its world-view as speedily and as successfully as may be.

Conservatism  
of the  
Average.

Average humanity, however, is intensely conservative. It is, therefore, not surprising that people should cling for a long time to old errors in the face of new truth. We are creatures of habit and slow adjustment. We rarely consent to take an uncertain step, inspired by enthusiasm and hope, unless we are able to see that some practical advantage is somehow thereby promoted, so that a solid foothold in reality is secured, by taking it, for each and all. At the same time, it is a great mistake to suppose that the discussion of questions dealing with educational philosophy and practice, even when they are of a highly speculative character, are of no interest to those who are not experts. As a matter of fact, the diagnosis of any physical, social or intellectual problem, — health, for example, or the tariff, or agnosticism — profoundly moves the plain man, notwithstanding the fact that it may be cumbered with hypothetical knowledge, adjusted, to be sure, to the ascertainment of some practical issue, but still theoretical and speculative in nature. Everyone instinctively philosophises.

The effort, therefore, to criticise or readjust the scale of current educational values, so as to make room for new or neglected elements, grows out of a sound instinct, the same in fact as that from which philosophy itself springs: the need of a larger practical recognition and comprehension of our spiritual resources. As it would be unwise to condemn the practice of medicine because there are quacks, or because so much bootless discussion prevails about the nature of disease, so it would be unwise to choke the critical impulse in education, when the aim is to find a fuller, more richly harmonious conception of that preparation for complete living, in which education finds its chief motive.

But, for reasons which will appear in the sequel, philosophy alone is competent to properly consider the ultimate grounds and proportionate values of current ideals of culture. To philosophy, therefore, we shall take the central thesis of the preceding chapters for final warrant, hoping thereby to overcome professional prejudice on the one hand, and the inertia of public indifference on the other.

## II

And, first, we turn to the *history of thought*. Now, in all vital and fruitful periods of reflection, the mind of man has accorded to the beautiful, whether in nature, art, or life, a prominent place among the values most worthy his serious trouble to conserve and love. We say "in all periods of vital and fruitful reflection" advisedly;

The Warrant  
of History.

for there have been periods when a great deal of labor has been expended with little or no fruit. The worst type of such a period was that of scolasticism, whose spirit has been described as one of "sterilising pedantry that avoids beauty, dreads clearness and detests life and grace, a spirit that grovels in muddy technicalities, buries itself in the futile burrowings of valueless researches, and conceals itself from human insight by the dust clouds of dessicated rubbish which it raises." Exaggerated though this estimate of the middle period of philosophy may be, it is true in the main. Unfortunately this spirit has prevailed to some extent in all periods until beaten back by the swifter and more vital intuitions of the mind. Both science and art have aided in its frequent obsequies.

Greek.  
Thought.

Three illustrations of vital philosophising on our subject will suffice to emphasise our meaning. And first, Greek philosophy. Now Greek philosophy, in its most fruitful and vital phases, accords to the beautiful a true place in its criteria of real values. This was to be expected, perhaps, in a nation which was busy producing masterpieces of beauty in several of the fine arts — in all except music — for reflection must, to be vital and productive, ever follow the creative life of the people. And the Greek people, or at least their leading thinkers, like the Italians of the sixteenth century, and others of a later day, grasped the meaning of "the life beautiful" with a courage and firmness which has never been



equalled; and in their most intense consciousness of its value they found that beauty, harmony, proportion and order, expressed the deepest message of the spirit not only in the arts, but also in science, morals, religion, politics and education as well.

Plato's philosophy, the most energetic and perfect example of this movement, is a "system" only as it somewhat loosely organised itself about his conception of the beautiful. He is the least "scholastic" thinker of that time or race, perhaps of any time or race. He developed with unrivalled force the ultimate tenets of idealism, resolving all mental aims into the three ideals of truth, beauty and goodness, and from the second, as from an immovable center, sought to harmonise man's relations with the world and God.

Plato.

The organising idea of his thought was the essential oneness of the beautiful and the good. In this conception, which logically led to an optimistic construction of the meaning of life, we have an obvious fusion of the æsthetic and moral ideals. This fusion became complete, in his thought, as he advanced to the supreme *Idea*, in which the beautiful and the good are one. This *Idea* he called The Good, the foundation and source of all being and knowledge: it is, as he expressed it, the idea "which gives to the existent its reality and, to him who knows, his capacity for reason and knowledge."

Plato is the only philosopher of antiquity who succeeded in harmonising, without exaggeration

or false emphasis,) the ultimate ideals of reason, placing them in the order of their ascending value; his doctrine of the beautiful not being an after-thought, as it has so often been among later philosophers, but an organic element of his view of life, and the balancing element of his intellectual system. If, sometimes, it seems as though beauty is exalted to an undue place of honor, this is only because it is the ideal end to which we attain by whatever path we approach life: the path from sense-perception up to ideas, which is the path of science, or the path from the will up to ideas, which is the path of conduct and morality.

The many glowing discussions on this subject scattered up and down the pages of his *Dialogues* show how vital a part of his thinking it was. Take, for example, the *Symposium* and the *Republic*, to which the *Hippias Major*, a "dialogue of research," and the *Phaedrus* and *Philebus* may be regarded as respectively introductory and supplementary. From these sources we gather that the connection of the diverse elements of existence and experience (what is sometimes called "the causal relation") is not a coldly formal one, such as the logicians often conceived it to be, but always practical in the sense of serving some beautiful or moral purpose. It is always some union of truth with beauty and goodness, which imparts to things and their "appearances" their essential connectedness; by which Plato means to say that their "energy," or latent capacity for

good, which is in everything that has value, lies in its serving some end in such a beautiful manner as to harmonize all nature with it; its final purpose is to fulfil a good aim, which is true with the outshining splendor of beauty and truth.

To fulfil the "idea" of man, for instance, a merely useful mechanical idea or purpose would not suffice. To be a good mechanic, to be useful in the world in this sense, is much, of course; but Plato would press the question, upon what does a man's usefulness depend? Ideally, upon his moral worth and upon the way he appreciates and uses the best means of proving it; and the *best* means, for Plato, is always the most beautiful. Therefore, the real value of a man is not known until we know his capacity for the beautiful. The cause of his existence is not known, any more than is that of anything in the universe, until we find the harmony of end (goodness) and means (beauty).

In the *Symposium* this note of exalted idealism is most fully sustained. One quotation will suffice to give an idea of the spirit of his reflective thinking:

"He who would proceed aright in this matter should begin with beautiful forms; soon he will perceive that the beauty of one form is akin to the beauty of another; and then, if beauty of form in general is his pursuit, how foolish would he be not to recognize that the beauty in every form is one and the same! And when he perceives this he will become a lover of beautiful forms; and next he will consider the beauty of the *mind* is more beautiful than the beauty of things outward. . . . At

length the vision will be revealed to him of a single science which is the science of Beauty everywhere . . . a thing of wondrous beauty, which is everlasting, which, without diminution and without increase, is imparted to the ever-growing and perishing beauties of all other things. . . . If man has eyes to see the true beauty, he becomes the friend of God and immortal."

This theme is continued in the *Phaedrus*, where we are told that this vision contains within it, by implication, a "reminiscence" of a previous state of existence, and is the source of whatever is purifying in the senses. It is essentially spiritual and in no way connected with the animal nature. To attain to true knowledge, therefore, he says (in the fifth book of the *Republic*) the student must (and this is quite in the manner of Schopenhauer, who borrowed from Plato here) become a sort of seer or artist, and see that all visible things are only types of eternal ideas, through which truth, beauty and goodness are reflected. The measure of all true education is the harmony and beauty which this insight alone can impart. Thus the Platonic æsthetic is at bottom a theory of the artistic education of man.

The Middle  
Ages.

The Platonic doctrine, with necessary modifications due to the advance of knowledge, was reproduced in various forms during the Middle Ages, and, at the time when the Renaissance, the second truly vital and productive period of human reflection, was at its height, it was caught up by many leading thinkers. The mode of stating the

problem is, of course, different; for each age produces its own fashions of thought; but in its essential traits, it is interpreted in much the same spirit. The scholastics could do nothing with it of any account, because the foreground of their thinking was closed to data not immediately connected with the theological interest with which they were chiefly concerned.

For a long time, therefore, philosophy lay under the hypnotic influence of the church; no future seemed in store for it except in connection with the old half-truths, partially transformed.

But the beginning of a rejuvenescence of reflective thinking, basing itself on a more liberal and sympathetic study of nature and man, duly appeared. This was the *third* fruitful era, inaugurated by Bacon, and including such names as Leibnitz, Descartes, Kant, Hegel, and the English thinkers, Locke, Berkeley and Hume.

Modern  
Thought.

It would be invidious, in this sketch, to single out for special consideration, any particular school. The interest of the movement for us lies in the general recognition of the æsthetical element, and the place assigned to the feelings and emotions in the several constructive theories of education and life which it produced. A re-statement of the problem came with these in every instance.

And why, we may ask, should it not be so? Thought, during the Middle Ages, had been under the influence of the Aristotelean logic, and had resulted in a dry and lifeless theological *a priori*-

*ism*, without real interpretative or practical significance. The power of that tradition was not wholly broken even by Kant and the critical method. Among the thinkers of that period, indeed, and to some extent down to the present, the idolatry of formal logic, as a "pure" method of knowing, was so confirmed and apparently ineradicable a habit, that the interests of feeling bade fair to be well-nigh completely stifled. Rousseau reasserts its claims; but in such a manner as to be the despair of both science and philosophy; for he exaggerates as wildly as he despises system in human education.

This tradition dies hard; hence the new humanism which, once it had taken a prominent place in human thinking, had many a hard battle of words with the old school, in spite of the fact that what is "new" in it was more a matter of method than of substance of thought.

Kant and Hegel rather strengthened than weakened the scholastic fashion of treating the problem not only by their style, but more by their exaltation of *knowledge* as the supreme problem of philosophy. They tended to regard thinking as a species of mental gymnastics to be treated apart from the contexts of individual character, feeling and will, with the result that they construct wonderful systems, based on an intellectual technique, which became the bone of contention among warring philosophical sects, propagating their dogmas more by argument than by good works.

Yet, in spite of these strictures, the philosophy of criticism cleared the ground as no previous method of thinking did for the clearer recognition of the neglected claims of feeling and taste. Both Kant and Hegel made permanent contributions to the true understanding of the beautiful. In their re-statement of the old truth they have not only reaffirmed the central facts but shown their complete harmony with the general interests of history and science properly so called.

The recent so-called "pragmatic" philosophy is too young as yet to lend itself to appraisal. Its leading exponent has explicitly declared that it is only "a new method of looking at old truth." If so, we may confidently expect that the claims of art and beauty will ultimately find the place in its purview which it occupied in Plato, who is regarded by many pragmatists as one of the chief sponsors of their school.

Pragmatism

It takes but very small perception to appreciate the fact that the author of *Creative Evolution* approaches very closely to the æsthetic world-view. A recent writer has said:

"The new world which Bergson opens to his readers is the world of organic nature seen for the first time through the creative imagination of a great literary artist and philosopher combined. Bergson recreates this world for his competent reader by showing it like a living stream issuing from the primal cosmic energy; and it is reflected in his pages with a morning freshness and promise. The novelty of his thought, the beauty and vitality of his style and the telling picturesqueness of his imagery, make the reading of his book a new experience to the student of

philosophical literature. But Bergson's philosophy does not fall upon our heads because it is buoyant with spirit; it is not a mere framework of logical concepts; it is a living, not a dead, philosophy. It is inspired with beauty. Living nature is like a work of art, and our descriptive science fails to render its true meaning, or grasp the nature of the evolutionary movement. The feelings, the perception, and the spiritual insight, that go to the making and the appreciating of a creative work are alone equal to the task."

Whatever may be the outcome of Bergson's philosophy, its æsthetic tendency will certainly never be gainsaid.

ints. In a sketch of this kind it is enough if my readers grasp the single idea, already expressed, namely that the most representative systems of thought have never sidetracked the problem of beauty. We might, it is true, consider the whole subject in our own time from other viewpoints. For example, the abundant and increasing evidence of modern scientific psychology might be appealed to. No psychologist would now consider his analysis of mental life to be worthy, or representative of the facts and laws of human behavior, without a serious attempt to describe and explain the *æsthetic* phenomena of consciousness. No one knows better than the trained psychologist in these days that human nature is incurably æsthetic; that, implicit in all mental states, are values implicating ideals of beauty, however obscurely they may be envisaged. He knows that beauty is a regulative element of the mind's be-



havior and that the mind is so constituted that it consistently seeks a harmony of thought, feeling and behavior, in which these higher values are expressed.

Logic and metaphysics, coördinate branches of philosophy, each dependent for their material content upon psychology and concrete experience, might also be invoked, if there were need, to show the pervasive influence of the æsthetic feelings, even in these abstract disciplines. Truth, indeed, is not merely a problem of logic, a question of the mere consistency and internal coherence of ideas. We attain to truth as much by feeling and intuition as by the process of argument, by poetic insight as much as by reasoning.

And as regards metaphysics, the words of Mr. Balfour may be recalled:

"Metaphysicians are poets . . . and they can only be justly estimated by those who are prepared to apply to them a quasi-æsthetic standard . . . but for them mankind would fall away in hopeless discouragement from its highest intellectual ideal, and speculation would be strangled in its birth."

The search for reality, in short, like the search for truth, implies the faith that life is not only good, but beautiful; and the "absolute" is attained only by a sort of vision, or immediate perception, luminous and transparent, in which we not only understand, but *know*, that the Supreme Experience, like the knowledge we have of ourselves, realises life as a plenum, in which perfect blessed-

ness and beauty are reconciled, and in which beauty and truth are one.

From the ethical and religious points of view, too, this position will be endorsed by every investigator not blinded by dogma. There is, whatever we may say to the contrary, an æsthetical element in morality and religion, which not only conditions our insight into the nature of conduct and its sanctions, but, in large measure, controls all our particular beliefs and judgments thereon. What we approve morally, or what we, by faith, aspire to become, must, in the last analysis, always be some imaginative ideal which possesses the quality of beauty, and which we approve as representative of our ideal of life.

Summary.

Inasmuch, then, as education is the chief means whereby the ideal of life is promoted, the determination of that ideal is all-important. Education, which proceeds without the clear consciousness of this truth is necessarily superficial, utilitarian and empirical in spirit, and therefore, on its social side, relatively barren and uninspiring.

As against this view I have argued that the school and its work must be more profoundly viewed, both for themselves and for the sake of their true efficiency; that more attention needs to be paid to what I have called "the intensive cultivation of the mind," i. e., to those areas of human nature which, at present, reveal a deficit of power; that in the more systematic use of the

forces of art, morals and religion we have the sole but adequate means of making up this loss.

These claims have been put forth with no desire or intention of disturbing the existing values or limiting the expansion of public instruction. Indeed, I go far with those who maintain that there are many things more "useful" to know than the beautiful. But I cannot see how this admission warrants a distrust of, or any indifference towards, the higher values, which our total experience, both of the past and the present, leads us to conserve with anxious care. Our national life and character cannot afford to be without one of these values. They are, and must ever be, among our most precious spiritual assets.

The school, college and university, and those trained for life under their guidance, will, if this experience can be trusted, attain their full efficiency only when they are free from distorted ideals and views; when they provide a complete training in accordance with a complete ideal of life.

When we thus consciously aim to make life beautiful, we aim also, with no trace of sectarianism, to make it also free and spiritual; and when it is beautiful, we work not on a *deficit* of power, but on a surplus, and we are led to aspire to greater things. Such a vision contains a motive that leads the mind to perceive the hindrances to real progress, to remove them, and so, once more, to give the soul the deeper satisfaction it craves.

Education that is instinct with *that* aim is the only education which meets the demands of human nature, and is thoroughly representative, rational and efficient.

Of this truth philosophy affords the highest and most durable warrant. Before this court, therefore, we rest our case, in no fear of the verdict. Beauty is justified by her defenders, who have ever found in art at least a partial way of salvation from vulgarity and selfishness. In the whole, of which beauty in nature and art is a part, she can be omitted only by doing violence to the truth of life itself.

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Each student has, or may have, his own individual way of following up the scent of a subject. In my own case this is to read everything I can lay my hands and eyes upon from all quarters, not noting down at first what I read, but gradually clarifying my mind by reflection in the light of my own slowly-evolved convictions. Hence, the list of books that follows is partial, not complete.

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
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
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
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
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